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Abstract 
In fully self-organized MANETs, nodes are naturally reluctant to spend their precious resources 
forwarding other nodes' packets and are therefore liable to exhibit selfish or sometimes 
malicious behaviour. This selfishness could potentially lead to network partitioning and network 
performance degradation. Cooperation enforcement schemes, such as reputation and trust based 
schemes have been proposed to counteract the issue of selfishness. The sole purpose of these 
schemes is to ensure selfish nodes bear the consequences of their bad actions. However, 
malicious nodes can exploit mobility and free identities available to breach the security of these 
systems and escape punishment or detection. Firstly, in the case of mobility, a malicious node 
can gain benefit even after having been detected by a reputation-based system, by interacting 
directly with its source or destination nodes. Secondly, since the lack of infrastructure in 
MANETs does not suit centralized identity management or centralized Trusted Third Parties, 
nodes can create zero-cost identities without any restrictions. As a result, a selfish node can 
easily escape the consequences of whatever misbehaviour it has performed by simply changing 
identity to clear all its bad history, known as whitewashing. Hence, this makes it difficult to hold 
malicious nodes accountable for their actions. Finally, a malicious node can concurrently create 
and control more than one virtual identity to launch an attack, called a Sybil attack. In the 
context of reputation-based schemes, a Sybil attacker can disrupt the detection accuracy by 
defaming other good nodes, self-promoting itself or exchanging bogus positive 
recommendations about one of its quarantined identities. 
This thesis explores two aspects of direct interactions (DIs), i. e. Dis as a selfish nodes' strategy 
and Dis produced by inappropriate simulation parameters. In the latter case DIs cause confusion 
in the results evaluation of reputation-based schemes. We propose a method that uses the service 
contribution and consumption information to discourage selfish nodes that try to increase their 
benefit through DIs. We also propose methods that categorize nodes' benefits in order to 
mitigate the confusion caused in the results evaluation. A novel layered security approach is 
proposed using proactive and reactive paradigms to counteract whitewashing and Sybil attacks. 
The proactive paradigm is aimed at removing the advantages that whitewashing can provide by 
enforcing a non-monetary entry fee per new identity, in the form of cooperation in the network. 
The results show that this method deters these attackers by reducing their benefits in the 
network. In the reactive case, we propose a lightweight approach to detect new identities of 
whitewashers and Sybil attackers on the MAC layer using the 802.11 protocol without using any 
extra hardware. The experiments show that a signal strength based threshold exists which can 
help us detect Sybil and whitewashers' identities. Through the help of extensive simulations and 
real-world testbed experimentations, we are able to demonstrate that our proposed solution 
detects Sybil or whitewashers' new identities with good accuracy and reduces the benefits of 
malicious activity even in the presence of mobility. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The trend of wired networking has changed recently with the emergence of sophisticated 
wireless communication technology. Technology further brought significant advancements to 
mobile computing and as a result, mobile devices have gained sufficient computation, 
communication and memory resources to become widely interconnected. These 
advancements in the field have enabled people to use their computational devices and gadgets 
while on the move. The rapidly advancing wireless technologies have allowed the creation of 
one of the important generations of wireless networks, i. e. multihop mobile ad hoc networks 
(MANETs). 
A mobile ad hoc network is a collection of nodes forming a temporary or permanent network 
without relying on any centralized architecture or control. Nodes can join or leave the 
network at any time and they can freely roam across the network. As MANETs do not rely on 
any centralized architecture, such as access points, base stations or remote servers, all the 
necessary network functionalities are performed by the nodes forming the network. Each 
node acts as a host as well as a router, relaying data to extend the range by establishing 
connectivity between the source and destination nodes that do not fall in direct range of each 
other. Distributing network functionalities, such as packet forwarding, to all the nodes 
increases robustness and avoids a single point of attack or failure. The avoidance of a 
centralized architecture also augments the MANETs' ability to support a wide variety of 
applications on low cost hardware with less time required to setup an infrastructure. Due to 
I 
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these flexibilities, it is tempting to use MANETs in situations where there does not exist a 
pre-deployed infrastructure or where it is costly to deploy an infrastructure such as in disaster 
relief scenarios, search and rescue operations, vehicular networks [1], casual meetings, video 
conferencing, personal area networks (PANs), campus networks, robot networks, and so on. 
1.2 Cooperation in Self-Organized MANETs 
In the last few years, self-organized systems have attained widespread attention in terms of 
research and deployment. These systems are typically organized according to the principle of 
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) organization, in which participants of the system have equivalent 
capabilities and responsibilities, i. e. all nodes are peers. Internet based P2P and mobile ad hoc 
networks are the two major examples of P2P communication systems. These systems have no 
centralized control and hence their main problem is cooperation. The participants are 
primarily concerned with their own benefit, because there is an incentive for peers to only 
consume network resources and services without contributing them back to the network. As a 
result, fairness and cooperation cannot be guaranteed. In a P2P context this conservative 
nature of participants is called free-riding [2-5] whereas in MANETs it is termed as 
misbehaviour or selfishness [6-10]. For example, in Internet based P2P networks, peers may 
not be inclined to provide bandwidth whereas in MANETs the users may not want to spend 
their own limited battery to forward others' packets. A promising solution to overcome this 
problem is to use reputation-based systems in order to give users some sort of incentive. 
However, due to the different characteristics of P2P and MANET systems, reputation-based 
schemes developed for them are different. MANETs are organized according to the same 
principle as P2P, i. e. nodes are autonomous (independent of any infrastructure), decentralized 
and self-organized. However, they have some special issues that are not present in P2P 
networks, such as limited battery power, mobility, wireless links, the broadcast nature of 
transmissions and the provision of packet forwarding services [I I]. Due to these different 
characteristics of MANETs, we are not going to discuss reputation-based systems that have 
been proposed for P2P systems. Throughout this thesis, we will only discuss reputation-based 
schemes that have been developed for MANETs. 
1.2 Cooperation in Self-Organized MANETS 3 
Most of the routing protocols developed for MANETs, such as Dynamic Source Routing 
(DSR) [12], Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV) [13] and Destination-Sequenced 
Distance-Vector (DSDV) [14] are based on the multihop assumption: each node must 
cooperate and forward other nodes' packets to extend the range and enhance network 
performance. The multihop assumption is valid for closed or managed MANETs where 
nodes belong to a single authority (such as the military); however, this assumption may not 
be properly followed in a fully self-organized open MANET where nodes have their own 
domains and objectives. Since data transmission is the most expensive function in a wireless 
environment as compared to other functions such as data processing, nodes are naturally 
reluctant to spend their precious resources forwarding other nodes' packets and can therefore 
exhibit selfish or sometimes malicious behaviour in open MANET environments. Nodes that 
utilize the services provided by other nodes but that do not contribute their services to the 
network with the intention to save their resources are called selfish nodes. This is also called 
misbehaviour because selfish nodes do not follow the predefined duties of the network, for 
instance, relaying other nodes' packets. This selfish behaviour of nodes could potentially lead 
to network partitioningI and network performance degradation. Some authors, such as 
Agrawal et al. [15], have shown that a small percentage of selfish nodes can disrupt the 
whole network and severely degrade network performance. One can object that regular users 
don't usually have the appropriate skills and knowledge to modify the software or hardware 
functionalities for their own goals or interests and act selfishly. Hubaux ei al. [ 16] answers 
this by pointing out that "criminal organizations can have enough interest and resources to 
reverse engineer a node and sell tampered nodes with modified behaviour on a large scale. " 
To enforce cooperation and discourage misbehaviour of nodes in MANET, three2 major 
schemes have been proposed: a) Reputation-based, b) Trust-based and c) Credit based 
models. By utilizing the past behaviour of end-users, reputation and trust based schemes 
enable a node to decide whether other nodes are trustworthy and cooperative. Eventually 
'By partition here we mean logical partitioning, which is not the same as topological (physical) partitioning. 
These logical partitions cause service holes in the network. 
2There is another category of schemes, called Game Theoretic models, but we will not discuss them in this Thesis. 
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nodes having high reputation or trust are given services and nodes having low reputation or 
trust are isolated from the network. In credit-based schemes nodes usually pay for services; 
payments are made in the form of virtual currency. Nodes are buyers and/or sellers of the 
packet forwarding services. Nodes require credit to forward their packets. 
Credit-based models are not scalable because they need a centralized virtual bank to regulate 
the transactions. Apart from the central virtual bank each node is equipped with tamper proof 
hardware for enhanced security. Due to these reasons credit-based schemes are not suitable 
for MANETs. Reputation or trust-based models on the other hand do not need any centralized 
entity or any tamper proof hardware and hence can be implemented in a fully distributed 
manner to increase scalability, thereby making them much more suitable for use in MANETs. 
Since our focus is on reputation-based schemes, we will not discuss credit-based schemes 
further, for a detailed survey interested readers are referred to Agrawal et al. [17] and 
Mandalas et al. [18]. 
1.3 Issues in Reputation-based Schemes 
In the last decade, substantial research has been undertaken on the important issue of how to 
enforce cooperation in mobile ad hoc networks. Reputation/trust-based and credit-based 
models are the major cooperation enforcement models that have been proposed in the 
literature for mobile ad hoc networks. Due to the distributed nature of reputation-based 
systems, they are deemed to be a promising solution to enforce cooperation in MANETs. The 
main purpose of these schemes is to ensure that selfish nodes bear the consequences of their 
misbehaviour. However, after being quarantined, these discredited nodes apply certain 
strategies in order to escape the consequences or increase their benefits thereby promoting 
lack of accountability in the network. These nodes can exploit certain weaknesses of the 
MANETs, such as free identities available to them, or weakness of the reputation system, 
such as the fact they detect identities but not distinct nodes, or take advantages of mobility in 
order to escape consequences. Due to these issues, cooperation enforcement schemes must be 
secured for best results. The following sections detail the major issues or strategies that 
selfish nodes can maliciously apply for their own benefit. 
1.3 Issues in Reputation-based Schemes 
1.3.1 Direct Interactions 
5 
A selfish node after being detected by a reputation-based system as a misbehaving node can 
still obtain benefit (throughput and utility) by interacting directly with the source or 
destination nodes of their communication by exploiting mobility. This gaining of benefit can 
occur due to the fact that there is no intermediate node along the path to drop the selfish 
nodes' data packets. Packet dropping is the strategy used by reputation-based schemes to 
decrease selfish nodes' throughput and utility. The direct interactions (DIs) have the effect of 
significantly improving the overall throughput and utility of both the good nodes as well as 
selfish nodes. DIs therefore cause two main problems. First, the detected selfish nodes can 
strategically select locations where they can directly interact with their source or destination. 
As discussed above, the motivation here is not to let the intermediate nodes be involved in the 
communication because, in reputation-based systems selfish nodes are isolated from the 
network by the intermediate nodes. Second, since high DIs can cause increased overall 
throughput and utility of a network, the confusion might be caused during the reputation- 
based systems evaluation, if they are not taken into account. For example, DIs make it 
unclear whether the increase in good nodes' throughput and utility is due to the efficiency of 
the reputation-based scheme or it is due to the high DIs produced in the network. 
1.3.2 Identity based Attacks 
Like every detection scheme, reputation-based systems require identities to be persistent as 
well as distinct. The persistence characteristic of identity implies that identities will be for 
long term use, in other words the lifetime of an identity should be long enough to make it 
hard for a selfish node to use it for short-term benefits. Otherwise a selfish node can simply 
discard an identity to escape the punishments imposed due to a poor reputation. The 
distinctness of identity implies that there will be only one identity tied to a single physical 
device or, conversely, a node should not be able to create more than one identity on a single 
physical device. For example, communications in wireless networks are usually based on a 
unique identity that represents a network entity: a node. Identities are used as an address to 
communicate with a network entity. This forms a one-to-one mapping between an identity 
and an entity and that is usually assumed either implicitly or explicitly by many mechanisms; 
hence two identities implies two distinct nodes [19]. Unfortunately malicious nodes can 
Introduction 6 
illegitimately claim multiple identities and violate this one-to-one mapping of identity and 
entity philosophy. Douceur [20] termed this as a Sybil attack, in which an attacker manages 
to create and control more than one identity on a single physical device. 
In order to impose identity persistence and distinctness a variety of methods have been 
proposed which is discussed in Section 3.6. One common technique is to use centralized 
Trusted Third Party (TTP), as proposed by Hoeper and Gong [211, which is responsible for 
the identity management in the network. However, due to the centralized nature and costly 
configuration, in terms of money and initial setup, these systems are not suitable for 
MANETs. Lack of identity persistence and distinctness can cause a variety of problems in 
reputation-based systems, which we consider below. 
As mentioned above, one of the main purposes of reputation-based schemes is to let selfish 
nodes bear the consequences of their bad actions. However, the open nature of MANETs 
enables a malicious or selfish node to change its identity and start again with a fresh (new) 
identity; in this way a selfish node whitewashes its previous misbehaving history. This is 
called a whitewashing or identity changing attack. Non-persistent identities make it difficult 
to hold malicious or selfish nodes accountable for their actions. 
In the context of reputation-based schemes, a Sybil attacker can disrupt the detection 
accuracy by defaming other good nodes, self-promoting itself or exchanging false positive 
recommendations about one of its quarantined identities. Perrig et al. [22] identified the 
following security protocols of ad hoc networks that can be affected by Sybil attacks. 
" Distributed Storage: A Sybil attack can disrupt the architecture where data is usually 
replicated or fragmented on several nodes, one such example is the use of distributed 
hash tables, because in reality data will be stored on Sybil identities generated by the 
same malicious node. 
" Routing: in those routing mechanisms where nodes are supposed to be disjoint, as is 
the case in multipath routing and location based routing, are affected by Sybil 
identities because one node will be on various paths and/or in different locations at the 
same time. 
1.3 Issues in Reputation-based Schemes 7 
" Data Aggregation: In a sensor network due to the lack of resources, data is often 
aggregated to one node. A Sybil node can change the whole aggregation reading 
outcome by contributing many times as a different user. 
" Voting: In ad hoc and Peer-to-Peer networks decisions can be made using voting; 
however in this case a Sybil node can control the result by rigging the polling process 
using multiple virtual identities. 
" Misbehaviour Detection: In misbehaviour detection schemes a Sybil node can 
increase its reputation, credit, or trust value and can decrease the same value for the 
other legitimate nodes by exploiting its virtual identities. Eventually this can diminish 
the detection accuracy of intrusion detection systems. 
" Traffic Congestion in a Vehicular Ad hoc Network (VANET): A malicious attacker can 
create the illusion of traffic congestion by spreading false information in a VANET. A 
malicious attacker can create an arbitrary number of virtual non-existent vehicles and 
transmit false information in the network to give a phoney impression of traffic 
congestion and eventually un-necessarily divert traffic [23]. 
1.3.3 The Difference between Whitewashing and Sybil Attacks 
The main difference between whitewashing and Sybil attacks is the notion of simultaneity. 
The whitewasher creates new identities while discarding its previous identity, hence only one 
identity is up at a time in the network. The Sybil attacker, on the other hand, creates and 
controls identities but simultaneously without discarding its previously active identities. 
Some of the authors, for example Tangpong et al. [24] consider them both as Sybil attacks 
with two flavours, viz. either the creation of identities one-by-one or simultaneously; 
regardless of their applications, which are different (as discussed above). Our proposed 
methods in this thesis for thwarting these attackers are to deter and detect every new identity 
created by these attackers, regardless the nature of their creation i. e. simultaneously or one- 
by-one. Due to this reason, the work presented in this thesis is mainly focussed on 
whitewashing and all of the simulation-based and testbed experiments that we present are for 
whitewashing attacks. However, our proposed schemes can equally be applied for the 
counteraction of Sybil attacks as well. 
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These attackers can get identities by two ways. First, they can fabricate identities (for 
example, creating an arbitrary identifier). Second, they can use stolen identities, i. e. spoof the 
identity of a legitimate node in the network. In this thesis, we assume the first case where 
nodes can create arbitrary identifiers because in MANETs, there are no restrictions on 
identity creation. 
1.4 Aims and Objectives 
Reputation-based schemes like other cooperation enforcement schemes have been proposed 
to counteract selfish nodes by detecting them and ensuring them bear the consequences of 
their bad actions. However, selfish nodes can escape the detection or still gain benefits after 
being detected. In essence, these schemes are not secured and malicious nodes can apply 
certain strategies to make their detection and punishment mechanism ineffective. The aim of 
this thesis is to provide security for reputation-based systems in order to make them detect 
and isolate malicious nodes effectively. So that malicious nodes may not bypass the detection 
mechanism by interacting directly with their sources or destinations, changing identities 
(whitewashing) or creating more than one identity on a single physical device (Sybil attack). 
Since identity-based attacks are more serious than the direct interactions, we will deeply 
focus on them by proposing a layered security approach that incorporates two line-of- 
defences, i. e. proactive and reactive security paradigms. The countermeasures proposed for 
these attacks should be distributed and should not involve any trusted third party for their 
operations, in order to make them suitable for open MANET environments. The following 
are objectives for achieving our aim. 
" In order to tackle the issue of Dls, we will look at Dis from two different perspectives 
or facets: (i) reputation system security and (ii) bias in their experimental results. In 
the reputation system security perspective, we will look at how to thwart or 
discourage those selfish nodes that are trying to increase their benefit by strategically 
choosing locations so that they can interact directly with their source or destination. In 
the second one, we will investigate the effect of DIs on certain metrics in mobile 
environments. Furthermore, we will propose methods to reduce the effect of DIs and 
resolve the confusion that would otherwise be caused. 
1.5 Novel Contributions 9 
" Identity-based attacks, such as whitewashing and Sybil attacks, pose a serious threat 
to the fair and successful working of reputation-based schemes. For example, a 
whitewasher can bypass detection by simply switching over to a new identity. A Sybil 
attacker can disrupt the detection accuracy by defaming other good nodes, self- 
promoting itself or exchanging false positive recommendations about one of its 
quarantined identities. Counter measures need to be developed for whitewashers and 
Sybil attackers to safeguard reputation-based schemes. As a first line-of-defence, 
these attackers should be discouraged in a way that does not cause extra overhead for 
the system. However, if attackers still dare to attack the system, a second line-of- 
defence should be in place to detect and isolate such malicious nodes in the network. 
Regarding these attacks, we will look into the following questions in this thesis. Are 
these attacks a threat to the system? Can these attackers be discouraged or detected 
using efficient methods? What are the techniques in the literature proposed to 
counteract them and what are their flaws? Are the existing proposed methods suitable 
for MANETs? Can they be thwarted using a layered security approach? 
1.5 Novel Contributions 
" We propose a method that uses service contribution and consumption information of 
nodes in order to discourage those selfish nodes that try to increase their benefit using 
DIs. Whereas, for DIs that are not caused by selfish nodes but caused by mobility and 
inappropriate simulation parameters, we first investigate their effect on certain metrics 
that are usually used in reputation systems evaluation, such as throughput, utility, 
network overhead and delay. We propose proactive, pre-simulation measures in order 
to reduce them in simulations and also propose to categorize throughput and utility to 
mitigate the confusion caused by DIs during evaluation. We adopt a widely used 
reputation-based scheme, called CONFIDANT [25-26] as our case study for our 
extensive simulations of DIs. As far as we are aware, no previous work has 
considered this issue in such context. Rather, some authors, such as [27] demonstrated 
that mobility can increase network throughput in the presence of selfish nodes; 
however, they did not show the reason of direct interactions and its consequences. 
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The idea (along with a survey on reputation-based schemes) has been published and 
given in Appendix E (E. 3 and E. 5). 
" We propose a non-monetary fee based scheme for MANETs that acts as a deterrent 
for whitewashing attacks, acting as a first line-of-defence of our layered security 
approach. Rather than trying to detect whitewashing attacks, we approach the problem 
in a novel way by removing the advantages that whitewashing can provide. In our 
proposed scheme, each node must pay an entry fee to consume network services. As 
monetary fees are not suitable for MANETs due to certain problems such as fee 
management complications, rather than a monetary fee we use a fee in the form of 
cooperation, i. e. packet forwarding. Fee imposition makes whitewashing costly (in 
terms of battery power) for an attacker, the same is the case with Sybil attackers; 
hence an attacker can perform fewer whitewashes or generate fewer identities within 
the limits of its battery capacity. Furthermore, this form of fee enforcement will also 
improve the overall system performance (i. e. network throughput and utility). The 
simulation results show that our scheme work better than the widely used reputation- 
based scheme, called CONFIDANT, in discouraging the attackers by reducing their 
throughputs and utilities. We published this idea as listed in Appendix E (E. 1, E. 4 and 
E. 6). 
" We propose a lightweight approach to detect the new identities of whitewashers and 
Sybil attackers, as a second line-of-defence of our layered security approach. The 
scheme works on the MAC layer using the 802.11 protocol without the need for any 
extra hardware. We investigate the received signal strength of a node to distinguish 
between a legitimate new node and a whitewasher's new identity. We conducted 
several experiments to show that a signal strength based threshold exists which can 
help us detect a whitewasher's identities. We demonstrate through the help of 
extensive simulations and real-world testbed of Sun Spot sensors that our proposed 
solutions improves the overall system performance thereby detecting such malicious 
nodes with good accuracy and reducing further their benefits even in the presence of 
mobility. Part of the idea has been published and given in Appendix E (E. 2). 
1.6 Thesis Organization 
1.6 Thesis Organization 
This thesis is organized as follows. 
11 
Introduction (Chapter 1): in this chapter we highlight the potential issue of selfishness in 
self-organized MANETs and the main schemes to counteract this issue. We then discuss the 
security issues of reputation-based schemes, such as direct interactions, whitewashing and 
Sybil attacks. Finally we outline the aims and novel contributions of the thesis and thesis 
organization. 
Background (Chapter 2): this chapter encompasses preliminary information about general 
network security and includes some discussion about why traditional network security 
techniques are not appropriate for use in mobile ad hoc networks. Furthermore, we discuss 
routing modes of operation in mobile ad hoc networks, describe in detail the Dynamic Source 
Routing protocol (DSR) and discuss the threats posed to ad hoc routing protocols including 
the packet relay problem and selfishness. Finally, we discuss the main ad hoc network 
simulators used in the research community for protocol evaluation. 
Cooperation Enforcement in MANETs (Chapter 3): this chapter covers cooperation 
enforcement schemes: reputation/trust and credit based schemes. Among these schemes we 
discuss which of these is more promising for use in MANETs. Finally, the limitations of the 
current schemes and the countermeasures for the Sybil and whitewashing attacks are 
discussed. 
A General Reputation System (Chapter 4): in this chapter we discuss the basic building 
blocks of our proposed reputation-based scheme i. e. the monitor, reputation system and path 
manager. Finally, we evaluate the scheme in order to confirm its working because we use this 
system for our layered security approach. 
The Effect of Direct Interactions (Chapter 5): in this chapter we demonstrate through 
simulation experiments the effect of direct interactions on reputation-based schemes. We 
adopt the widely used reputation-based scheme to evaluate this and identify the common 
misjudgements that may be caused by such direct interactions. We propose methods to 
mitigate its effect whether it is caused by inappropriate simulation parameters or a selfish 
node strategy. 
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Deterring Whitewashing in MANETs (Chapter 6): in this chapter we demonstrate where 
in the reputation range a whitewasher node can obtain the most benefits. We then propose a 
novel approach to discourage whitewashing by reducing these benefits. We show through 
simulation that our scheme works better than CONFIDANT in reducing the evil nodes' 
throughputs and utilities in the network. 
Detecting Whitewashing in MANETs: A Reactive Approach (Chapter 7): we use a cross- 
layer approach to detect the new identities of whitewashers and Sybil attackers on the MAC 
layer using the 802.11 protocol without the need to use any extra hardware. Investigating the 
received signal strength of a node, we distinguish between a legitimate new node and a 
whitewasher's new identity. Through extensive simulations and real-world measurements, we 
show that our proposed solution improves the overall system performance thereby detecting 
such malicious nodes with good accuracy and reducing further their benefits even in the 
presence of mobility. 
Conclusions and Future Work (Chapter 8): we conclude in this chapter by summarizing 
our research contributions and discuss future work. 
Chapter 2 Background 
In this chapter we will give a brief overview of network security and shed light on the 
concepts, components and protocols used throughout the rest of this thesis. In addition to the 
traditional network security, we will also review the security requirements of mobile ad hoc 
networks, their implications and the challenges in making them secure. Since routing is an 
important mechanism, especially for ad hoc networks where nodes act as a host as well as a 
router, for making a network operational; we will overview the modes of operation used by 
the routing techniques in mobile ad hoc networks with an elaboration of the Dynamic Source 
Routing (DSR) protocol that we use in this thesis. Furthermore, we will briefly describe the 
threats that endanger the routing process including the issue of selfishness and its 
consequences in terms of network performance degradation. Finally, we discuss various 
network simulators that are available to simulate MANETs. 
2.1 Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs) 
A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is a collection of nodes forming a temporary or 
permanent wireless network without relying on any centralized architecture or control. As 
shown in Figure 2-1, the nodes could be laptops, mobile phones, PDAs, web-enabled cell 
phones and so on. Nodes can join or leave the network at any time and they can freely roam 
across the network. As MANETs do not rely on any centralized architecture, such as access 
points, base stations or remote servers, all the necessary network functionalities are 
performed by the nodes forming the network. Each node acts as a host as well as a router, 
13 
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relaying data to extend the range by establishing connectivity between the source and 
destination nodes that do not fall in the direct range of one another. Distributing network 
functionalities such as packet forwarding to all the nodes increases robustness and avoids the 
creation of a single point of attack or failure. The exemption of a centralized architecture also 
augments the MANET's ability to support a wide variety of applications on low cost 
hardware with less time required to set up. Due to this flexibility, it is tempting to use 
MANETs in situations where there does not exist a pre-deployed infrastructure or where it is 
costly to deploy an infrastructure such as in disaster relief scenarios, search and rescue 
operations, vehicular networks, casual meetings, campus networks, robot networks, and so 
on. 
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Figure 2-1: Mobile Ad hoc Network 
The main characteristic of MANETs is that they are self-organized networks, since there is 
no central authority; nodes autonomously form the network quickly without any human 
intervention. The network autonomously determines its own configuration parameters: 
routing, addressing, etc. Another important characteristic of MANETs is the ability of a node 
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to move freely while remaining connected to other nodes in the same network. However, 
nodes in these networks may be mobile, static or a mixture of both. 
2.2 A Succinct Review of Network Security 
In this section we skim through the basic security services that have been addressed in the 
research community over the years [10,28-30]. 
Confidentiality maintains the secrecy of a message, even if the data travels via an insecure 
medium. It ensures the security of the content of a message communicated between 
authorised parties. The content of the message should not be disclosed to another party except 
to the sender and the receiver. Attacks on confidentiality include message interception, 
release of message contents to other parties, etc. as shown in Figure 2-2 (iii). 
Confidentiality is difficult to maintain in mobile ad hoc networks due to the broadcast nature 
of the wireless links, which facilitates eavesdropping. As a result of this, various security 
mechanisms, including key distribution, are more difficult. 
Authentication is an important service that verifies the identities of sending and receiving 
parties. The main attack on authentication is the masquerading attack- an attacker pretending 
to be a legitimate user. It is harder to detect such attackers in mobile ad hoc networks because 
there is no central authority controlling certificates and key distribution for identity 
authentication. A distributed authentication service is required in such networks. 
Integrity of a message ensures that the message should not be modified in any sense 
including addition, deletion, introduction of unnecessary delays, etc. by unauthorized parties, 
as shown in the Figure 2-2 (iv). 
Access Control ensures only legitimate users have access to resources. It restricts services, 
resources or data to users according to their access rights. It also enforces authorisation. To 
attack access control, an attacker can use masquerading, message interception and 
modification, or fabrication. The absence of infrastructure and random mobility makes it 
harder to detect corrupted nodes in a mobile ad hoc network. Some kind of distributed 
authentication management service is therefore needed to ensure access control. 
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Availability ensures that services or devices are always available. An attack for disrupting 
availability is called a denial of service (DoS) attack which can be achieved by interruption of 
data, interruption of the network or overloading the server, as shown in Figure 2-2 (ii). One 
of the potential issues in mobile ad hoc networks is that nodes are usually low powered 
devices, so they can easily be attacked by sleep deprivation (keeping the CPU of a device 
engaged until the battery is exhausted) or incorrect packet forwarding that can cause a DoS 
attack. 
Non-Repudiation is the ability for preventing a sender or a receiver of a message denying 
the sending or reception of a message. An attack on non-repudiation is masquerading. 
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2.3 Security Implications of MANETs 
Wireless communications enables users and organizations to enjoy various functions, such as 
portability, flexibility and low installation costs, which they may not enjoy using traditional 
wired networks. Apart from these advantages, wireless communication also creates a new set 
of security implications. Some of these implications are the same as those for wired networks, 
some are caused by the wireless connectivity itself, and some are new, as (these implications 
are) pointed out by D. Djenouri et al. [101. Srivatsa [311 categorises them as follows. First, 
the main risk in wireless networks is the broadcast nature of wireless connectivity itself 
which makes it easier for an adversary to eavesdrop on data or inject bogus data into the 
network. Second, the devices usually used in wireless networks are resource constrained, 
having limited bandwidth, memory, computational power, and battery power. They are a 
palatable target for a powerful adversary because they cannot use heavy cryptographic 
mechanisms for power saving reasons. Third, the absence of a centralized Trusted Third 
Party (77P) or a certification authority in a wireless ad hoc network induces challenges for 
efficient trust and identity management. Fourth, in the case of ad hoc networks nodes are 
assumed to be cooperative and will relay others' packets; however a selfish or a 
compromised node may violate this assumption. Fifth, nodes in wireless networks are more 
vulnerable to physical security threats than those of wired networks, such as an enterprise 
server, because nodes in wireless networks are portable handy devices and may be easily 
stolen. 
Security in MANETs is more challenging because apart from the lack of infrastructure, 
mobility of nodes causes ad hoc networks to have a dynamic, continuously changing 
topology. Furthermore freedom of movement offers flexibility for the potential attackers to 
move across the network to search for victims. Nodes may be small hand-held devices, such 
as PDAs, palmtops and smart phones, which can easily be compromised or stolen. The 
situation may become even worst when an adversary exploits a number of these 
compromised devices to launch an insider attack in a sensitive network, such as a military 
network. Due to the above mentioned constraints the security protocols used in existing wired 
networks may not be very effective in MANETS. MANET security protocols must be able to 
scale instantly and on the other hand they should not be affected by the dynamic topology. 
Protocols that need a lot of computational, memory or bandwidth resources are not suitable 
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for MANETs because nodes usually have limited resources as compared to their wired 
counterparts. 
MANETs were originally introduced as closed or managed networks that belonged to a single 
entity or organization called an offline authority, such as the military. In this case the end- 
users have a pre-established relationship and they work under this offline authority. The 
offline authority usually performs the initial set up procedures, for example to allot keys or 
certificates to nodes, and to allocate initial trust to the nodes, before network deployment. 
Since nodes belong to a single authority and all have a common objective, they are therefore 
motivated to cooperate. However, the proliferation of mobile communication devices such as 
laptops, PDAs, cell phones may produce a fully self-organized mobile ad hoc network, where 
nodes do not pertain to a single organization. End-users come together to form a network in a 
purely ad hoc manner forming an open or pure ad hoc network. Users are usually strangers 
without having any relationship and nodes have no pre-established security associations. 
They have different interests and objectives and they share their resources for global 
connectivity. The lack of a Trusted Third Party (TTP) and the existence of untrusted users in 
a fully self-organized MANET causes the following security problems, as highlighted by 
Mcdonald et al. [32]. 
" Fully self-organized MANETs are open in nature. Just like the Internet, nodes are 
liable to join and leave the network at random. Openness attracts selfish and malicious 
users. 
" Each end-user will be its own authority domain, and therefore responsible for 
accomplishing distributed network functionalities, such as packet forwarding for other 
nodes, as well as generating and maintaining its own keying material. 
" There will always be a threat of active insider attacks in the network. 
" As Douceur [20] pointed out, in the absence of an offline TTP, a node can create and 
control more than one identity without any cost or difficulty, termed as a Sybil attack. 
As a result, a node can join the network every time under a different identity and 
hence it will be difficult to hold malicious nodes accountable for their actions. 
In MANETs, routing is based on multihoping, i. e. in order to extend the range of 
communication each node is supposed to forward other nodes' packets. However, in open 
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MANETs nodes may not cooperate and may exhibit selfish behaviour by not providing 
packet forwarding services to other nodes. This selfishness or misbehaviour in packet 
forwarding degrades overall network performance. Cooperation enforcement schemes, such 
as reputation, trust and credit based solutions have been proposed to enforce cooperation in 
MANETs. Since routing is an important networking function these schemes (for example 
reputation-based schemes) improve routing by motivating nodes to cooperate in the packet 
forwarding process and restricting selfish nodes' services. 
Our work is related to the improvement of the reputation-based system that is used ultimately 
to secure the routing process from selfish nodes. Furthermore reputation-based schemes have 
been proposed to work as an extension of routing protocols. Likewise, our reputation-based 
scheme, described in Chapter 4, is an extension of the DSR protocol. Broch et al. [33] have 
undertaken a performance comparison of four popular routing protocols and have established 
the result that DSR has the best throughput performance: more than 95% across all movement 
speeds and mobility rates. This motivates us to use DSR as the basic routing protocol for our 
proposed work. 
2.4 Routing in MANETs 
Routing in mobile ad hoc network is deemed to be the most critical part of network control. 
Since there is no infrastructure (routers etc. ), routing protocols in ad hoc networks use mobile 
nodes to route packets from a source to a destination node using multihoping if the 
destination does not lie in the direct radio range of the source node. Node mobility can cause 
a highly dynamic network topology where wireless links are constantly established and 
pulled down due to the nodes' movements. As a result, conventional routing protocols 
designed for infrastructure or wired networks do not work for the network in ad hoc settings. 
Several routing protocols have been proposed in the literature for mobile ad hoc networks and 
performance-based comparative studies have been conducted by the research community to 
judge the properties of various solutions. However, in this section we will generally discuss 
routing protocols based on their mode of operations. 
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2.5 Mode of Routing Operation 
Proactive vs. Reactive 
Proactive and reactive modes are concerned with whether nodes in ad hoc networks should 
maintain routes to all possible destinations in the form of a table or should discover 
destinations on demand. 
Proactive routing protocols store route information (before it is required) in a table hence they 
are sometimes referred to as table-driven routing protocols. Route updates are periodically 
broadcast by each node; consequently every node updates its routing table accordingly. These 
protocols have the advantage of experiencing minimal delays when communicating with 
arbitrary destinations in the network. However, their main disadvantage is the additional 
overhead of control traffic that is used to continually update stale route information. The 
situation gets worse when the control packet overhead increases in MANETs where links are 
often broken due to mobility. Furthermore, these protocols may not scale well for larger 
networks [34]. An example of proactive routing is Destination-Sequenced Distance-Vector 
(DSDV) [14]. 
Reactive protocols, on the other hand, generate routing information only on-demand without 
maintaining routes beforehand. This significantly reduces the control packet overhead. 
However, it causes delays when a node wants to communicate with another node for the first 
time. Route caches are used to store routes that may be used in the near future. Examples of 
reactive routing include DSR [ 12] and Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV) [ 13]. 
Research has also been done on hybrid routing protocols that combine the advantages of both 
the proactive and reactive protocols. The hybrid protocols make use of the hierarchical 
network architectures. The reactive and proactive routing techniques are exploited in different 
hierarchical levels of the network. The example of the hybrid routing protocol is the Zone 
Routing Protocol (ZRP) [35]. However, these protocols may cause large communication 
overhead due to the topological changes in the network. 
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Source vs. Hop-by-hop Routing 
These modes of operation are concerned with whether the source node of a packet decides the 
route for the packet to be forwarded to the destination node or the intermediate nodes decide 
the next hop until the packet arrives at the destination. 
In source routing protocols, the source node is responsible for selecting the route and storing 
the route information in the packet header. All intermediate nodes follow the packet header to 
forward the packet faithfully along the path. These protocols have the advantage that 
intermediate nodes are not required to maintain the routing information. However, the packet 
size is increased due to the source routing information carried in each packet. 
In hop-by-hop routing protocols source nodes are only required to know how to get to the 
next hop; subsequent intermediate nodes also find their next hops up to the destination node. 
These routing protocols reduce the packet header size but they require all the intermediate 
nodes to retain routing information. 
As shown in Table 2-1, the four main routing protocols can be classified based on their mode 
of operation. 
Table 2-1: Classification of Routing Protocols 
Mode of Operation Proactive Reactive 
Source Routing ZRP DSR 
Hop-by-hop Routing DSDV AODV 
2.6 The Dynamic Source Routing Protocol (DSR) 
The DSR routing protocol is one of the main routing protocols developed for mobile ad hoc 
networks, proposed by Johnson et al. [12]. It is an on-demand routing protocol in which 
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source nodes initiate a route discovery process to find the destination. The discovered route is 
then listed in the data packet's header, called the source route. Each node maintains a 
dynamic cache, called a route cache that is used to store routes to other destination nodes in 
the network. Routes can be determined through a route discovery process, forwarding packets 
along an active path and through overhearing using passive acknowledgments. The on- 
demand routing reduces the overhead caused by periodic route advertisement. As is evident 
from the title, DSR is a source routing protocol that allows source nodes to select and control 
multiple routes to a destination for routing packets. There are two main mechanisms in DSR: 
Route Discovery and Route Maintenance, which are discussed below. 
Route Discovery 
In DSR routes to destinations are determined through a route discovery process that is 
illustrated by Figure 2-3 and Figure 2-4. When a source node S wants to send a data packet 
(message) to some destination D, after saving the data packet in its send buffer it first 
searches its route cache to establish whether there is already a route to node D. If there is no 
route found in the route cache to D, then S will commence a Route Discovery process by 
broadcasting a Route Request (RREQ) control packet. S adds itself to the beginning of the 
route record before sending the message. As a result all nodes falling within the radio range 
of S will receive the RREQ packet, for example node B and G in Figure 2-3. The RREQ 
packet contains the source and destination nodes, a unique RREQ identifier and a list of all 
nodes along the path that have been traversed by this packet so far. Figure 2-4 shows the step 
by step processing of the RREQ and Route Reply (RREP) messages along the path, the red 
line in Figure 2-3. 
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Figure 2-3: Route Discovery Example 1361 
RREQ 
Broadcast 
RREP 
Unicast 
S< RREQ, S, D, Sid, () > 
B< RREQ, S, D, Sid , (B) > C -" *: < RREQ, S, D. Sid, (B, C) > 
DC: < RRE P, D, S, Sid, (B, C, D) > 
C -º B: < RREP, D, S, Sid, (B, C, D) > 
B -" S: < RRE P, D, S, Sid, (B, C, D) > 
Figure 2-4: Route Discovery Processing 1361 
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When a node receives a RREQ message, it compares the destination address contained in the 
message with its own address to establish whether the message is intended for itself. If the 
message is not destined for itself, it will append its address to the route record and broadcast 
the RREQ further on until the destination is reached or time to live (TTL) expires. In order to 
control the flooding and unlimited forwarding of RREQ messages in the network (i. e. to 
prevent loops), the DSR protocol specified that nodes should only forward the first copy of 
the same RREQ messages they receive. 
If the destination node D receives a RREQ message, it will send a Route Reply (RREP) 
control packet to the source node along with the route record that has been accumulated 
during the route discovery process. If the destination node uses a MAC-based protocol (such 
as IEEE 802.11) that allows bidirectional links, it simply reverses the source route record in 
order to send the RREP back to the source node S. If the MAC protocol does not allow 
bidirectional links then the destination node should find a route back to the source node S by 
searching its route cache or by launching a route discovery process. 
S-B-C I RRF. 
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After receiving the RREP message, S saves the returned route into its route cache. In future, S 
will use this route to send all packets destined to node D until the route is broken. 
Route Maintenance 
Since the topology of a mobile ad hoc network changes frequently, the paths contained in the 
route caches of nodes are often broken. To prevent broken links, each node after forwarding a 
packet must confirm the reachability of the next hop. After a certain period of time if the 
node does not receive any confirmation from the next hop, it retransmits the packet. After a 
maximum number of retransmissions, if the node still does not receive any response from the 
next hop, the link to the next hop is thought to be broken and the node will send a Route 
Error (RERR) control packet back to the source node. The source node will start a new route 
discovery process. 
In Appendix B we will show the DSR protocol structure in the NS-2 simulator. 
There are three mechanisms that DSR proposes to confirm the data flow over the link from 
the node to the next hop: 
" Network layer acknowledgements are used when a node sends an explicit 
acknowledgement request to probe its next hop node. 
" Link layer acknowledgements are provided by the MAC layer protocol, such as in 
IEEE 802.11. 
" Passive acknowledgements can be used to overhear (promiscuous listening) packet 
forwarded by the next hop node in order to confirm its reachability. Most reputation- 
based schemes monitor nodes for packet misbehaviour using passive 
acknowledgements; we will discuss these schemes in detail in Chapter 3. 
2.7 Threats to Ad hoc Routing 
Since routing in ad hoc networks is deemed as the most critical component of network 
control, substantial research has been undertaken in order to secure it. Security of routing 
becomes very challenging in a pure ad hoc network where nodes do not belong to a single 
authority and nodes do not have an a priori trust relationship. In Section 2.2 we discussed 
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these challenges posed in mobile ad hoc networks in detail. Here in this section we will 
briefly discuss common attacks on ad hoc routing protocols, pointed by many authors such as 
[28-29,37] that can be categorized into Active and Passive attacks. 
Network attacks can be classified as active and passive attacks. In active attacks, an attacker 
carries out some actions, for example addition, deletion or delays. In passive attacks, on the 
other hand, an attacker acts as an observer to analyze data exchanged between 
communicating parties without any modification or intervention. 
2.7.1 Active Attacks 
" Black Hole Attack: in a black hole attack, a malicious node advertises the shortest 
path (zero routing metric) to all or some of the destinations. As a result, neighbours 
route their traffic towards the attacker node. The attacker then drops all these packets 
to create a denial of service attack in the network. In other situations an attacker 
advertises spoofed messages from the victim node to falsely show the shortest route to 
all destinations. Consequently, all nodes will direct their traffic towards the victim 
node to quickly deplete its battery power. 
" Worm Hole Attack: the attacker receives data at one location and tunnels it to another 
location in the network causing invalidity of routes for the data. 
" Resource Consumption Attack: in the network layer, a malicious node can generate 
or inject packets that can consume network resources uselessly. For example, an 
attacker can initiate a lot of route discoveries, route discoveries of bogus destinations, 
or the forwarding of outdated packets to nodes in the network. 
" Route Cache Poisoning: this attack is used against on-demand routing protocols such 
as DSR in which route caches are poisoned to disrupt the whole routing of the 
network. A malicious node can inject spoofed packets with bogus route information 
into the network; every node overhearing this packet will save the route in its route 
cache. As a result, packets are routed on longer paths or through routing loops 
consuming network resources needlessly. 
" Rushing Attack: a malicious node that receives a RREQ packet from a source node 
immediately responds to the source node before any other legitimate nodes may react. 
Any responses after it will be considered as duplicates and will be deleted. 
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Consequently, any route discovered by the source node will contain the malicious 
node information as one of the legitimate nodes. 
2.7.2 Passive Attacks 
" Eavesdropping: it is the act of secretly listening to the conversation or 
communication of other parties without their consent. Eavesdropping is one of the 
main issues in wireless networks; traffic can easily be eavesdropped due to the 
broadcast nature of wireless networks. In routing, mostly the routing information is 
communicated within the packets with the header in plain text that can be easily 
overheard and analysed to disclose the path to the source or destination or to 
compromise their location privacy. Cryptographic techniques are usually used to 
conceal data from eavesdropping. 
" Selfishness: in multihop ad hoc networks, intermediate nodes act as a host as well as 
a router to forward packets for other nodes. As nodes have limited battery power, they 
are naturally inclined to save power by spending power only on their own network 
activities. Therefore it can cause selfishness in nodes and they may drop other nodes' 
packets. This is a passive attack [38] and also called passive Denial of Service (DoS) 
attack [39]; however, these packet drops can also be used as an active attacks, such as 
black hole attack. Since selfishness or passive DoS attack is one of the main themes of 
our work in this thesis, we will discuss this issue in more detail in the next section. 
2.8 Packet Relay Problem 
In self-organized open ad hoc networks, there is no strong authentication infrastructure nor 
any centralized authority to manage trust relationships among nodes. Consequently, the 
reliability of the basic network functions can be jeopardized by any node in the network. 
However, none of the classical security mechanisms is helpful in counteracting a 
misbehaving node. The proper network operation not only relies on the correct execution of 
critical network functions by the network nodes, but it also needs each node to cooperatively 
perform a "fair share" of the network functions: node cooperation, such as packet forwarding. 
Nodes are usually assumed to be cooperative in ad hoc networks. 
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In this thesis we consider malicious nodes as being distinct from selfish nodes. Malicious 
nodes intentionally damage others by breaking the proper network operation. This kind of 
misbehaviour can be tackled using traditional security services, such as authentication, 
integrity, etc. A malicious entity, for example, can launch a route disruption attack by 
injecting spoofed routing packets to partition the network or to create a routing loop. This 
kind of attack can be tackled using authentication and integrity to verify the routing control 
packets. Selfish nodes, on the other hand, do not intend to directly damage the functioning of 
the network, but are reluctant to spend their resources for others. This kind of misbehaviour is 
unique to self-organized networks and can be grouped under non-cooperation problems. 
Several techniques have been proposed to enforce cooperation and to counteract this kind of 
misbehaviour in ad hoc networks. 
Cooperation enforcement schemes offer a reasonable solution to selfish nodes. In order to 
stimulate nodes to cooperate, these schemes offer incentives to nodes that cooperate in the 
form of reputation, trust or of virtual currency. We will discuss cooperation schemes in detail 
in Chapter 3, however here we will discuss the types of selfish nodes. 
" Type 1: Selfish forwarding. This type of selfish node does not forward any data 
packet at all. When this type of behaviour is exhibited, all data packets that have a 
different source or destination address than the current node address are dropped. 
However, a selfish node following this model takes part in the Route Discovery and 
Route Maintenance phase of the DSR protocol. Since data packets are significantly 
larger in size than control packets, a selfish node dropping all data packets can save a 
significant fraction of its battery power while still contributing to the network 
maintenance. 
" Type 2: Selfish routing. This type of selfish model focuses on selfish nodes that do 
not take part in the Route Discovery and Route Maintenance phase of the DSR 
protocol. A node not participating in the Route Discovery process will not be selected 
in any path and hence the packet forwarding services will automatically be disabled. 
A selfish node of this type will not be detected by any reputation-based scheme; 
however, work has been done on tackling them, such as in the work of Djenouri et al. 
[40-411. 
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" Type 3: Energy-driven selfish behaviour. This type of misbehaviour is more complex 
than the other two, and is discussed by Michiardi and Molva [38]. In this model, a 
selfish node changes its behaviour with respect to its battery power level. The node 
behaves well until an energy threshold is met then it starts behaving like the type I 
selfish node until the next lower energy threshold is reached, at which point it starts 
behaving like the type 2 selfish node. 
" Type 4: Partial selfish behaviour. This type of selfish node partially drops packets; it 
can therefore be very tricky to detect in the network. Reputation-based schemes 
usually use a threshold to detect selfish nodes; selfish nodes of this kind may not cross 
the threshold. 
We use only the type 1 selfish model throughout this thesis. This type of selfishness is 
much more serious and dangerous to routing protocols because in this model selfish 
nodes interrupt the data flow by dropping the data packets, hence forcing the routing 
protocol to restart the route discovery process. The route discovery process may not be 
initiated if an alternate route is available however; it may again contain some selfish 
nodes due to which it may also fail. This process continues until the source concludes that 
the data cannot be further transferred. 
2.9 Network Simulators 
There are mainly two ways to investigate MANETs (or its protocols): by using software- 
based simulators or conducting real network experimentation using a testbed. Testbeds are 
not usually favoured by most researchers due to their cost and lack of flexibility, especially 
when the scale of the experimental network increases. Software simulators are then 
considered as a viable alternative and are a widely adopted solution. 
In order to study various simulators available for MANETs, it is important to specify the 
basic components required for MANETs, some of them are given below. 
" Nodes: a set of mobile devices are required that act as a basic entity of a network and 
that should have the processing as well as wireless transmission capabilities. 
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" TCP/IP protocol stack: since nodes are communication devices, their internal 
architecture should be defined in terms of the TCP/IP protocol stack. In other words, 
nodes' communications are regulated by the functionalities of the TCP/IP protocol's 
layers, i. e. application, transport, network, MAC/data link and physical layers. 
" Wireless interface: nodes should be equipped with radio devices that enable them to 
transmit and receive wirelessly. 
" Mobility: nodes should have the ability to move freely across the network following 
random patterns or mobility models. 
" Data traffic: nodes are required to establish connections with other nodes or group of 
nodes in the network. These connections will be in the form of data traffic flows with 
various transmission rates where nodes will act as sources and destinations of the data 
traffic. 
" Nodes as routers: since, there are no dedicated routers in ad hoc network, such as 
MANETs, nodes are required to act as a host as well as a router in order to forward 
other nodes' packets. 
Currently there are many simulators that can simulate a MANET. In this section we will 
briefly discuss the most commonly used network simulators. We will compare their merits 
and demerits and opt for one as a platform for our work in this thesis. 
2.9.1 GloMoSim 
GloMoSim was developed at the University of California, Los Angeles, USA. According to 
L. Hogie et al. [421 it is the second most popular network simulator but suffers from a lack of 
in-depth documentation. It provides a scalable simulation environment both for wired and 
wireless networks. It is built using a layered approach that mimics the OSI seven-layer 
network architecture. 
GloMoSim is designed to simulate wireless communication protocols using a set of library 
modules that have been written using the parallel discrete-event simulation language, called 
PARSEC. New modules and protocols can be added to the library using the PARSEC 
language. The DSR protocol implementation is also available in GloMoSim. 
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GloMoSim is not entirely free, but its source and binary code can be obtained for research 
purposes by academic institutions only. The commercial version of GloMoSim is called 
QualNet and is based on the C++ language. 
2.9.2 OPNet Modeler 
OPNet (Optimized Network Engineering Tools) is a commercial discrete event network 
simulator used for network modelling and simulation. It was developed at MIT and 
introduced in 1987 as the first commercial network simulator. It is written in C++. The 
OPNet Modeler allows users to design and study networks, devices, protocols and 
applications in an interactive development environment. It provides a GUI-based 
environment simulating the network graphically in a way that mimics the structure and 
components of an actual network. It allows users to design the network visually without 
manually writing scripts for it. The development language is C/C++. 
An object-oriented approach is used by the modeler: nodes and protocols are modelled as 
classes along with the inheritance and specialization facility. 
2.9.3 NS-2 
NS-2 [43], developed at ISI (Information Sciences Institute), California and supported by 
DARPA and NSF, is the de facto standard for network simulation and its behaviour is highly 
trusted within the networking research community [42]. It is also a discrete event simulator 
targeted at networking research organized according to the OSI model. It provides support for 
the simulation of Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), routing and multicast routing 
protocols over wired and wireless networks. NS-2 simulates a layered wired or wireless 
network from the physical layer all the way to high level applications. Wireless networking 
support has been introduced through a number of extensions, for example the Monarch CMU 
projects [44] developed protocols for wireless and mobile hosts, one of them being the 
implementation of IEEE 802.11 layers (WiFi). It includes all commonly used IP protocols 
along with a simulation visualisation tool called network animator (nam). 
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NS-2 is written using C++ and OTcl and hence is an object-oriented simulator. OTcI is an 
interpreted language used as a "front-end" while C++ is a compiled language and used as a 
back-end language. The reason for the use of two different programming languages is that 
OTcl is appropriate for programs and configurations needing rapid changes while C++ is 
appropriate for programs that need faster execution. In other words, C++ is fast to run but 
slow to change whereas OTcl is fast to change but slow to run. NS-2 contains a C++ class 
hierarchy (compiled hierarchy) with a similar class hierarchy in the OTct interpreter. There is 
a one-to-one relationship between a class in the compiled hierarchy with the same class in the 
interpreted hierarchy. 
NS-2 not only provides the most commonly used IP protocol, but also allows users to 
implement their own protocols; hence it is highly extensible. It also supports the four ad hoc 
routing protocols discussed above, including DSR. The downloaded source code of NS-2 can 
be compiled on multiple platforms, for instance UNIX, or on Windows using Cygwin3 [45]. 
2.9.4 Comparison 
All of the above mentioned simulators provide the components required for MANETs, 
discussed above. Now we have to consider other criteria to narrow the selection. There are 
many criteria based on which a suitable simulator can be chosen; we will start by considering 
accuracy as an important factor. However, there is no clear conclusion in the literature about 
which one is the most accurate. Cavin et al. [46] conducted experiments for comparing the 
accuracy of the simulators and the authors concluded that the results are barely comparable 
because the results are different quantitatively (not the same absolute value) as well as 
qualitatively (not the same general behaviour). Moreover, there is no standalone simulator 
that can fit all the necessities of the wireless application developers. It would be more 
realistic to think about a hybrid approach in which the lowest layers (MAC and physical) and 
the mobility model are simulated while the upper layers (transport to application layers) are 
executed on dedicated hosts, such as a cluster of machines. 
' Cygwin is developed by the Open Source community in order to provide a Unix-like environment running in Microsoft Windows Systems. 
Background 32 
Since there is no definite conclusion regarding the accuracy of the above mentioned network 
simulators, we have to opt for one as our simulation environment based on our own ease and 
attraction. In Table 2-2, we summarise the comparison of simulators based on a variety of 
metrics. 
Table 2-2: Comparison of Simulators 
Simulators Free Open Source 
Programming 
Language 
Implementation of DSR 
OPNet No No C Yes 
GloMoSim Limited Yes PARSEC Yes 
NS-2 Yes Yes C++, OTcI Yes 
From the comparison summary, we opt to use NS-2 as a network simulator for our research 
work for the following reasons. 
" NS-2 can be easily downloaded and installed for free. 
" It is open source. 
" NS-2 has active research community and a large archive of questions and answers can 
be found on the Internet which can provide solutions to many problems; hence makes 
the research progress smooth. 
" Source code of other protocols, such as the CONFIDANT protocol, can be easily 
obtained, which makes the job of comparing our scheme with other benchmark 
schemes easier. 
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2.10 Summary 
This chapter provides background for our work that includes network security, mobile ad hoc 
networks and their requirements, various routing techniques developed for MANETs - 
especially DSR protocol - and the threats that endanger the routing process. We also 
discussed the issue of selfishness or misbehaviour. Finally, we discussed various network 
simulators available in the research community that could be used to simulate MANETs, 
along with a discussion to justify our selection of NS-2. 
Chapter 3 Cooperation 
Enforcement in MANETs 
Cooperation enforcement schemes can be mainly categorized into three groups i. e. 
reputation-based, trust-based and credit-based schemes, as shown in Figure 3-1. Reputation 
and trust based schemes work more or less the same way, i. e. nodes are classified as 
trustworthy or untrustworthy based on their cooperation history in the network. Eventually, 
nodes having high reputation or trust (greater than some threshold) get services; whereas 
nodes having low reputation or trust are isolated from the network. The reputation and trust 
evolve locally in a distributed manner. Reputation-based schemes are further divided into two 
sub categories, i. e. active and passive acknowledgement schemes which will be discussed 
later in this chapter. In credit-based schemes, on the other hand, payments of usually a virtual 
currency are made for cooperation in the network; however for secure payments nodes are 
employed with a tamper proof hardware. A central virtual bank is used for payments 
management. We discuss these schemes in the following sections. 
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In credit-based schemes the packet-forwarding function is treated as a service which can be 
weighted (valuated) and charged. Nodes pay for services like packet forwarding and they also 
act as a buyer and/or seller of services. These models incorporate a form of virtual currency 
to regulate the dealings between the nodes for services. They require the existence of tamper- 
resistant hardware and a virtual bank. The former is used by each node for secure payments 
(on client side) and the latter is used on network level that offers trusted-third party services 
to the nodes, such as managing payments, securing transactions, etc. 
The concept of a commercial transaction in a MANET was first used by Buttyan et al. [471 to 
prevent selfishness in MANETs. They proposed two models: the Packet Purse Model (PPM) 
and the Packet Trade Model (PTM); both of these models make use of a tamper proof 
hardware security module. These models make use of a virtual currency called nuglets. In 
PPM, the source node adds nuglets to the packet and each intermediate node will take an 
amount for forwarding the packet until the packet reaches the destination node. The source 
node is responsible for loading a sufficient quantity of nuglets onto the packet; otherwise a 
packet having insufficient nuglets will be discarded on intermediate nodes. The problem with 
this model is that a node can take more nuglets than the amount they are supposed to take. 
The use of this model is limited to source routing protocols, such as DSR. It is due to the fact 
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that in the PPM model source nodes are responsible for adding the correct amount of nuglets 
in the packet; and in source routing; only source nodes select the paths for communication 
and they know the number of nodes in the selected path. Another problem is in the Route 
Maintenance phase, when the path is considered broken in the middle, half node will take 
money for nothing useful. In the PTM, each intermediate node purchases packets from the 
previous node and sells it to the next node at a higher price. Eventually, the destination node 
will pay probably the highest price to the second last node along the path. However an 
attacker can easily launch a DoS attack in this scheme, because the source node does not pay 
for the service. 
Wang, et al. developed SPM: A Security Policy Based on Micropayment in Ad hoc Networks 
[48], which combines the features of credit-based schemes with the subjective observation 
based monitoring of reputation-based schemes. Nodes are characterized in the network as 
consumers, merchants, and brokers. Consumers are nodes that send their data/control packets 
to other nodes (merchants) to forward. Merchant nodes forward data/control packets from 
consumer nodes and take a virtual currency called scrip for providing services to them. 
Brokers on the other hand are the neighbours in a transaction that issues scrip to the 
consumers and merchants based on their reputation. Merchants sell their services to 
consumers and consumers acquire scrip from brokers (neighbours) to buy services from 
merchants. 
3.2 Trust-based Schemes 
Reputation and trust are sometimes used interchangeably; however some authors [49] 
consider them different entities. Reputation and trust are tightly related to each other: 
reputation enables trust. Reputation reflects a collective opinion that leads to trust or distrust, 
whereas trust typically exists at a personal level. That's why more weight is given to the 
personal or direct opinion than that of indirect or secondhand opinion. In other words, trust is 
one's subjective or personal experience of an entity about another entity. When these 
experiences are combined with other entities in the community, its collective reflection in the 
community is reputation. In this section we will overview a couple of trust-based schemes for 
MANETs. 
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Pirzada et al. [50] describe an approach to building distributed trust relationships between 
nodes, assuming DSR as the routing protocol used in an ad hoc network. It is assumed that 
nodes in the network passively monitor events; we will discuss these techniques in the next 
section. Events are the activities of nodes in the network, for instance forwarding, receiving, 
and overhearing of data or control packets. Independent trust agents are used that reside on 
each node in the network. Each agent firstly drives trust for other agents by monitoring other 
nodes in promiscuous mode for different events, such as data or control packet forwarding 
events. Information gathered from these events may be classified into one or more trust 
categories which indicate that a node is trusted for the particular category of service. For 
example, an agent may be trusted for data forwarding, but not for routing security. Secondly, 
each agent quantifies trust in a continuous range by collecting information from the 
neighbouring nodes, filtering it, and assigning weights to each event, before finally 
computing trust levels for each node. 
Based on the subjective trust model developed by Xiaoqi et al. [51 ], Vasantha et al. [52] 
proposed a Subjective Trust Model, called Trust-based DSR (TBDSR). Here each node is 
capable of having an opinion about every other node in the neighbourhood. The opinion is 
represented by a triple value containing belief, disbelief and uncertainty (b, d, u), where all of 
these values are continuous ranging from 0 to 1. Based on the opinion of successful and 
failed communication experiences, each node maintains a list called a Trust Table. A node 
must forward others' packets to achieve a good opinion in the neighbourhood. Eventually 
nodes having a bad opinion in the community may be isolated from the network. 
3.3 Reputation-based Schemes 
Reputation-based models consider the past history of interactions and based on that history 
they enable nodes to identify cooperative (trusted) or uncooperative (untrusted) nodes in the 
network. Nodes build up these histories or subjective reputation from the direct interaction 
experiences that are made visible to the new interacting nodes in the form of secondhand 
reputation information. However, nodes can use both direct and indirect experience to better 
evaluate the interacting nodes. Visible past histories are of significant importance in building 
up reputation in the network. According to Friedman et al. [53], history is very beneficial in 
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many aspects. First, a history may show the information about the ability of an entity. 
Second, history deters moral hazards in the present: each entity will perform to the best of its 
ability because current actions will become history in the future. Finally, since histories 
reveal information about a node's abilities, nodes with higher abilities are distinguished from 
the nodes having lower abilities. Reputation-based systems usually enable nodes to collect, 
maintain, and disseminate reputation information histories in the network. In a MANET 
environment, reputation information is gathered either through passive acknowledgments 
(promiscuous mode listening) or by active two-hop acknowledgments. Eventually nodes 
having high reputation can access services whereas nodes having low reputation are isolated 
from the network. 
A core component of the reputation-based models is the monitoring or observation of one hop 
neighbours. Due to the fact that a node can trust nobody but itself, it gives more weight to 
direct observations, which are called firsthand information. The accuracy and efficiency of 
misbehaviour detection is strongly dependent on the monitoring component. However, due to 
the complex and unpredictable nature of a mobile ad hoc network, it is very difficult to have a 
perfect monitoring system at low cost (where cost may be measured as energy or some other 
metric). In this section we will discuss the two main sub categories of reputation-based 
schemes, i. e. active and passive based acknowledgments schemes and will also discuss their 
pros and cons along with other related issues that will need to be addressed in the future 
research. 
3.3.1 Passive Acknowledgement Based Schemes 
In these schemes, monitoring is done by making use of passive acknowledgements and the 
networking hardware will be put in promiscuous mode. The schemes may not work 
efficiently in the presence of ambiguous collisions, partial dropping, or unidirectional links 
[22] which will be discussed in this section. 
Watchdog and Pathrater 
Two techniques were proposed by Marti et al. [54]: Watchdog and Pathrater which run on the 
Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) protocol. Watchdog is a process running on each node that 
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maintains a reputation table to record the reputation of one hop neighbours. Every time a 
source node S sends a packet to the destination node D via intermediate nodes, S holds a copy 
of the packet in memory until it overhears (in promiscuous mode) the same packet forwarded 
by the intermediate node before time T expires. Node S increases the reputation of the next 
node when it is confirmed that it has forwarded its packet, and decreases it otherwise after a 
time-out period. If the neighbouring node drops packets exceeding a given threshold the node 
is deemed to be misbehaving. Pathrater is used to evaluate paths in order to avoid the path 
having misbehaving nodes. Each node maintains a list of ratings for every neighbour node in 
the range from 0 to 1. Node ratings are initialized to a neutral value such as 0.5 and then 
incremented or decremented depending upon its behaviour. Using these ratings Pathrater 
evaluates paths and selects the one having the highest rating. This technique has no 
punishment for misbehaving nodes, a drawback which is addressed by the CONFIDANT 
scheme. 
CONFIDANT 
Buchegger and LeBoudec [25] proposed an extension to the DSR protocol called 
CONFIDANT (Cooperation Of Nodes, Fairness In Dynamic Ad-hoc NeTworks), which is 
similar to Watchdog and Pathrater. It has four main components: the Monitor, the Trust 
Manager, the Reputation System, and the Path Manager. The Monitor applies similar 
techniques to those of the Watchdog process as it promiscuously listens to neighbours but 
also observes routing protocol behaviour. The Trust Manager is responsible for sending an 
ALARM to all its friend nodes when misbehaviour is detected, and other trust managers 
receiving ALARM messages determine the trustworthiness of the message by scrutinizing the 
trust level of the sender. Based on this information the Reputation System maintains a local 
rating list and a blacklist, and further exchanges these lists with friends. Finally the Path 
Manager, which applies similar techniques to those of Pathrater, evaluates paths according to 
the reputation of nodes along the path and discards paths that include misbehaving nodes. 
Since this protocol allows nodes in the network to send ALARM messages to each other, it 
could give more opportunities for attackers to send false alarm messages that a node is 
misbehaving while actually this might not be the case, a process referred to as rumour 
spreading [55]. The authors enhanced their scheme in later work [26] by using a Bayesian 
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model that classifies and rules out liars. We discuss and use this latest version of 
CONFIDANT in order to analyse the effect of direct interactions on reputation-based scheme 
in MANETs, in Chapter 5. We will also compare our scheme with this in Chapter 6. 
CORE 
As with the previous schemes, CORE [38] also relies on the DSR routing protocol. It 
monitors neighbours via the watchdog mechanism as well. CORE combines three types of 
reputation information: subjective (direct) reputation, indirect reputation and functional 
reputation. Functional reputation depends on certain functions which are given a weight 
based on their importance, for example control packets are considered less important than 
data packets, and hence more weight is given to data forwarding functions. These reputations 
are combined for a node to have an aggregate reputation in the network. Nodes having 
reputation below a given threshold are isolated from the network. An isolated node can, 
however, rejoin the MANET if it successfully increases its reputation by cooperating well for 
a period of time. To protect nodes suffering temporarily from bad environmental conditions, 
more weight is given to past behaviour. However this also provides an opportunity for an 
attacker to misbehave after building up a good reputation. Unlike CONFIDANT, only 
positive recommendations are allowed to be communicated in the network. 
3.3.2 Problems with Passive Acknowledgment 
Most reputation-based schemes make use of promiscuous listening or passive 
acknowledgments to observe their neighbours for packet forwarding activities. Apart from its 
advantages, such as the fact that it needs no specialized hardware ensuring low cost, 
promiscuous listening has several disadvantages which are caused by the peculiarities of 
mobile ad hoc networks. Marti et al. [54] identify the following weaknesses of the Watchdog 
mechanism in the presence of which it might not detect a selfish or misbehaving node. 
Ambiguous collision: as shown in the scenario demonstrated in Figure 3-2, an ambiguous 
collision occurs at A while it is listening for B to forward a packet on. Node A does not know 
whether the collision is caused by its neighbouring nodes or by node B. 
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Figure 3-2: Passive Acknowledgment 
Receiver collision: due to the receiver collision problem node A can tell whether B sends the 
packet to C, but it cannot tell whether C received it. Node C might not receive the packet 
because of a collision. 
Limited transmission power: a node can limit its transmission power such that a signal is 
sufficiently strong to reach the previous node while weak enough not to reach the true 
recipient. 
Collusion: more than one misbehaving node can collude to disrupt the Watchdog 
mechanism. For example, B forwards a packet to C but B does not report to A when C drops 
the packet. 
Partial dropping: when a node drops packets at a rate lower than the configured misbehaving 
threshold. 
3.3.3 Active Acknowledgment Based Schemes 
These schemes do not suffer from the problems mentioned above, but instead of listening to 
passive acknowledgements, they explicitly send acknowledgements to inform the source 
node of packet receipt. For this, they incur extra overhead; however some schemes use 
Piggybacking to decrease the overhead incurred. 
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ZACK 
Kejun et al. [56] propose a scheme that focuses on the detection of misbehaving links instead 
of misbehaving nodes and which may be used as an add-on to the existing source routing 
protocols, such as DSR. The scheme makes use of a special acknowledgment packet which 
has been assigned a fixed route of two hops or three nodes in the opposite direction of the 
actual data traffic flow. Three consecutive nodes (triplets) N1, N2, and N3 are assumed to lie 
along the path from source to destination. When N, forwards a packet to N3 via N2, N, will 
not be sure whether N3 received the packet due to the misbehaviour or ambiguous collisions 
in the path. In order to confirm the packet reception N3 will send an ACK packet to N, via N2, 
called a 2ACK. Among the triplet, N, is the observer (or ACK receiver) of the link N2 => N3. 
This triplet formation is carried out along the whole path. 
Every outgoing packet N, will store the ID of the packet for time tin a list it maintains. When 
an ACK is received for a packet and is matched to an ID in the list before time t expires, the 
entry in the list is discarded and a special counter Cpk, is incremented and C, n; s is incremented 
otherwise. After a time period Tubs the ratio of Cmrs and Cpk, is compared with a preset 
threshold R,,, is, if the ratio is greater than the threshold all nodes are reported regarding the 
misbehaving link N2 => N3 by sending a RERR message. Each node receiving or overhearing 
such a RERR message deems N2 => N3 to be a misbehaving link. These links are then 
avoided in the future. Nodes such as N2 should not alter the 2ACK packet passing through 
them; a one-way hash chain mechanism is used as an authentication scheme to avoid such 
tampering. 
MARS 
Zhao et al. [57] propose MARS (MultipAth Routing Single path transmission), which 
provides protection against cooperative misbehaving nodes. The scheme combines multipath 
routing and single path data transmission with an end-to-end feedback mechanism. Before a 
source node starts communication with a destination node, it first selects two node-disjoint 
paths (paths having no node in common) from its path list; one is used for data transmission 
and the other is for transmission information exchange. Two new control packets INF and 
NTF are introduced in the scheme; however, it is not specified what these abbreviation stand 
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for. When the first data packet is sent on one path then a special control packet INF is sent 
through the other path to inform the destination about the data rate, packet size, and other 
path related information. The destination node then detects misbehaviour by analyzing the 
actual data received and the data sent by the source node. If the data rate falls below a certain 
threshold or the packets are tampered with then it notifies the source node about the 
misbehaviour along the path using a special control packet called an NTF. Authentication is 
used on source and destination nodes only. Upon receiving an NTF packet the source node 
will remove the paths from the list and select two other paths; otherwise it will start a new 
route discovery process to discover new paths. 
MARS reduces overhead compared to 2ACK; however, because it only detects misbehaving 
paths it can reduce the chance of utilizing good nodes that happen to fall along a path with 
another node that misbehaves. There is no punishment strategy, so if the number of selfish 
nodes increases then there would eventually be no path available for data transmission. 
LeakDetector 
Graffi et al. [58] propose a scheme which they refer to as LeakDetector. It works using a 
proactive routing protocol and uses both the Watchdog mechanism and active 
acknowledgments for detecting misbehaviour of a single node or multiple colluding nodes. 
Each source node maintains a traffic counter for each path indicating the amount of traffic 
transmitted to that path. The periodic proactive routing messages will contain two extra (new) 
fields i. e. T, omr and Ti. T, oar is the 
field that specifies the total traffic for this route and the T; 
field is used by the visited node i to specify the fraction of traffic that has passed through the 
node in relation to the total traffic sent by the source node. Along the path, data will be 
passed through nodes. Let's say N, passes data to N2. Then N2 will first append its 
information to the visited node list field in the packet and then report the amount of data 
received from N1 in the TN) field in relation to the preset field T, 0 ,. 
The destination node creates a virtual graph based on the information received (T,,,,,, and Tj) 
from the nodes constructing the path. Vertices represent nodes and the weighted edges 
represent the amount of traffic flowing between two nodes. The graph obviously provides a 
top level view of the whole traffic flow in the path. When the destination node determines a 
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node with significant in/out traffic flow variation, it is reported to the source node via a route 
reply message on a disjoint path. The source node can then take further action by updating 
the blacklist table or using a reputation technique to punish the malicious node. Moreover 
traffic counters are refreshed periodically to detect a node that was previously cooperating 
and then switched over to malicious behaviour. 
The authors evaluate the scheme using seven stationary nodes. Since it is proposed for use in 
MANETs, a larger number of nodes in a mobile environment would be needed for a more 
complete evaluation. 
3.4 Discussion 
Credit-based schemes have some issues that make them impractical for use in MANETs. 
Firstly, they are not scalable due to the central virtual bank. Secondly, these models need 
some form of tamper proof hardware on each node. Reputation or trust-based models on the 
other hand do not need any centralized entity, such as a virtual bank, or any tamper proof 
hardware. As a consequence they can be implemented in a distributed manner to increase 
scalability, making them much more suitable for use in MANETs. 
Table 3-1 summarizes the important features and limitations of the schemes we discussed in 
Section 3.3 of this chapter. Generally speaking, passive acknowledgment techniques are more 
promising than active acknowledgment techniques because they do not cause any extra 
communication or memory overhead. Active acknowledgment provides reliability at the cost 
of extra memory and communication overhead but in environments where there is a high 
collision rate, the active acknowledgements are as prone to errors as promiscuous listening 
techniques. Schemes such as MARS [57] that make use of node-disjoint multipath routing 
maintain a large cache for storing these paths. Since in mobile environments path 
reconstruction rate can be high, this can cause substantial overhead and delay due to the 
frequent path discovery messages in the network. Furthermore, acknowledgments no matter 
if explicit, may still be lost due to high mobility or collisions resulting in further overhead in 
the form of retransmissions. On the other hand promiscuous listening techniques can cope 
with high mobility or collisions by only relaxing the misbehaviour threshold. 
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Buchegger et al. [59] conducted a testbed to establish how efficient promiscuous listening is 
and they discovered some very interesting results. First, in high traffic loads they did not 
experience a single collision; hence there was a very low chance of ambiguous and receiver 
collisions; however these can still be compensated by adjusting the threshold. Second, they 
found out that it is not easy for a misbehaving node to drop a packet due to malicious power 
adjustment (limited transmission power) because it is difficult to achieve the power range 
adaptation using current off-the-shelf hardware. Third, in some situations passive 
acknowledgments perform even better than active acknowledgments. 
3.5 Limitations of Current Work 
The schemes we have discussed in previous section have some limitations which need to be 
seriously considered in future research. Hoffman et al. [60] classified attacks against 
reputation systems that have been developed mostly for peer-to-peer systems; more or less 
the same attacks have been pointed out by various authors including Mandalas et al. [ 181, 
Mitchell et al. [61], Carrara et al. [49], and Agrawal et al. [17]. As we discussed in Chapter 1, 
due to the different characteristics of MANETs, reputation systems developed for MANET 
environments are different from those that have been developed for P2P environments. Our 
aim here is to classify the attacks against the reputation systems that have been proposed for 
mobile ad hoc networks only. Below, we discuss some of the attack mechanisms that exploit 
the component(s) of reputation systems in MANET environments. 
3.5.1 Self-Promotion 
In this kind of attack, an attacker tries to falsely increase its reputation in the network. The 
possibility for such attacks is usually found in reputation systems that consider positive 
feedback such as CORE and CONFIDANT. 
Self-promotion attacks can be performed by a node in collusion with other nodes or through a 
single node using its own virtual identities, called Sybil identities. Sybil attack [20] occurs 
when a malicious node generates and controls a large number of logical identities on a single 
physical device. This gives an illusion to the network of each logical identity being a different 
46 
3.5 Limitations of Current Work 47 
legitimate node. The individual form of self-promotion attack can be found in the scenarios 
where a node broadcasts spoofed secondhand reputation information with fabricated 
augmented reputation about itself. Systems having strong authentication mechanisms can 
counteract this attack; however a node colluding with other nodes or with its own Sybil 
identities can still launch the attack. Collusion among different distinct adversaries has been 
addressed by a number of researchers [58,62-65]. Collusion in the form of Sybil attacks can 
be avoided or mitigated by detecting Sybil attacks in the network, these approaches will be 
discussed in the next section. We will discuss our proposed approach in Chapters 6 and 7. 
3.5.2 Slandering 
In this type of attack, which is more or less the reverse of self-promotion, one or more nodes 
or identity falsely generates negative feedback about other nodes or identities; this is also 
called badmouthing. An individual node can publish secondhand reputation information 
having falsely accused good nodes. Reputation systems that consider negative feedback 
mechanisms are vulnerable to this attack. For example, to cope with this attack CORE only 
allows positive feedback whereas CONFIDANT uses a trust mechanism and deviation tests 
to counteract the issue. However, in CONFIDANT there are no restrictions on the frequency 
of secondhand information exchange, a node can easily be brainwashed by frequently having 
false negative ratings sent to it while passing the deviation tests at neighbouring nodes. 
Slandering performed by an individual may have less destructive effects than that of an attack 
committed by a coalition of nodes or identities. However, these kinds of attacks can be 
mitigated using authentication mechanisms. 
In case of a coalition of nodes or identities, a single node having other Sybil identities or a 
coalition of other distinct nodes badmouth about other nodes in the network. Some schemes 
have tried to mitigate the effects of it. For example LARS [66] and OCEAN [67] do not allow 
nodes to exchange their reputation information with neighbours whereas CONFIDANT 
assigns low weights to secondhand reputation ratings to reduce the effect of slandering. 
° It is out of the scope of this thesis to discuss collusion attacks any father. 
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3.5.3 Whitewashing 
In a whitewashing attack, an attacker abuses the system for short-term benefits by allowing 
its reputation to degrade and then escapes the consequences of abusing the system by 
exploiting some system vulnerability to repair its reputation [60]. In MANET environments 
(as with other online systems), the easiest way for the attackers to repair their reputation is to 
re-enter the system with a new identity and get a fresh neutral reputation. The whitewasher 
further takes advantage of the availability of free pseudonyms to whitewash as many times as 
it likes. These zero cost identities make it harder to maintain reciprocity in the network [68]; 
in other words, harder to ensure that nodes face the consequences of their actions. It is due to 
the fact that accountability is based on identity which can be easily obtained, changed or 
discarded in mobile ad hoc networks given that there is no centralized identity management. 
The main reason for whitewashing being beneficial for an attacker is the neutral reputation 
that is an initial reputation allocated to each newcomer. The amount of this initial reputation, 
no matter how big or small, can always be manipulated by an identity changer when there are 
no restrictions imposed on it. In other words, this neutral reputation gives the opportunity for 
whitewashers to utilize network services without contributing to the network. This will 
further encourage them to change their identities after they have been identified by a 
misbehaviour detection scheme. We will discuss in Chapter 6 about how we put restrictions 
on the neutral reputation to discourage whitewashers. 
In order to make whitewashing attacks more effective and productive, an attacker can 
combine it with other types of attack. For example, in a reputation-based system that takes 
positive and negative feedback into consideration, a whitewasher can concurrently perform a 
self-promotion attack to lengthen its identity lifetime. Similarly along with other 
misbehaviour, a whitewasher can increase its identity lifetime by slandering those nodes that 
produce negative feedback about it, in order to make their negative feedback less reputable; 
hence their feedback will be considered less trustworthy in the network and have less impact. 
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3.6 Sybil Attack and Whitewashing Detection 
The following are some of the existing solutions developed for attackers using more than one 
identity. These solutions can be applied for both whitewashing and Sybil attacks, because the 
only difference between whitewashing and Sybil attacks is that a Sybil attacker 
simultaneously controls more than one identity whereas a whitewasher uses more than one 
identity but one at a time: there is no notion of simultaneity. 
Levine et al. [69] surveyed countermeasures against Sybil attacks and categorized these 
techniques as follows. 
" Trusted Certification: Many authors suggest trusted certification as a solution to 
prevent Sybil attacks. Trusted certification employs a centralized authority which is 
responsible for establishing a Sybil-free domain of identities. Each entity in the 
network is bound to a single identity certificate. Douceur [20] has shown that trusted 
certification is the only approach which is fully capable of preventing Sybil attacks. 
However, there are problems in this approach. For instance, it suffers from costly 
initial setup, lack of scalability and a single point of failure or attack. 
" Resource Testing: In this approach various tasks are distributed to all network nodes 
or all identities to test the resources of each node to determine whether each 
independent node has sufficient resources to accomplish the tasks. The tests are 
carried out to check the computational ability, storage ability and network bandwidth 
of a node. In the case of a Sybil attack, an attacker will not possess sufficient 
resources to perform the additional tests imposed on each Sybil node. The main 
drawback of this approach is that an attacker can acquire enough hardware resources, 
such as storage, memory, and network cards to accomplish these tasks. 
" Recurring Costs and Fees: In this approach identities are periodically re-validated. 
Each participating identity is further periodically charged with a fee. For example, 
Margolin et al. [70] propose the use of a recurring fee per participating identity to 
deter Sybil attackers and they suggest that such a recurring fee is more of a deterrent 
than a onetime fee. They also establish that recurring fees can incur a cost to the Sybil 
attacker that increases linearly with the total number of participating identities, 
whereas a one-time fee incurs only a constant cost. The recurring fee may not be a 
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monetary payment mechanism, it can also be a non-monetary payment mechanism 
such as CAPTCHAs [711 or charged SMS messages. CAPTCHAs are automated 
puzzles which are hard for a computer to solve but very simple for a human. 
However, fee management is generally too costly to implement and manage in 
MANETs. 
" Trusted Devices: This is a one-to-one mapping of a hardware device and a network 
entity. In other words, one hardware device, such as network card, is bound to one 
network entity. However, there is no way of preventing an entity from acquiring 
multiple hardware devices, such as where an attacker installs two network cards. 
The above schemes were basically developed for P2P and web based applications which 
incur a fee or micropayment on a per identity basis. However, these are not suitable for 
MANETs for two reasons: first, monetary payments are not suitable for MANETs; one of the 
various reasons for this is that MANETs are often deployed in emergency or disaster 
scenarios where these payment schemes are not practical. Second, in the case of a onetime 
entry fee or recurring (monetary) fee per identity, the management of these payments is too 
costly to implement in MANET environments. We summarize the following schemes that are 
specifically developed for ad hoc networks. 
Carrara ei al. [49] suggest low reputation rating for newcomers in order to discourage 
whitewashers from changing identities. Nodes are then required to increase this low 
reputation further. This promotes identity persistence in circumstances where there exists the 
ability to change identities easily. Unfortunately, the use of this mechanism will discourage 
new legitimate users; moreover by changing an identity this low reputation can still be 
manipulated. 
Hubaux et al. [72] exploit mobility to enhance security in MANETs. Off-line certification 
authorities are used for the authorization of mobile nodes when joining the network. For fully 
self-organized security where there is no central authority, nodes establish security 
associations purely by mutual agreement. Users can activate a point-to-point Secure Side 
Channel (SSC) using infrared or wired media between their personal devices to authenticate 
each other and set up shared keys when they are in close proximity to each other. The author 
attempts to solve the problem of impersonation and Sybil attacks by binding a user's face and 
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identity using these SSCs. However SSCs are based on the assumption that nodes are 
connected through wired or infrared connections. Infrared and wired connections are often 
not practical in a MANET environment, because of the short range and line-of-sight nature of 
the infrared links and the static nature of wired media (movement constraints). 
3.6.1 Cryptographic based Detection 
Hashmi et al. [73] categorized cryptographic based authentication mechanisms for MANETs 
into three broad categories, i. e. central Certification Authority (CA), distributed CA and self 
CA systems. 
Central CA systems: these are the simplest but most expensive solutions (in terms of required 
infrastructure cost); they are also called trusted certification which is discussed in Section 3.6. 
Before network formation, each node obtains its identity credentials from a central CA, 
which is also called Trusted Third Party. This TTP is responsible for thoroughly checking the 
credentials of the applicant before issuing any identity or certificate to it. It also maintains a 
database for storing all issued identities and uses this database for revoking or renewing any 
identity. These systems are very effective for Sybil attack detection; however there are certain 
limitations of this approach that make it unsuitable for MANETs. First, the reachability of 
TTP to all nodes in MANETs may not always be guaranteed. Second, TTP is the single point 
of failure or attack. Third, it is costly in terms of initial setup, etc. 
Distributed CA systems: in this approach, n nodes collectively perform the tasks of a CA in a 
MANET. Each of these n nodes uses the threshold cryptography in order to generate a share 
of the master private key of the CA. Eventually any k out of these n nodes will provide CA 
services in the network. Different authors suggest different values for the parameters k and n. 
Zhang et al. [74] suggest all nodes to take part in CA formation and then for a new node any 
k neighbours can provide CA services. A new node will be issued a certificate after 
negotiating with each of the k CA nodes. The issuance or renewal of a certificate for nodes is 
a resource intensive job that requires considerable communication between the new node and 
k CA nodes. Zhou et al. [75] suggest the n number of nodes that establish CA to be static. 
However, this approach limits the availability of CA services, i. e. the required k out of n 
nodes might not be accessible to any new nodes at all times. Generally, in these schemes, a 
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malicious node can easily get k multiple identities and k shares of the private key of 
distributed CA by continually making network joining requests and can eventually build the 
master private key of the distributed CA. It is due to the fact that these schemes do not 
specify how the new nodes' credentials are checked [73]. 
Self CA systems: these systems are not costly on node level; however they are not a good 
resistant for the Sybil attacks. In these systems, nodes can generate themselves as many 
identities as required. The Web of Trust model [76] is one such example of these systems. In 
this model, each node becomes an individual CA and issues its own certificate (identity). 
Nodes can create trusted certificate chains by signing and exchanging certificates with other 
trusted nodes. The trustworthiness can only be established by direct physical contact. Each 
node maintains a repository of certificates in order to store certificates issued by it and 
received from trusted ones. When a new node cast a request for authentication, the 
authenticator node checks its locally maintained repository for a certificate chain to leads to 
the requesting node. The authenticator signs the certificate if a certificate is found. 
Furthermore, both nodes exchange their certificate repositories (if trusted). The drawback of 
this model is that nodes are free to generate and sign certificates; similarly, they can create 
fake trust chains involving Sybil identities and hence subverting the whole authentication 
process. 
A thorough discussion on this topic is out of the scope of this thesis, interested readers are 
referred to Hashmi and Brooke [73]. 
3.6.2 Signal Strength based Detection 
The motivation for RSSI (Received Signal Strength Indicator) to be used for Sybil node 
detection in wireless networks is that it is lightweight compared to public key cryptography 
which requires heavy computation. However, RSSI is unreliable due to its time varying 
nature, its dependence on transmission power and, apart from this, the irregularity of the 
transmission medium. Most RSSI schemes are based on the radio model that says: the power 
received approximately decays with the distance to the power a, i. e. 
P,. oc Pt/d" Eq. 3-1 
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where P, is the received power at the receiver node, P, is the transmit power at the transmitter 
node, and d is the distance between the transmitter and the receiver. The value of a for 
outdoor propagation is 2, i. e. free space model and for indoor is 4, i. e. two-ray ground 
reflection model [77]. If the transmitted power is known, the receiver node can deduce the 
distance between them and thereby use simple geometric triangulation to locate the 
transmitter. Here we summarize some well-known RSSI based Sybil attack detection 
schemes. 
Zhong et al. [78] show that no sensor node can hide its location in an environment where it is 
monitored by four or more nodes. Using the ratio of RSSIs from these multiple receivers, no 
node can hide its location from the authority that controls these monitoring nodes. The proof 
given by the authors can be found in Appendix D. 
Demirbas et al. [79] implemented Zhong's algorithm of localization by conducting an indoor 
experiment of static MICA 2 motes. The author argues that since the locations of the nodes 
stay the same, it's cumbersome to calculate locations. In other words, they avoid calculations 
of fading through distance. They prefer to record and compare the ratio of RSSI for the 
received messages instead. They demonstrated through experimentations that RSSI values 
fluctuate a lot even for fixed nodes. Nonetheless using the ratio of RSSI, the time variance 
can be overcome and even two collaborating detector nodes are sufficient to detect a Sybil 
node. However, node cooperation is very important for the scheme to be viable; nevertheless, 
nodes may not be trusted or may collude in a hostile environment. 
Jiangtao et al. [80] proposed a Sybil node detection scheme for static clustered wireless 
sensor networks using RSSI and status information aggregated in the head nodes. They also 
used Zhong's algorithm [6] for localization. Furthermore to emulate a real network space 
situation, Jake's Channel Model [81] was established between network nodes. William jakes 
developed a model for Rayleigh fading (it is a fading model developed specially for urban 
areas) based on summing a series of sinusoid signals. Two methods were proposed to 
enhance detection accuracy: judging member nodes and head nodes. To judge member nodes, 
head nodes accumulate status information from the member nodes and use RSSI to verify the 
results. An alarm message is broadcast to other heads if a Sybil member node is detected. To 
judge the head nodes, member nodes cooperate and share information to verify the location 
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of each head. Members raise an alarm and announce re-clustering if all of the group members 
detect a Sybil head. The performance degrades with network sparseness due to errors in 
distance computation. The scheme suffers from the same problems as Demirbas et al. 's [79]. 
Suen et al. [82] propose a scheme for peer/node identification and authentication by 
associating transmitters' location information. Each node must be equipped with GPS to 
establish its own position. Using the magnitude of signal strength information, which is 
further confirmed by at least two collaborating nodes, the distance between receiver and 
transmitter is determined using lateration [83]. In order to precisely locate the transmitter, 
directional antennas are used with the collaboration of at least one trusted node (using 
angulation [83]) to capture the signal direction. The authors indicate that the factors affecting 
variance in location are speed and density. Location accuracy is decreased with an increase of 
speed and network sparseness. This scheme is lightweight but it incorporates directional 
antennas to determine the signal direction and the process needs trusted node collaboration. 
Xiao ei al. [84] propose a localized and distributed scheme to detect Sybil attacks in 
VANETs. The scheme takes advantage of the VANET traffic pattern and roadside base 
stations. The detection process uses statistical analysis of signal strength distribution. Signal 
strength distribution will be observed over a period of time for a suspect vehicle. Vehicles are 
categorized as claimer, witness, and verifier. Each vehicle will play all these roles, but on 
different occasions for different purposes. Nodes will periodically broadcast and receive 
beacon messages to/from their neighbours. Claimer nodes periodically broadcast beacon 
messages claiming their identities and positions, such as GPS position. In order to verify the 
position of the claimer, the verifier will collect the claimer's position plus its RSSI from the 
witnesses (neighbours) and compute locally the estimated position of the claimer. To get 
optimal estimated position an MMSE (Minimum Mean Square Error) calculation is 
performed on the collected signal strength information. Null hypothesis is used in order to 
confirm the detection. If the difference between the estimated and claimed positions of a 
claimer is greater than the significance level, then the claimer vehicle will be deemed as a 
Sybil node or vehicle. Once a Sybil node is detected the Sybil Classification algorithm is 
performed to check for other Sybil IDs generated by the same attacker. 
3.7 Summary 55 
In order to reduce the chance for Sybil nodes to take part in the witness group, witnesses are 
selected from the opposite traffic flow, which can be achieved by taking advantage of the 
traffic pattern and roadside base stations. Secondly, as the scheme uses signal strength 
distribution it is difficult for a malicious node to change its signal strength distribution. The 
scheme accuracy increases as the number of witnesses and observation period increases. 
Although results show the system to work effectively, it is nonetheless limited to VANET 
environments by design and would be difficult to adapt for more general MANET 
environments. 
3.7 Summary 
We have presented a detailed overview of the major schemes developed for enforcing 
cooperation in MANETs these are reputation-based, trust-based and credit-based schemes. 
Since reputation-based systems do not require any tamper proof hardware for nodes or a 
centralized management entity, such as virtual bank as used in credit-based schemes, they are 
deemed suitable for MANETs. Therefore our main focus has been on reputation-based 
schemes. We highlighted the potential limitations of these schemes, for example, a node can 
bypass the detection by changing identity (whitewashing attack), or a node can disrupt the 
detection accuracy by self-promoting itself or slandering about others by using Sybil attacks. 
We also surveyed the solutions for whitewashing and Sybil attacks from the literature, such 
as cryptography based and signal strength based detection; however cryptography based 
mechanisms usually need a trusted third party and signal strength based detection usually 
needs directional antennae or GPS systems for localizations. In chapters 6 and 7 we will 
present a layered security approach for the efficient tackling of whitewashing and Sybil 
attacks without using any trusted third party or any extra hardware, such as directional 
antennae or GPS systems. In the next chapter we will highlight another issue of detection 
bypassing which has not been addressed by the research community before, i. e. when a node 
interacts directly with its sources or destinations. 
Chapter 4A General Reputation 
System 
4.1 Background 
Currently, reputation systems are being widely used in many different fields of IT, such as on 
websites e. g. eBay and Amazon. In ad hoc networks, reputation mechanisms have been 
proposed to address and tackle the issue of selfishness in the network. The main difference 
between these two types of reputation-based systems is that the reputation systems used for 
websites are operated manually (i. e. involving human input); whereas in MANETs, the 
reputation systems are operated autonomously. One of the main advantages of reputation 
systems is that it works in a distributed manner which is why they are well adapted to an ad 
hoc network environment. In ad hoc networks, these mechanisms discourage and punish 
nodes that do not cooperate in the packet forwarding process. Ultimately, nodes having poor 
reputation are isolated from the network; whereas legitimate nodes (that cooperate) save 
battery power by not serving detected selfish nodes and enjoy higher throughput in the 
network as well. 
Resnick and Zeckhauser [85] proposed the following three main goals to be accomplished by 
a reputation system. 
" Provide information that helps distinguish between trustworthy and untrustworthy 
nodes or principals. 
" Encourage nodes to operate in a trustworthy manner. 
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" Discourage untrustworthy nodes, preventing them from services to which they do not 
contribute. 
Our aim in this chapter is to develop a reputation-based system for MANETs that captures 
the essence of the existing systems. We will evaluate that scheme through simulation in order 
to demonstrate that our scheme fulfils the above mentioned three goals. We will use that 
reputation-based scheme as a background for our work in the subsequent chapters (i. e. 
Chapter 5,6 and 7). In Chapter 5, we use CONFIDANT for our investigation of direct 
interactions which is closely related to our reputation-based scheme. In the text that follows 
we will discuss the design of our general reputation-based system for MANETs, its various 
components and how they interact with each other in order to detect and isolate selfish nodes 
in the network. Finally, we show through simulation that the designed reputation-based 
system reduces the selfish nodes' throughput and the selfish packet drop rate as well while 
maintaining relatively high throughput for good nodes. 
Throughout the operation of a network, a node can play two possible roles: the requestor and 
the provider role. The requestor refers to a node asking for the execution of a function. f 
whereas the provider refers to a node supposed to contribute or to provide the execution of 
function f. By function f we generally mean a packet forwarding service which the provider 
offers to the requestor. The main objective of the requestor is to identify the trustworthy or 
cooperative nodes; whereas the objective of the provider is to discourage untrustworthy or 
selfish nodes by dropping their packets. In the context of (the initialisation of) a reputation 
system, we describe how reputation builds up with the help of the requestor and the provider 
model as follows. 
The requestor: the requestor issues a request for function f (packet forwarding) and monitors 
its execution by using the promiscuous listening facility of the network interface card. The 
requestor confirms the result of the execution of function f and updates the reputation rating 
of the provider according to the acknowledged behaviour and eventually will periodically 
exchange this information with its neighbours. 
The provider: upon receipt of a request for the execution of function f, the provider accepts 
or rejects the request based on the reputation rating associated with the requestor. The 
provider simply drops packets originated by a selfish node without explicitly broadcasting 
A General Reputation System 58 
any message. This denial of execution of function f or dropping of packets by the provider is 
related to the node isolation mechanism. In the following sections we will discuss in detail 
the individual components, depicted in Figure 4-1, and their interaction among one another in 
the requester-provider context. 
DSR Agent 
Monitor 
Overheard packets 
Cache 
First hand info 
Second hand info 
Reputation System 
First hand rating 
Reputation rating 
Path Manager 
Figure 4-1: Major components of reputation-based system 
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4.2 The DSR Agent 
DSR is the underlying routing protocol, called Dynamic Source Routing protocol, discussed 
in Section 2.5 that we use for our reputation system. The intention of this work is actually to 
fortify the DSR routing protocol against selfish nodes. The main job of the DSR protocol is to 
discover routes, and to send and receive packets on the routing level. It also taps (or 
overhears) packets in promiscuous mode. The DSR agent is the main component in Network 
Simulator 2 (NS-2.30) responsible for most of the routing related activities in the network; 
hence we refer to it as the DSR Agent instead of DSR. In appendix B, we will briefly 
demonstrate the DSR protocol structure in NS-2. 
4.3 The Monitor 
The Monitor is the main component of the reputation-based system which is used to detect 
selfish behaviour of nodes by confirming the execution of function f. In Section 3.2 we 
discussed the popular monitoring mechanism called watchdog by Marti ei al. [54] and we 
also discussed its weaknesses. In spite of its drawbacks, it is still a promising solution for use 
as a monitoring tool; we elaborated our arguments about this in Section 3.3. Watchdog relies 
on the promiscuous mode operation of wireless NICs (network interface cards) based on the 
802.11 standards. Promiscuous mode means that if a node X is within the range of node Y, it 
can overhear all communications from node Y even if node X is not directly involved in those 
communications. 
Every node maintains a cache used to temporarily store copies of sent or forwarded packets. 
Whenever a node requires sending a data packet, no matter if as a source of data traffic or as 
a relay node forwarding a data packet for another node, it registers or saves a copy of the 
packet in its cache. An overheard packet from the next hop represents a proof of execution of 
the packet forwarding function f, if it is confirmed that the packet overheard is the one that is 
buffered in the cache. In order to confirm this, we compare the UID (unique identification) 
field of the packet in order to uniquely identify it. If the UID field of the packet is matched, 
the behaviour (which is forwarding in this case) is transferred to the reputation system and 
the packet entry is freed from the cache. On the other hand, if the watchdog timer expires and 
the corresponding expected packet has not been overheard, it is deemed that the next node has 
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dropped the packet. The behaviour of the next hop node is passed to the reputation system 
(which is not forwarding in this case) and the packet entry is freed from the cache, this whole 
process is shown in Figure 4-2. Based on the observation the behaviour can be written as the 
following. 
(a, if the overheard packet * observed packet or WDT expires, Behaviour =tb, if the overheard packet = expected packet. 
Here WDT is the watchdog timer, Behaviour denotes the event observed through direct 
experience, with a=1 if misbehaviour has been observed and b=1 otherwise. 
One important point to note here is that in the watchdog mechanism, the last hop before the 
destination node along the path will not perform all of the above formalities (for example 
activating the watchdog process) because the destination node is not expected to forward the 
packet any further. 
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4.4 The Reputation System 
The reputation system module also plays an important role: it is responsible for the detection 
of misbehaving nodes. It interacts with the monitor, the path manager and with the one-hop 
neighbours, as shown in Figure 4-1. Each node maintains two tables: a firsthand information 
table and a reputation rating table. Any direct interaction experiences regarding other nodes 
are captured through the monitor module and are stored in the firsthand information table. 
The firsthand information table contains the address of a node and its firsthand reputation 
rating. In order to keep the reputation secret, each node will share only its firsthand reputation 
information with its neighbours. The reputation table maintains the overall reputation of 
nodes in which reputation is computed from both firsthand and secondhand ratings. We 
assume neighbours to be trustworthy5 for exchanging their direct experiences in the form of 
secondhand information. We adopt Buchegger et al. [55] model for reputation formulation 
and detection, which is as follows. 
Handling firsthand information: We define two variables a and ß, the former represents 
selfish (packet dropping) behaviour and the latter represents good (packet forwarding) 
behaviour these variables are increased or decreased based on the behaviour which is the 
result of the monitoring process. The purpose of the Eq. 4-1 is to provide a reputation system 
that incorporates firsthand, secondhand and fading updates. Based on the observed behaviour 
the variables a and ß are updated accordingly as follows. 
a=ýa+&)a 
/3 = ý/3 + mb Eq. 4-1 
Here 4 is the fading factor that fades reputations after a fading timeout in order to assign 
higher weight to the recent activities, its value falls in [0,1], and w is the weight assigned to 
the secondhand information, its value should be less than I which falls in [0,11 - Reputations 
i. e. a and /3 in Eq. 4-1 will be updated by three processes as depicted in Table 4-1; whereas 
s In the thesis, we will not examine issues related to rumour spreading, etc. 
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the initial reputation rating of a node is a=ß=1. Each process will provide different 
values for a, b, w and C. These updates are explained below. 
Firsthand update: in this process a and b represent a single direct event observed (l indicates 
the confirmation of the observed behaviour, i. e. forward or drop of a packet); these values are 
simply added to the overall reputation rating, as shown in Eq. 4-1. 
Secondhand update: each node will share its direct experiences, i. e. a and ß, of nodes in the 
network. For example, after direct experience with node j, node i will share a and ß of node j 
with other nodes, let's say node k. After receiving this information shared by node i about 
node j, node k will treat a and ß as a and b in Eq. 4-1 and will apply the secondhand weight 
as well, as shown in Table 4-1. 
Fading update: reputations are continually faded in order to motivate nodes for cooperation 
or to reduce a chance for a node that uses its high reputation for malicious activities. As 
shown in Table 4-1, the secondhand information will be ignored when reputations are faded. 
Table 4-1: Reputation update processes 
S. No. Process Description a b { iu 
1 Firsthand Update 0/1 0/1 I 1 
2 Secondhand Update a I Secondhand Weight 
3 Fading Update 0 0 Fading Weight I 
Handling secondhand information: each node periodically broadcasts its firsthand 
information table after PT (publishing timeout), in order to inform its one-hop neighbours 
about its direct experiences. This can be performed by setting Time-To-Live (TTL) field to 1. 
After receiving firsthand information from a node, which will become the secondhand 
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information for the receiving nodes, the reputation system conducts a deviation test on each 
individual rating. In other words, other nodes' ratings are checked against the node's own 
reputation rating, if other nodes' experiences deviate too much from the node's own 
experience, the secondhand rating will not be accepted; otherwise the reputation rating will 
be updated. 
Detection: in order to setup a criterion for the detection of misbehaving nodes, we have to 
setup a threshold to detect selfish nodes because the distinction between good and selfish 
nodes is very important. We use the following formula for the misbehaviour threshold. 
MT - aa+, 6 
Eq. 4-2 
After calculating the reputation of a node, the reputation is checked against the misbehaviour 
threshold, as shown in the Eq. 4-2 above. Reputations below the misbehaviour threshold 
indicate well-behaved nodes and these nodes are therefore provided with packet forwarding 
services, whereas reputations above the misbehaviour threshold are deemed to be 
misbehaving and the identity of these nodes is communicated to the path manager component 
in order to clean the routes from misbehaving nodes. This whole process is shown in Figure 
4-3. 
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Delete routes 
The path manager is originally responsible for maintaining the route cache of the DSR 
protocol. The reputation system interacts with the path manager to inform it whenever 
misbehaving nodes are detected. The path manager maintains a list of misbehaving nodes and 
provides the facility for insertion, deletion and searching a node address in the list. These 
types of query can be sent by the DSR agent or the reputation system. When a misbehaving 
node is detected and the path manager is informed of its identity, it should find out and delete 
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all routes containing the misbehaving node. As a result, when a node searches for a route in 
the DSR route cache, the path manager only opts for safe routes that contains only good 
nodes. 
4.6 Node Isolation 
As discussed above that path manager will store the identity of misbehaving nodes and delete 
all routes containing these misbehaving nodes. This is considered as a first step of node 
isolation. The second step is that upon receipt of data or a route request packet, each node 
should check the source of the packet and then the DSR agent queries the path manager to 
establish whether the source of the packet is registered as misbehaving, as shown in Figure 
4-4. If the data or the route request packet originated from a misbehaving node, the packet 
will silently be dropped. Eventually, misbehaving nodes will be gradually isolated from the 
network thereby reducing the overall selfish nodes' throughput in the network, as will be 
shown in the next section. 
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In order to make sure that our designed reputation system achieves its primary goal, we 
evaluate it through simulation. As we mentioned in Section 4.1, the objective of a reputation- 
based system is to have a threshold that distinguish between good and selfish nodes, to 
encourage good nodes by providing them high throughput and to discourage selfish nodes by 
reducing their benefits (throughput). Once we find out that our designed reputation-based 
scheme achieves its goal, we will implement our proposed schemes (from Chapter 6 and 7) 
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on top of it. Please note that the utility of a node can also be taken as a benefit of a node, as 
we did in the coming chapters, however, we will consider only throughput here. 
4.7.1 Simulation Setup 
We use Network Simulator NS-2.30 to implement the scheme and evaluate it using the 
parameters listed in Table 4-2. Additional parameters include: MT = 0.8, WDT = 0.5 seconds, 
co = 0.2, C=0.9, fading timeout = 60 seconds and PT = 10 seconds. Each node runs DSR as 
its routing protocol. Selfish nodes are selected randomly from all of the population. Each 
selfish node participates in the routing process by forwarding routing related control packets, 
such as route requests, route replies and route error messages. Selfish nodes drop all data 
packets received from other nodes for forwarding. 
Table 4-2: Simulation Parameters 
Parameter Level 
Area 1000m X 1000m 
Maximum Speed 10 m/s 
Pause Time 60 seconds 
Radio Range 250m 
Carrier Sense Range 550m 
Number of Nodes 30 
Number of Connections 20 
MAC 802.11 
Application CBR 
Packet Size 64 B 
Simulation Time 900s 
Movement Random Waypoint Model 
Placement Uniform 
Selfish Population 0% to 100% 
The simulation results obtained are the averages from running 20 random scenarios for each 
point on the graph using random seeds. A comparison has been made between the DSR 
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protocol and reputation incorporated DSR protocol. We evaluate the scheme using the 
following metrics. 
4.7.2 Metrics 
1. Good Throughput. The throughput available to good nodes. We calculate throughput as 
the ratio between the total number of data packets successfully received by destination 
nodes to the total number of data packets sent by the source nodes (at the application 
layer). 
(: nnd Thrmit = 
Total Received Pkts 
r--- Total Sent Pkts by Good Nodes 
2. Evil Throughput. The throughput available to selfish nodes. 
Evil Th. rnv_t. = 
Total Received Pkts 
"" -, -, r-- Total Sent Pkts by Evil Nodes 
3. Selfish Drop Rate (SDR). The ratio of data packets dropped by selfish nodes to all 
dropped packets. 
. SnR = 
Total Selfishly Dropped Pkts 
Total All Types Dropped Pkts 
4.7.3 Simulation Results 
The throughput available to selfish nodes in the defenceless DSR is comparatively greater 
than that of the evil throughput of the reputation enabled DSR, as shown by Figure 4-5. 
However, the difference tends to lower when the percentage of selfish nodes increases in the 
network. This is due to the fact that even selfish nodes' packets are dropped by the other 
selfish nodes and hence do not reach their corresponding destinations. 
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Figure 4-5: Comparison of Evil Throughput 
Likewise, the throughput available to good nodes in reputation enabled DSR is also relatively 
stable as compared to that of the good throughput using the defenceless DSR protocol, as 
depicted in Figure 4-6. However, the good throughput in reputation enabled DSR decreases 
when the percentage of selfish population increases. The good throughput vanishes when the 
selfish population increases to 100 percent. This is due to the fact that all nodes becomes 
selfish: there are no good nodes left in the network. The reputation enabled DSR maintains a 
relatively stable and higher good throughput than the defenseless DSR, especially when 
mobility is moderate. 
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Figure 4-6: Comparison of Good Throughput 
As shown in Figure 4-7, the reputation mechanism incorporated into the DSR protocol 
significantly reduces the selfish drop rate in the network. As the percentage of selfish 
population increases the selfish drop rate in the reputation enabled DSR decreases slightly. 
This is due to the fact that other drops in the network increase; for example when selfish 
nodes are detected, every other node will drop their data and route request packets in order to 
isolate them from the network. The good throughput ceases when there is no packet 
forwarder left in the network. 
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In this Chapter, we presented our general reputation-based scheme for MANE1's. We 
demonstrated its various components with the help of diagrams and their interaction among 
each other in order to detect and isolate selfish nodes in the network. We have shown through 
simulation that the designed reputation-based system successfully satisfied its main 
objectives. Firstly, it differentiates between good and evil nodes by detecting misbehaving 
nodes in the network. Secondly, selfish nodes are discouraged by reducing their benefits. 
Thirdly, good nodes gain higher benefits than the selfish nodes; hence there is advantage in 
cooperation. We will use our proposed reputation-based scheme in order to show in the 
coming chapters that selfish nodes can apply certain strategies to bypass the detection and 
gain higher benefits in the network, for example by changing identities or interacting directly 
with the source or destination. 
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Chapter 5 The Effect of Direct 
Interactions 
5.1 Introduction 
Selfish nodes are always the intermediate nodes along a path. They do not forward packets 
for others because there is no benefit for them in doing so. This selfish behaviour of nodes 
potentially effects throughput of the network. This issue has been considered by a number of 
authors by showing that a small percentage of selfish nodes can significantly reduce the 
overall throughput of the network [ 15,25,38,54]. 
As discussed in Section 4.1, the main objectives of reputation-based schemes is to detect 
selfish nodes through a misbehaviour threshold, maintain network throughput by enabling 
nodes to construct paths that only include good nodes and discourage selfish nodes by 
restricting their services, i. e. selfish nodes are not provided with packet forwarding services 
anymore by the good nodes acting as intermediate nodes. However, selfish nodes can still 
gain benefit in the form of throughput and utility from the network by interacting directly 
with the destination nodes by exploiting mobility. 
In the case of direct interactions, there is no intermediate node along the path to drop the 
selfish nodes' data packets as it is the strategy of reputation-based systems to decrease selfish 
nodes' throughput and utility. This has the effect of significantly improving the overall 
throughput and utility of both the good nodes as well as the selfish nodes. Figure 5-1 
elaborates on this by depicting all possibilities for direct interactions between nodes. Direct 
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interactions can cause problems which will be discussed in this chapter from two different 
facets or perspectives, i. e. reputation system security and the biasness in their experimental 
results. In the first one, we will look at direct interactions as a selfish node's strategy for 
increasing its benefits after being detected by a reputation-based system. In this case selfish 
nodes can strategically select their locations where they can interact directly with their source 
or destination. We propose methods to counteract and mitigate it. In the second one, we will 
look at the confusion caused due to the direct interactions when reputation-based schemes are 
evaluated under certain metrics, such as throughput, utility, network delay and overhead. We 
propose throughput and utility categorization technique in order to mitigate the confusion 
caused by direct interactions during evaluation. We will investigate and demonstrate this 
using CONFIDANT [25-26] as a benchmark scheme for our case study. 
1. Selfish Source No 
2. Selfish Source No 
3. Good Source No 
4. Good Source lip 
Selfish Destination 
Good Destination 
Selfish Destination 
Good Destination 
Figure 5-1: Possible ways for direct interactions to occur among nodes 
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2 we will cover relevant background 
material and related work that has been proposed in the research community. In Section 5.3 
we overview the benchmark scheme called CONFIDANT which we use for our analysis. In 
Section 5.4 we will highlight the potential problems caused by direct interactions that should 
be addressed when considering mobility in simulation-based evaluations of reputation-based 
schemes in MANETs. In Section 5.5, we give possible remedies for reducing direct 
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interactions. Section 5.6 presents our analysis and results. We conclude the chapter in Section 
5.7. 
5.2 Background 
In a MANET environment, reputation information is locally evolved through monitoring 
packet forwarding activities using passive acknowledgments (e. g. promiscuous mode 
listening). Schemes such as CONFIDENT, CORE and others [25,38,54] further share this 
information with neighbours to collaboratively detect and isolate selfish nodes. On the other 
hand, some schemes such as LARS [66], and OCEAN [67] rely only on local information to 
detect and isolate selfish nodes without considering secondhand reputation information. Due 
to ambiguous collision and receiver collision problems in passive acknowledgment based 
monitoring, two-hop (explicit) acknowledgment was proposed by Kejun et al. [56] to 
overcome these problems at the cost of increased communication overhead. In order to 
reduce overhead, Zhao and Delgado-Frias [57] propose a scheme that combines the multipath 
routing and single path data transmission with an end-to-end feedback mechanism; however 
it only detects misbehaving paths with no punishment strategy for individual misbehaving 
nodes. 
Li and Wu [86-87] identify that mobility can increase the scope of interactions and 
recommendation dissemination thereby speeding up the overall trust convergence. Pirzada el 
al. [27] compare the performance of trust-based reactive routing protocols in which it is 
further shown that mobility increases throughput in the network (in the presence of selfish 
nodes) due to the increased interactions among nodes; however they did not explore this fact 
that the increase in throughput is actually caused by the Dis of nodes. Their work differs from 
ours in that they show the effect of mobility on throughput; however, they do not consider 
direct interactions among nodes while evaluating their schemes. 
5.3 Overview of the CONFIDANT Scheme 
Buchegger and Boudec proposed an extension to the Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) 
protocol called CONFIDANT [25] (Cooperation Of Nodes, Fairness In Dynamic Ad-hoc 
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NeTworks). It has four main components: the Monitor, the Trust Manager, the Reputation 
System and the Path Manager. The Monitor promiscuously listens to neighbours to observe 
their behaviour, for example, packet forwarding behaviour etc. Every time a source node 
sends a packet to the destination node via intermediate nodes, the source node holds a copy of 
the packet in memory until it overhears the same packet forwarded by the intermediate node 
before time WDT (watchdog timer) expires. The source node increases the reputation of the 
next node when it is confirmed that it has forwarded its packet, and decreases the reputation 
otherwise. The Trust Manager is responsible for sending an ALARM to all its friend nodes 
when misbehaviour is detected, and other trust managers receiving ALARM messages 
determine the trustworthiness of the message by scrutinizing the trust level of the sender. 
Based on this information the Reputation System maintains a local rating list and a blacklist, 
and further exchanges these lists with friends. Finally the Path Manager evaluates paths 
according to the reputation of nodes along the path and discards paths that include 
misbehaving nodes. Since this protocol allows nodes in the network to send ALARM 
messages to each other, it could increase the opportunity for attackers to send false alarm 
messages that a node is misbehaving while this isn't actually the case, a process referred to as 
rumour spreading [55]. 
The authors enhance their scheme in Buchegger and Boudec [26] by using a Bayesian model 
that classifies and rules out liars. In order to cope with rumour spreading, a trust rating 
mechanism is introduced that represents the trustworthiness of a node. Each node maintains a 
trust rating, a firsthand rating and a reputation rating for every other node. Only firsthand 
information is exchanged with neighbours. Secondhand information and trust ratings are 
never exchanged. Nodes build their reputation tables based on their own firsthand 
information, as well as the secondhand information received from neighbours. To reduce the 
effect of liars who publish false reputation ratings, a secondhand rating is accepted by the 
receiver only if it is compatible with the current reputation rating. For compatible reputation 
information, the trust rating of the publisher is increased and in case of incompatible 
information the trust rating is decreased. We implemented this version of CONFIDANT for 
our simulation study since it is robust and effective. 
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5.4 Problems Caused by Direct Interactions 
5.4.1 A Selfish Node Strategy 
it is believed that mobility increases the capacity of wireless ad hoc networks, as pointed out 
by Grossglauser and Tse [88] where selfishness in the network was not considered. However, 
selfish nodes can exploit mobility to increase their throughput and utility, even in the 
presence of a cooperation enforcement scheme. Crowcroft et al. [89] demonstrate that the 
geographic location of a node has a heavy effect on cooperation enforcement schemes. They 
observed in their study that nodes located at the middle of the network can have better 
services than those at the edges. Figueiredo et al. [90] argue that mobility decreases the 
capacity of wireless ad hoc networks by evaluating the strategies of selfish nodes for 
increasing their benefits. Using game theoretic models, they study the incentive mechanisms 
(reputation and credit) and show that if users strategically choose their positions in the 
system, network performance degrades significantly. They pointed out that when users apply 
their best strategies, the outcome would be the topologies where nodes are either tightly 
clustered together (in the case of credit-based scheme) or spread into a chain (in the case of 
reputation-based scheme). 
In a similar way, a selfish node can exploit mobility and interact directly with a destination 
node to increase its benefits without being punished by the reputation-based system. In 
Section 5.5.1, we propose a general solution in order to discourage such types of selfish node 
activity. 
5.4.2 Confusion in Evaluation 
Reputation-based schemes are usually evaluated based on measurements of the utility and 
throughput [25-26,38] of nodes. Other metrics have also been considered [56,911 such as 
delay or the routing overhead of the network. These metrics are affected when the schemes 
are evaluated in environments where there are high levels of direct interactions between 
nodes in the network. We will show in Section 5.6 that the commonly adopted simulation 
parameters used by the research community for the evaluation of reputation-based schemes 
The Effect of Direct Interactions 78 
usually produce high levels of direct interactions that can cause confusing results. The 
following are the metrics affected by direct interactions. 
Utility 
In fact the direct benefit or utility relates to the source and destination of a packet only, and 
consequently intermediate nodes are naturally inclined to act selfishly and save power for 
their own communications rather than spending it on forwarding packets for others. Altman 
et al. [92] and Buchegger et al. [25] define the benefit or utility of a node as follows. 
ui = br Z Preceived + bs F Pent - cf 2: Pforwarded Eq. 5-1 
Where u; is the utility of a node i, b, is the benefit when i receives a packet as the destination 
node, b, is the benefit acquired by i when its packet successfully reaches its destination and cf 
is the cost (in terms of memory, bandwidth and CPU usage) incurred by node i of forwarding 
a packet for others. The exact values of benefit and cost variables (b bs and cf) depend on 
energy models, CPU and memory usage per packet, but the value of each one is in the range 
[0,1]. One of the main focuses of reputation-based schemes is on decreasing the utility of 
selfish nodes and increasing the utility of good nodes in the network. Utility is likely to 
increase in networks with more direct interactions between sources and destinations. We will 
show in Section 5.6 that the commonly adopted simulation parameters in mobile 
environments produce a substantial amount of direct interactions. This increases the nodes' 
utilities which can cause a misjudgement about whether the utilities are increased or 
decreased due to the direct interactions or due to the designed scheme. 
Throughput 
The main objective of reputation-based schemes is to maintain reciprocity in the network. 
This is performed as each node provides services to good nodes only. As a result, good 
throughput is increased and evil throughput is decreased. In ad hoc networks packet 
forwarding services are provided by the intermediate nodes. Despite the punishment and 
restrictions imposed on selfish nodes, they can still increase their throughput by interacting 
directly with a source or a destination (this, by the way, can also happen with the good 
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nodes). If a selfish node takes a position as shown in Figure 5-1 acting as a source and/or 
destination for some time during its simulation lifetime, its originated or received packet 
count will be considerably increased; hence increasing its overall throughput. If this situation 
prevails in the network, it can cause confusing results as we will highlight in Section 5.6. 
That is, it is not clear whether the good and evil throughputs are being affected primarily by 
the direct interactions or by the reputation-based scheme. 
Delay and Routing Overhead 
The direct throughput gained also affects the delay and routing overhead of the network. 
When a source node directly interacts with a destination node there is no intermediate node 
involved in the traffic forwarding, which reduces the overall number of forwarding events in 
the network and hence reduces the overall routing overhead. It also affects the delay of the 
network because there are only source and destination nodes in the routing path and hence 
low delay results. In other words, increased direct throughput produces reduced delay in the 
network. Reputation-based schemes considering delay and routing overhead as metrics, can 
lead to confusion in understanding the results. In particular, it becomes harder to establish 
whether the reduced delay and routing overhead is caused by the direct interactions or by the 
designed reputation-based scheme. 
5.5 Possible Remedies 
It is important to reduce the direct interactions or at least consider them while evaluating 
reputation-based schemes. Alternatively, new strategies should be devised for when there is 
no intermediate node between a source and a destination. The following are possible 
remedies which may help reducing direct interactions or at least allow nodes to be treated 
fairly when interacting directly. The first method can be used to mitigate the effect when 
selfish nodes exploit direct interactions for their own benefit, while the latter two methods 
can be used to reduce the confusion caused by direct interactions. 
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5.5.1 Contribution to Consumption Ratio (C2CR) 
In P2P networks, Contribution to Consumption Ratio (C2CR) plays an important role when 
network resources are allocated to nodes, for example allocating download limit, download 
speed etc. to nodes. The same concept may be used here to judge every node based on this 
C2CR value. By contribution we mean the data forwarding service provided by a node and by 
consumption we mean the use of other nodes' data forwarding services. The C2CR is 
different from reputation because reputation is the measurement of cooperation of a node, it 
does not say anything about the overall service consumption of that node. The C2CR on the 
other hand may reveal the overall behavioural history of a node in the network, i. e. how much 
data forwarding service is provided to the network and how much the same service is used by 
the node itself. Using reputation-based schemes, a node can enjoy low contribution and high 
consumption of the network resources, such as packet forwarding service by intermediate 
nodes, without being detected by the reputation system. For example, a node can aim at low 
contribution by performing selective dropping, dropping route request packets, interacting 
directly with its source or destination or providing services to one node and refuse them to 
another. C2CR can help to identify such dishonest nodes in the network. In MANETs, the 
C2CR of a node n can be calculated by overhearing all the packets forwarded by n and all the 
packets originating from n, formulated as follows. 
C2CR(n) - 
Pkt Forwarded(n) 
Pkt_Originated(n) Eq. 5-2 
Every node logs this information and shares it with its neighbours. Every source and 
destination interacting directly should provide quality of service (QoS) based on the C2CR 
value. The higher the C2CR value of a node the better the QoS it will get and the lower the 
delay it will experience. For example, if a source node asks for a file to download from a 
destination in the network, the destination node will intentionally delay the file based on the 
C2CR value of the source node. The request from a node will be ignored if its C2CR value is 
less than a certain threshold. In this way a source directly interacting with a destination can 
be assessed and can be fairly treated in terms of services. As a result a selfish node cannot 
increase its throughput or utility by interacting directly with the destination node. 
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5.5.2 Tweaking Simulation Parameters 
The most commonly used simulation parameters for the evaluation of reputation-based 
schemes can cause substantial direct interactions among nodes in the network, as shown in 
Section 5.6, including the simulation parameters used for CONFIDANT. The radio 
transmission range and simulation area are usually taken as 250 meters and 1000 meters 
squared respectively by researchers for evaluation and testing; some authors such as Zakhary 
and Radenkovic [93] use 750 meters squared with 250 meters radio range. Some simulators, 
such as NS-2, use a 250m radio range as a default value. This 250m radio range in a1 km 
squared area potentially increases the possibility of a source interacting directly with its 
destination in a mobile environment, as shown in Figure 5-2. This is due to the fact that one 
node having a 250m radio range can cover a diameter of up to 500m, while only three nodes 
(2-hops) can easily cover a distance of more than I km. In a mobile environment such nodes 
can easily interact directly as a source and destination. It is suggested that reducing the radio 
transmission range may help reduce direct interactions. However, establishing an optimal 
radio transmission range that produces high throughput and low collision rate in all situations 
is a difficult task. In order to avoid this problem, we discuss a promising method in the next 
section. 
1000m 
250m U 250m 
Range Range 
Figure 5-2: 1Km Radio Range Occupied by Two Nodes 
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5.5.3 Utility and Throughput Categorization 
Throughput and utility categorization can be used to reduce the ambiguity and confusion 
caused by direct interactions. This kind of solution is not appropriate for the counteraction of 
selfish nodes that use direct interactions as a strategy to bypass the detection process. 
However, we will show in the next section that this method is suitable for reducing the 
prevalence of confusing results. Since high levels of direct interaction produce high evil and 
good throughput in a network, categorizing utility and throughput into direct and indirect6 
forms will help clarify the evaluation of a scheme. In other words, when evaluating the 
throughput of a reputation-based scheme, it may be better to isolate the regular (indirect) 
throughput from the direct throughput (based on direct interactions) to establish whether the 
throughput is increased due to the designed scheme or as an effect of the direct interactions. 
In the next section, we implement a widely used reputation-based scheme, called 
CONFIDANT, to confirm how much throughput is the result of these direct interactions. Our 
simulation studies show that in the presence of 20% selfish nodes and in a continuous mobile 
environment, 59% of the evil throughput and 29% of the good throughput is gained through 
direct interactions among nodes. These direct interactions accordingly affect the delay and 
routing overhead in the network. 
5.6 Simulation Based Analysis 
5.6.1 Setup 
We use Network Simulator NS-2.30 to implement the CONFIDANT scheme and evaluate it 
using the parameters listed in Table 5-1. These parameters are commonly used in the research 
community. In this simulation study our aim is to find out how often a source node interacts 
directly with a destination node and to what extent it affects the throughput, utility, delay and 
6 We will refer to the evil and good throughput as throughput available to selfish nodes and good nodes respectively. By 
direct and indirect throughput we mean that throughput gained through direct interactions and without direct interactions of a 
source and a destination respectively. 
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routing overhead. We categorize the throughput and utility of the network to improve the 
clarity of the results obtained. 
Table 5-1: Simulation Parameters 
Parameter Level 
Area 1000m x 1000m 
Maximum Speed 10 m/s 
Pause Time 0 to 1000 seconds 
Carrier Sense Range 550m 
Number of Nodes 50 
MAC 802.11 
Application CBR 
Packet Size 64 B 
Simulation Time 900s 
Movement Random Waypoint Model 
Placement Uniform 
Selfish Population 20% 
5.6.2 Mobility Model 
We use a random way-point movement model [94-95] for our mobile scenarios used in our 
simulations. In this model a node first waits for the pause time duration and then moves on to 
a randomly chosen position with a random velocity. The process is repeated until the 
simulation ends. A zero second pause time represents continuous mobility; we increase this 
up to a 1000 second pause indicating a static network (since each simulation run lasts for 900 
seconds). 
5.6.3 Metrics 
We evaluated the CONFIDANT scheme using the following metrics. 
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1. Throughput. The ratio between the total number of data packets successfully received by 
destination nodes to the total number of data packets sent by source nodes at the 
application layer. 
2. Good Throughput. The throughput available to good nodes. 
3. Evil Throughput. The throughput available to selfish nodes. 
4. Direct Good Throughput. The throughput achieved by good nodes through direct 
interactions, with no intermediate nodes involved in the path. 
5. Direct Evil Throughput. The throughput gained by selfish nodes through direct 
interactions. 
6. Real or Indirect Throughput. The throughput achieved without direct interactions. 
7. Utility. The benefit a node can get from the network, the formula is shown in Eq. 5-I. 
We used the value of b,, b, and cyto be I in order to measure the utility in packets only. 
A negative utility value means that a node incurs an overall loss. 
8. Evil Utility. The utility gained by evil nodes. 
9. Good Utility. The utility achieved by good nodes. 
10. Direct Evil Utility. The sum of 'received and P e,, 1 where the source, destination or both 
are selfish and happen to be interacting directly. Please note that in our scenario selfish 
nodes do not forward any data packets, hence Pforwarded doesn't apply here. 
11. Direct Good Utility. The sum of Preceived and Psent where the source, destination or both 
are good nodes that happen to be interacting directly. Please note that our aim here is to 
show that a considerable amount of sent and received packets are gained from direct 
interactions, hence we do not plot Pforwarded" 
12. Delay. The total time (in seconds) taken by data packets to reach their destinations 
divided by the total number of packets. 
13. Routing overhead. The total number of sent and forwarded events on the routing layer. 
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5.6.4 Analysis 
Figure 5-3 shows the effect of selfish nodes on network throughput, with 60 seconds pause 
time. If all nodes are selfish, throughput still exists in the network due to the direct 
interactions; this throughput will be increased when the pause time reduces. As shown in 
Figure 5-4, both the normal evil and good throughputs are increased due to mobility where 
the increase in evil throughput is more than that of the good throughput. By normal we mean 
the throughput that is normally shown by reputation-based schemes in the literature, which is 
a mixture of both direct and indirect throughput. The evil throughput peaks at a 600 second 
pause time. One of the reasons for this is that the evil throughput is also affected by the actual 
act of the node pausing: during a pause when a selfish node is detected by its neighbours, it 
then moves to a new neighbourhood after the pause where it is likely to be treated as a new 
node, and hence starts receiving services again. However, more than one pause throughout 
the simulation lifetime can increase the chance of repeating interactions among nodes and 
hence faster detection. For example, a selfish node detected in one neighbourhood (after 
having paused there) may interact with the same nodes again without having any services a 
second time. The 600 seconds pause may be the optimal time for a selfish node to stay static 
along with other nodes, after which it then starts moving for the remaining period of 300 
seconds until the end of the simulation. 
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Figure 5-3: Average Throughput with respect to % of Selfish nodes 
In Figure 5-4, the direct evil and direct good throughputs also increase with the increase in 
mobility and here again the increase in direct evil throughput is affected more than the direct 
good throughput. This is because the number of good nodes is greater than the number of 
selfish nodes. With a zero second pause time, 59% of the evil throughput is gained through 
direct interactions and 29% of the good throughput is achieved through direct interactions. In 
order to clarify this fact further, we found out that in 41.75% evil throughput, 24.75% is 
achieved through direct interactions while in 55.96% good throughput, 16.24% is gained 
through direct interactions. 
So the real benefit to a selfish node when a cooperation enforcement scheme is in force is 
considerably lower than the results suggest, after the direct interactions are filtered out, as 
shown in Figure 5-5. Likewise, the good throughput is also increased due to the direct 
interactions of nodes. This difference suggests that in work related to the effectiveness of 
reputation schemes, there is a need to make clear whether the increased good throughput is 
due to the direct interactions or the cooperation enforcement scheme itself. In other words, in 
order to evaluate reputation-based schemes, it's important to filter out the direct throughput 
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from the indirect throughput, in order to be clear about how much good throughput is 
increased due the scheme being assessed. Likewise, this also helps to establish how much evil 
throughput is reduced due to the reputation-based scheme. In short, categorizing throughput 
and utility clarifies that (i) the actual evil throughput is much lower and (ii) the good 
throughput is also lower than that claimed. 
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Figure 5-4: Direct and Indirect Throughput vs. Mobility 
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Figure 5-5: The Indirect Good and Evil Throughput vs. Mobility 
As shown in Figure 5-6 and Figure 5-7, there is considerable amount of evil and good utility 
gained due to direct interactions which can cause confusion for the developers as well as for 
the readers. In the scheme evaluation a developer may be frustrated (as I was) about the 
increase in evil utility (which is against the aim of the reputation-based systems); however, in 
reality this might not be the case. Because the evil utility contains direct evil utility which a 
reputation-based system do not have the mechanisms to prevent or even mitigate it. In the 
case of good utility, the actual indirect good utility might not be so much to claim the scheme 
to be efficient. The reason for the greater received packets than sent packets in Figure 5-7 is 
that the sent packets are recorded for good nodes only, i. e. for 80% of the population 
(because it is good utility) while the received packets are recorded for the good as well as evil 
nodes, i. e. all population. 
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When there is low direct throughput in the network, there are more forwarded events and 
hence higher average per packet delay. In other words, there is an inverse relationship 
between direct throughput and delay as well as forwarded events on the routing layer, as can 
be seen in Figure 5-8 and Figure 5-9. To evaluate the effect of a reputation-based scheme on 
the average delay and routing overhead in the network, it's also important to consider the 
direct throughput in the network. 
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Figure 5-8: Delay Affected by Direct Throughput vs. Mobility 
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5.7 Summary 
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Mobility may cause strange problems in simulation-based evaluation of schemes, especially 
for reputation-based schemes. The main target of reputation-based schemes is to detect and 
isolate selfish nodes, increase good throughput and decrease evil throughput in the network. 
Due to mobility however, the chance of direct interactions of a source node and a destination 
node increases which can result in misjudgements about the effect on throughput in the 
presence of selfish nodes in the network. Apart from the natural occurrence of direct 
interactions, a selfish node can use them to increase their benefits. We have shown that there 
is a pronounced gain in throughput caused by direct interactions and that direct interactions 
also affect delay and routing overheads in the network. Based on the results provided, we can 
establish that it is important to reduce direct interactions or at least consider them while 
evaluating reputation-based schemes. Finally, we suggested some strategies that should be 
used to reduce direct interactions and to mitigate the potential confusion caused by them in 
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the evaluation of reputation-based schemes. In the following chapters we will propose 
proactive and reactive schemes in order to tackle whitewashing and Sybil attacks. 
Chapter 6 Deterring Whitewashing 
Attacks in MANETS 
6.1 Background 
The sole purpose of reputation-based schemes is to let selfish nodes bear the consequences of 
their bad actions in the form of isolation from the network while allowing good nodes to 
enjoy the network services. Through this selfish node isolation process, nodes are encouraged 
to cooperate. However, the open nature of MANETs enables a selfish node to change its 
identity and start over again with a fresh (new) identity; in this way a selfish node 
whitewashes its previous misbehaving history. This is called a whitewashing or identity 
changing attack. According to Hoffman et al. [60], "whitewashing attacks occur when 
attackers abuse the system for short-term gains by letting their reputation degrade and then 
escape the consequences of abusing the system by using some system vulnerability to repair 
their reputation". If identities are not persistent, this makes it difficult to hold selfish or 
malicious nodes accountable for their actions. 
In order to enhance identity persistence some authors have suggested assigning the smallest 
possible initial reputation for newcomers or an entry fee per identity [68-70]. These 
techniques are efficient because they do not need any centralized trusted third party for 
identity management. However, the smallest initial reputation can still be manipulated 
because of the zero cost of identities. A monetary based entry fee per identity that might 
address this is, however, not suitable for open MANETs due to a number of problems. First, 
it causes complications in fee management. Second, it requires security mechanisms to secure 
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the fee itself, such as tamper proof hardware. Third, fee payments and the fee structure itself 
represent extra burdens for users and the system; for example, incorporating a charged text 
message or monetary-based mechanism into the system is an extra activity for the users and 
the system itself. Due to these problems, we adopt an entry fee concept in our scheme but 
instead of a monetary fee system, we use fee as a form of work imposed on every newcomer. 
Each new entrant will expend some of its battery to pay an entry fee in the form of 
cooperation in the network before expecting the network to provide services. For a normal 
selfish node, it is no longer beneficial to perform a whitewash because it will pay an entry fee 
each time it re-enters the network. This represents a social cost [68] incurred by newcomers, 
i. e. newcomers are not welcomed; however it is still beneficial for the overall network 
performance. In monetary based fee systems, the payment process takes a specified or fixed 
time; however, in our non-monetary based fee system where cooperation is involved, the time 
required for payment varies and depends on the number of neighbours. Usually, in dense 
parts of the network the time variation is low. In addition to battery or cooperation, this 
unspecified or unfixed time may also be used as a deterrent to thwart the whitewashers and 
Sybil attackers. 
Moreover our non-monetary based fee system is easily manageable on a technical level in 
MANETs (no virtual bank or centralized fee management system is required); it does not 
need any tamper-proof hardware in order to secure fees; and it uses packet forwarding as a 
form of fee payments, hence no extra entity needs to be incorporated into the system. 
The scheme discourages whitewashers and Sybil attackers alike; because the fee enforced 
will be applied per new identity. Fee imposition makes whitewashing costly (in terms of 
battery power) for an attacker, the same is the case for Sybil attackers; hence an attacker can 
perform fewer whitewashes or identity rounds within the limits of its available battery power. 
Furthermore, the fee enforcement will also improve the overall system performance (i. e. 
network throughput and utility). This is due to the fact that fee payment implies contributing 
to the network by forwarding other nodes' packets. 
In Section 6.3.6, we will show that our proposed scheme significantly reduces the evil 
throughput and evil nodes' utility as compared to our comparator reputation-based scheme 
CONFIDANT [25-26]. 
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.2, we present our scheme, 
explaining how an entry fee is used as a deterrent against whitewashing attacks. In Section 
6.3, we evaluate and compare our scheme through simulation results; we also highlight how 
the scheme is implemented in NS-2. The chapter is concluded in Section 6.4 with a 
discussion about future extensions to the scheme. 
6.2 Deterring Whitewashing 
6.2.1 Assumptions and System Overview 
Firstly, we assume that the network is dense; hence we will not consider the issues related to 
boundary and network sparseness. 
Secondly, we modified our designed reputation-based scheme from Chapter 4 in order to 
incorporate our non-monetary fee based scheme into it. 
Thirdly, each node must pay the fee when joining the network; after this phase a node can 
start building its reputation, as depicted in Figure 6-1. Each node creates a fee count for the 
nodes to which it has either interacted directly or known about them from other neighbours 
when they publish their fee related (secondhand) information. The fee count is updated either 
through direct interaction experiences or when a forwarding event is observed through 
overhearing. Every forwarding event will be considered in the fee count (not a reputation 
count) until the fee is fully paid i. e. the fee threshold is met. In other words, if a node has not 
fully paid its fee and in the meantime it forwards a packet, then it will be considered as a fee 
update event. After the fee is paid, every forwarding event will be considered in the 
reputation count. Nodes will exchange their fee counts along with reputation information 
with their neighbours. We assume that nodes do not lie about these values; however we 
acknowledge this as an important issue that we aim to consider in future work. Route request 
messages and data packets will be dropped for the nodes that have not paid their fee. 
Fourthly, fee enforcement will be initiated after the first detection. In other words, during 
bootstrapping, nodes will not consider each other as new nodes (we consider first identity to 
be valid); hence, two new nodes when interacting will ignore each other (we will explain this 
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further in Section 6.3.3). They will either drop or forward packets based on their natural 
behaviour until our reputation-based scheme detects misbehaving nodes. This assumption is 
valid, since a whitewashing attack is usually meant to escape the consequences of 
misbehaviour or having a bad history. 
Newcomers 
Reputation Build-up 
Fee Payment 4 
Participation in 
Figure 6-1: The process of a new node entering into the network 
Finally, we categorize nodes in the network based on whether their fee has been paid. That is, 
we refer to nodes that have paid their entry fee as mature nodes and those who have yet to 
pay their fee as new nodes. 
6.2.2 Design Rationale 
In most existing schemes, newcomers are allocated some reputation to start with, called a 
neutral reputation, denoted by X as shown in Figure 6-2. The smallest reputation of a node, 
denoted by Z, is slightly greater than the detection threshold. A node having reputation Z (or 
higher) can exploit the services of the network without being detected as a selfish node, The 
chance of whitewashing increases when the current reputation n of a node is in the region a. 
The amount of the initial reputation, which is equal to a=X-Z, can always be manipulated 
by an identity changer when there are no restrictions imposed on this region. In other words, 
in the absence of restrictions, this neutral reputation gives the opportunity for whitewashers to 
utilize network services without contributing to the network. This will further motivate 
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selfish nodes to change their identities after they have been detected by a misbehaviour 
detection system. Some authors suggest assigning the smallest possible neutral reputation to 
newcomers; however, the smallest neutral reputation can still be manipulated because of the 
zero cost of identities with no restrictions. 
Reputation 
The smallest Permissible 
Reputation in our 
scheme 
Y A 
p 
Reputation for 
Newcomer 
Current Reputation n 
The smallest permissible 
Reputation 
X v T 
a 
Z 
Misbehaviour 
Figure 6-2: Reputation levels 
For our scheme, we set the smallest permissible reputation Z to be greater than the node's 
initial reputation X by an amount ß, denoted by Y (instead of Z). In our scheme we will use 
the threshold Y, the amount of reputation ß, and the fee threshold interchangeably. 
In light of the above modifications, we describe our scheme as follows. For a node to get 
services from the network its basic reputation must be above Y, i. e. it has to pay the entry fee. 
This is based on a simple principal: cooperate, before you are cooperated with. In other 
words, each newcomer will pay an entry fee in the form of spending its battery power for 
cooperation with other nodes that will consequently increase its reputation up to a certain 
threshold Y in its neighbours' reputation tables. In the meantime every node will periodically 
exchange fee and reputation information with its neighbours. After exceeding reputation Y, 
every node (except selfish nodes) will provide packet forwarding services to the new node 
because it has paid the entry fee. It is important to note here that after fee payment if a node 
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misbehaves and crosses the misbehaviour threshold, it will still be liable to isolation from the 
network. 
We will now discuss how the threshold Y will discourage whitewashing or identity changing 
attacks. As shown in Figure 6-2, we increase the basic level such that the smallest permissible 
reputation will be Y. In our design a node cannot manipulate the neutral reputation because 
services will only be provided to those nodes with reputation greater than Y. Neutral 
reputation or reputation less than Y is just an indication that the fee has not been paid or is yet 
to be paid. Mostly nodes are selfish in open MANETs and they are inclined towards their 
own benefits. We have designed our scheme in such a way that it will always be beneficial 
for a node not to change its identity after achieving Y provided that the attacker objective's 
cost is less than its benefits. In other words, a node will always incur a loss when changing its 
identity after gaining Y. By definition of our scheme 
X <Y, 
Therefore 
X-Y= ß<O Eq. 6-1 
Here there will always be an amount ,6 of loss to reputation or the fee that has been paid, after 
a node changes its identity. 
Therefore 
6.2.3 Analysis of the Deterrence 
In generic communication models for wireless ad hoc networks, a source node creates a 
message and stores it in memory, in order to send it to a destination node. Assuming that the 
path to the destination is already established, the source node will transmit to the nearest 
neighbour that falls along the path. Suppose all this processing and transmission of a packet 
consumes an amount ET of energy (i. e. battery power). We assume that on receiving and 
forwarding a packet, ER and EF amount of energy is consumed respectively. In order to 
maximize the life span, a selfish or a malicious node tries to engage itself in activities that 
cost it low battery consumption. Assuming that AE is the minimum energy a selfish or a 
malicious node can consume by choosing among the activities, such as transmission, 
reception or forwarding. Let Emax(n) be the maximum battery power available to node n. 
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Then the maximum lifetime of node n's communication capability C(n) can be defined as 
follows. 
C(n) = 
Emax(n) 
Eq. 6-2 AE 
Eq. 6-2 shows that the communication capability of node n depends on the maximum 
available energy Emax(n) and the energy required for each packet to be transmitted, 
forwarded or received; the selection from these three activities depends upon the attacker's 
choice for amount of life span it wants to achieve. 
Let ß be the fee node n has to pay, which is the number of packets forwarded for others as a 
fee payment. Furthermore, we suppose node n can use I identities simultaneously (acting as a 
Sybil attacker) or in sequence (acting as whitewasher). Then by incorporating ß and I into 
Eq. 6-2, according to our scheme we get the following. 
C(n) = 
Emax(n) 
_ c9 x 1) AC Eq. 6-3 LIE 
Eq. 6-3 shows that in our scheme (fee per identity), the communication capability of a node is 
also dependent on ß and I, which can be explained by two points. First, if the amount of fee 
enforced is increased (ß in the equation), then C(n) will be reduced. This is due to the fact 
that the greater the number of packets forwarded as a fee, the lower the amount C(n) will be 
leftover for node n's own communications. Second, the greater the number of identities node 
n uses for Sybil attacks or whitewashing, the greater the number of times the fee must be 
paid; hence node n will have a lower amount C(n) leftover for its own communication. This 
is how the fee enforcement will discourage nodes from using multiple identities. 
The scheme discourages whitewashers and Sybil attackers alike, because the product ß xJ in 
Eq. 6-3 will be applied on both types of attackers alike. Furthermore, the product ß xi will 
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also improve the overall system performance (i. e. network throughput and utility), due to the 
fact that fee payment implies contributing to the network by forwarding other nodes' packets. 
6.2.4 Node Interactions 
Mobile ad hoc networks enable nodes to roam freely across the network and move from one 
neighbourhood to another. Nodes need other nodes in the network to forward their packets 
and this gives rise to situations in which nodes interact with other nodes that they already 
know and sometimes with strangers to whom they have not interacted before. To distinguish 
between strangers and previously known nodes, a node can check its own reputation table for 
the corresponding reputation entry that specifies the cooperation history of a node in the form 
of reputation values. If there is no entry found in the reputation table, the node will be 
considered a new node. Reputation tables are built from direct experiences with nodes and 
from secondhand information gathered from neighbours, as we discussed them in Section 4.3 
and Section 4.4. We will describe using reputation tables how nodes should behave when 
they interact with other nodes. By checking its reputation table a node can categorize nodes 
that have paid their entry fee, we call them mature nodes, and nodes that have not yet paid 
their entry fee, called new nodes. As shown in Table 6.1, there are four different possibilities 
for node interactions; nodes in the columns are the sources of traffic while nodes in the rows 
are destinations for traffic. We describe the process as follows. Suppose node i starts 
communication with node j, i. e. Ni -- Nj, where the arrow specifies the direction of traffic 
flow. The following are the four cases of interaction based on whether the nodes are mature 
or new. We also refer to each cell in Table 6-1 using the same letter (a to d). 
6.3 Simulation Based Analysis 
Table 6-1: Node Interaction Matrix 
Receiver 
Nodes Mature New 
V Mature a) Cooperate b) Cooperate 
New c) Ignore d) Ignore 
a) Both nodes i and j are mature: they will provide services to each other. 
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b) Node i is mature and j is new: in this case if node j is not selfish, should forward i's 
packets, in order to pay the fee. 
c) Node i is new and node j is mature: node j will ignore node i provided that node j did not 
receive any secondhand information from its neighbours about node i (being paid the fee) 
or it did not overhear node i forwarding packets for others until its reputation becomes 
greater than Y. 
d) Both i and j are new: they ignore each other's requests. An important point to note here is 
that when new nodes ignore each other will not cause the entire network to be in the 
deadlocked state because the fee enforcement will start in effect from the first detection, 
as we discussed the issue of bootstrapping in Section 6.2.1. 
6.3 Simulation Based Analysis 
6.3.1 Setup 
We use Network Simulator NS-2.30 to implement and evaluate our scheme using the 
parameters listed in Table 6-2. In this simulation study our aim is to find out how the fee 
enforcement per identity affects the throughput and utility of good and evil nodes in MANET 
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environments and to further assess whether it is beneficial. In either case we will compare the 
fee incorporated reputation-based scheme with the CONFIDANT scheme. Throughout our 
experimentation the percentage of selfish nodes is 10%, and these selfish nodes can use five 
identities in total. The value of reputation ß, threshold Y, or the fee threshold, as shown in 
Figure 6-2, is set as 50. NS-2 assigns a sequential (starting from zero until the number of 
nodes) integer number for the identification of each node in the network, we use these 
identifiers as nodes' identities. All results are the average of 20 random scenarios or 
simulation runs. 
Table 6-2: Simulation Parameters 
Parameter Level 
Area 1000m x 1000m 
Maximum Speed 10 m/s 
Pause Time 0 to 600 seconds 
Number of Nodes 30 
Connections 25 
MAC 802.11 
Application CBR 
Packet Size 64 Bytes 
Simulation Time 600s 
Movement Random Waypoint 
Placement Uniform 
Selfish Node Population 10% 
No. of IDs per Selfish Node 5 
6.3.2 Mobility Model 
We use a random waypoint movement model [94-95] for all of our scenarios in the 
simulations. We discussed this model in Section 5.6.2. 
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6.3.3 Attack Implementation 
Using NS-2.30 we implemented two types of nodes: (i) nodes change identities one-by-one 
(whitewashers) and (ii) nodes change identities without discarding the previous one (Sybil 
attackers). We mentioned in Section 1.3.3, that our proposed methods thwart new identities, 
regardless of the notion of simultaneity. Since, in our simulations, only whitewashers are 
used; however, it is presented here to demonstrate that how our scripts can be used to create 
Sybil attackers in MANETs. 
In order to create nodes having more than one identity, we bind n nodes together to represent 
one node having n-1 identities. In other words, in the case of whitewashing, we bind 5 
nodes together; node 1 is up while the rest of the 4 are shutdown. So when node I moves to a 
random location at random time, all the other 4 nodes are also moved to the same location 
following exactly the same dynamics. Each identity will work in rounds, for example one 
identity will be alive or up for a certain period of time while the rest of the identities will be 
down, after finishing its time it will be down and another identity will be up and so on. 
In the case of whitewashing, each identity of the whitewasher will be up one at a time, as 
depicted in Figure 6-3. For example, Id2 is up and will complete its round during time 12. 
After t2 expires, Id2 will be put down and 1d3 will be up; if the connection to or from Id2 is 
still active then it will be switched over to the next identity, i. e. Ida. The last identity (Id,,, ) 
will stay up until the end of the simulation. 
' In order to start up and shutdown a node, we use the node "on" and "off' options of the command() function of 
the mobile node class in NS2. 
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Figure 6-3: The whitewasher node process 
In the case of Sybil attackers, each new identity will be added to the already up identities. For 
example, in Figure 6-4, after time ti expires, Id2 is also added to the already up identity i. e. 
Id, and so on. 
Throughout our experimentations, we used random scenarios (random mobility and traffic) 
using the commands provided in Appendix A. In Appendix A, we also provide the source 
code that has either been written from scratch or modified from existing code of NS-2 scripts 
for mobility and traffic generator. 
Figure 6-4: The Sybil node process 
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6.3.4 Attack Models 
We classify the attacker nodes into two categories. However, the number of identities 
available for performing whitewashing is fixed. One class of evil nodes will misbehave (drop 
others' packets) without paying the fee. In the results we refer to this as Attack Model I or 
class-I attackers. In a realistic scenario, this type of evil node may be the result of normal 
users who have no expert knowledge of the field, but who have nonetheless installed 
misbehaviour software (e. g. claiming to extend battery life) programmed by others. We 
assume that they do not know the fee threshold and how to cross it. The second class of nodes 
are those evil nodes that commit misbehaviour and they do pay the fee as well. In our results 
we refer to this as Attack Model II or class-II attackers. In this case we are interested in the 
effect on throughput and utility of the network if, for example, some evil nodes pay the fee 
and then start committing misbehaviour. 
6.3.5 Metrics 
We evaluated our scheme using the following metrics, i. e. good throughput, evil throughput, 
good utility and evil utility; we discussed these metrics in Section 5.6.3. 
6.3.6 Analysis 
If there is no restriction imposed on identities in a network where users can acquire an 
unlimited number of new identities at zero cost, nodes performing whitewashing can get 
pretty good benefits from the network. As shown in Figure 6-5, the evil throughput of 
CONFIDANT is significantly higher than in our scheme because there are no restrictions 
imposed on newcomers and hence evil nodes can have multi-fold benefits in terms of 
throughput and utility. The greater the number of identities used, the greater the exploitation 
of network resources thereby increasing the benefits for whitewashers. Fee enforcement 
reduces the overall evil throughput (by about half) in the network. The throughput of the 
class-Il attackers is marginally higher than that of the class-I attackers. This is due to the fact 
that class-II attackers pay the fee: they forward packets for other evil nodes; consequently, 
evil nodes obtain slightly higher throughput on average. 
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The good throughput of CONFIDANT on the other hand is slightly higher than our scheme in 
the scenarios where there is moderate mobility, as depicted in Figure 6-6. It is due to the fact 
that two new nodes ignore each other in our scheme which is likely to occur after the first 
detection of whitewashers. 
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The average utility of an evil node is considerably higher in CONFIDANT as compared to 
our scheme, as shown in Figure 6-7. This is due to the fact that in CONFIDANT evil nodes 
drop 100% of packets (no forwarding); however, they can still continuously enjoy the neutral 
reputation before their detection. Class-II nodes pay their fee i. e. their forwarded packet count 
is greater than that of the class-I attackers and hence their utility is lower than that of the 
class-I nodes. 
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Average Utility per Evil Node Vs Mobility 
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Figure 6-7: Average utility per evil node vs. mobility 
Good nodes suffer considerably more in CONFIDANT. The more benefit the evil nodes get, 
the more the good nodes suffer. Because good nodes forward evil nodes' packets before 
detection, hence good nodes have low utility. As shown in Figure 6-8, good nodes in 
CONFIDANT enjoy considerably less utility than in our scheme (note that the y-axis 
represents negative values in Figure 6-8) as their packets rarely reach their destinations due to 
the selfish nodes in the network. Class-II nodes pay their fee in the form of forwarding 
packets for other nodes; hence in the presence of class-II attackers, the good nodes 
comparatively suffer less than in the scenarios where class-I nodes exist. 
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6.4 Summary 
In this chapter, we discussed the potential issue of whitewashing and Sybil attacks in 
reputation-based schemes that, if not addressed, can make them impractical. We discussed 
our proposed scheme using an entry fee per identity to discourage normal whitewashers as 
well as Sybil attackers without using any costly method, for example, PKI or a centralized 
trusted third party. The simulation results show that our scheme performs well in reducing 
evil nodes' benefits as compared to the CONFIDANT scheme in the presence of 
whitewashing nodes. In addition to improving the overall system performance, our proposed 
fee enforcement scheme discourages whitewashers and Sybil attackers and makes new 
identity creation costly (in terms of battery power) for an attacker and hence reduces the 
number of whitewashes in the network. The downside of our approach is that newcomers are 
not welcomed i. e. they are not given services immediately. Finally, our scheme relies on 
secondhand information about reputation and fees. Safeguards are therefore needed to ensure 
nodes do not lie about these values (or are sanctioned if discovered), and we also aim to 
consider this in our future work. 
Chapter 7 Whitewashing Detection 
in MANETS: A Reactive Approach 
7.1 Background 
In the previous chapter, we discussed how to deter whitewashers and Sybil attackers; 
however, an opportunity still exits for attackers to launch an attack, for example after paying 
the fee. This can occur if the benefit an attacker can gain is greater than the cost incurred by 
the fee enforced. This would represent an ample motivation for such attackers to launch an 
attack. In short, a second line-of-defence is necessary in order to counteract such attacks by 
detecting them and further isolating them, if they are not deterred by the proactive technique. 
In this chapter, we will present our scheme, that detects whitewashers' and Sybil attackers' 
newly created identities. However, for tests and experimentation purposes we deployed only 
whitewashers in our network scenarios. The scheme can be applied to both cases alike, 
whether the new identities are created either one after the other or simultaneously make no 
difference to the detection process. Our detection scheme can work as a standalone scheme, 
but could equally be deployed as an add-on to existing schemes, for example it could be 
incorporated into a reputation-based system. Unlike other related work [24,96], our proposed 
scheme does not need any directional antennae or any GPS (Geographical Positioning 
System) equipment [84,97]. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 7.2, we will explain our scheme 
with the help of some experiments along with an overview of the IEEE 802.11 protocol. In 
Section 7.3, we describe how we conducted the scenarios (from Section 7.2) as real-world 
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testbed experiments using Java Sun Spot sensors [98] in order to confirm our rationale. In 
Section 7.4 we discuss the issue of tuning the detection threshold for worst case scenarios. 
Since our scheme can act as a stand alone, however it can be integrated into reputation-based 
schemes and we will discuss in Section 7.5 how it works with the reputation system. In 
Section 7.6, we evaluate our scheme, through extensive simulations and analyse the results. 
The chapter is concluded in Section 7.7. 
7.2 Detection of Whitewashing Identities 
7.2.1 Overview of IEEE 802.11 Protocols 
The IEEE 802.11 protocol is the most widely adopted wireless networking protocol used in 
real applications [99-100]. Basically, IEEE 802.11 is the standard for medium access control 
(MAC) in wireless LANS and its main job is to provide carrier sensing multiple access with 
collision avoidance (CSMA/CA). The standard specifies two medium access control 
mechanisms, viz. distributed coordination function (DCF) and point coordination function 
(PCF). The PCF has been developed to use in infrastructure network configuration, whereas 
the DCF applies to both infrastructure as well as ad hoc mode. Since the DCF is based on 
CSMA/CA which is used in ad hoc network configurations, in this chapter we will confine 
our focus only to this mechanism. 
The main purpose of the DCF protocol is to maximize throughput while preventing packet 
collisions by using carrier sensing with a 4-way handshake, as shown in Figure 7-I. 
Collisions occur when a node receives more than one packet at the same time; as a result 
neither packet is correctly received. 
The basic mechanism for 802.11 is as follows. Consider a node has data to send to a 
destination node in the network. It waits for a random backoff time. This is a random deferral 
time before transmission is started and its value is taken from the interval between zero and 
the size of a contention window (which is the maximum amount of time a node can wait, will 
be explained later). If the node senses, at any time, that another node is using the channel, it 
pauses its timer until the other node completes its transmission. After the backoff time 
expires, the node will sense the channel in order to determine whether it is idle. After 
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establishing that the channel is clear, it waits for a short period of time, called DIFS (DCF 
interframe spacing) and senses the channel again. If the channel is still free, the node will 
transmit a Request-To-Send (RTS) control frame to the destination. If the destination is free 
to receive data, it will respond with a Clear-To-Send (CTS) control frame. A Network 
Allocation Vector (NAV) is also transmitted along with both the RTS and CTS frames. We 
will explain the purpose of the NAV shortly. After the data is successfully received by the 
destination, the destination will transmit an Acknowledgement (ACK) frame back to the 
sender. If the sender still has more data to send, it would initiate its backoff time again while 
repeating the rest of the process. 
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Figure 7-1: Functionality of CSMA/CA 
The main purpose of the NAV is to inform other nodes about the length of the channel 
reservation time. Any node that overhears the NAV will sense the channel after the NAV 
expires. Since persistent (useless) sensing of the channel is one of the biggest uses of energy, 
the NAV diminishes the amount of this idle sensing; hence energy is saved across all nodes in 
the network. 
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The contention window is used to promote fairness in the network, so that no node 
monopolizes the channel for a long period of time. The size of the contention window usually 
varies based on the condition of the network. A window size that's too small implies that the 
chance of two nodes transmitting simultaneously will be increased. Whereas a window size 
that's too large means that the nodes might be idly waiting (unnecessarily) for a long time 
before their transmissions can proceed. 
IEEE 802.11 defines interframe spacing periods of time between frames, in order to ensure 
that the channel is truly freed (idle). In our case, DIFS (DCF interframe spacing) and SIFS 
(short interframe spacing) are used. During DIFS, nodes sense the channel and start the frame 
exchange, if the channel has been sensed as free and their backoff times have also expired. In 
other words, when a node senses the channel, it must be free for the length of the DIFS period 
before the transmission starts. The SIFS is the time period that a node will wait between the 
RTS, CTS, DATA and ACK frames in the 4-way handshake. SIFS has shorter duration than 
that of the DIFS, which ensures that another node does not incorrectly determine that the 
channel is idle during the 4-way handshake; hence priority is given to the transmission in 
progress8. 
7.2.2 Assumptions 
We assume that all nodes transmit with a constant power, i. e. nobody should increase or 
decrease their transmit power. 
Our scheme is lightweight and does not generate any extra overhead caused by the periodic 
broadcasting of beacons or other control frames. Nodes will only capture the signal strength 
values of the transmissions occurring in their neighbourhoods. We do not require any form of 
node localization, hence no GPS is needed. Moreover there is no need for any centralized 
identity management or any extra hardware, such as directional antennas. 
s Other MAC 802.11 issues, such as hidden and exposed terminals, fall out of the scope of this thesis and are 
therefore not discussed here. 
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7.2.3 Signal Strength Based Analysis 
The distinction between a new legitimate node and a whitewasher's new identity can be made 
based on the distance from the receiver. That is new nodes become neighbours as soon as 
they enter inside the radio range of other nodes; hence their signal strength at the receiver 
node is recorded in a gradually increasing fashion when they move closer. In contrast a 
whitewasher, which is already a neighbour, will cause its new identity to appear abruptly in 
the neighbourhood. When it changes identity the signal strength of that identity will be high 
enough to be distinguished from the newly joined neighbour. 
Our experiments show that a signal strength based threshold exists which can help us detect 
whitewasher identities. Our simulation results further demonstrate that when this threshold is 
properly tuned based on speed; it produces about 90% true positives with about 10% false 
positives. 
Each node maintains a list of neighbours in the form <Address, Rss-List <time, rss», as 
shown in Table 7-1, and records the RSS (received signal strength) values of any directly 
received or overheard frames i. e. RTS, CTS, DATA and ACK messages. In other words, each 
node will capture and store the signal strength of the transmissions received from its 
neighbouring nodes. This can be performed when a node either takes part in the 
communication directly with other nodes acting as a source or a destination or when a node 
does not take part in the direct communication. In the latter case it will capture the signal 
strength values of other communicating parties through overhearing the control frames. Each 
Rss-List in front of the corresponding address contains R RSS values of recently received 
frames along with their time of reception, T,,. Where n is the number of elements in the Rss- 
List that can be increased or decreased depending upon the memory requirements of a node. 
In our simulation, we used n to be five elements; however, for real-world scenarios, it should 
be 10 to 20 elements because of the time varying nature of RSS. 
In the following experiment, we plot the RSS of nodes in order to determine and visualize the 
behaviour of the new legitimate nodes and the whitewashers. 
7.2 Detection of Whitewashing Identities 
Table 7-1: Neighbour list based on received signal strength 
Node ID Rss-List 
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Experiment 1 
This experiment is designed to allow us to compare the behaviour of new legitimate nodes 
with whitewash identities. As shown in Figure 7-2(a), when a new node B enters into another 
node A's neighbourhood or radio range, node B gradually enters over time. This is the natural 
behaviour of nodes entering into one another's radio ranges and becoming neighbours in 
mobile environments. Due to this natural behaviour of entrance and exit, when node A stays 
static and node B entering into A's radio range with speed s, node A will observe its received 
signal strength continuously increasing. When A plots B's received signal strength readings 
as B moves towards A and then ultimately goes out of range on the other side; assuming that 
B is continually communicating with another node C or A. In graphical form, the RSS of B 
will produce more or less a complete elliptic curve, as shown in Figure 7-3. The diagram 
shows RSS plots for several arbitrary nodes in a random mobile scenario (this is taken from 
our simulation work presented in Section 7.6). The interesting characteristic of these plots is 
that the curve for each legitimate new node starts from the smallest readable RSS value (in an 
ideal situation), in this case it is GID (good identity) 17 indicating that GID 17 entered into 
36 node's radio range normally. Whereas whitewash identities start from higher RSS values, 
such as WID (whitewash identity) 6 and 8 indicating that WID 6 and WID 8 did not enter 
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normally into radio ranges of node 36 and node 21 respectively. So it can be deduced that 
these identities are the whitewashed one and their previous identities were roaming deep 
inside the radio ranges of the receivers, i. e. 36 and 21. This smallest readable RSS value 
could be used as a detection threshold; however mobility and velocity make things more 
complicated. For example, the common questions which may arise are, when A will receive 
B's first signal strength value and at that particular moment, what would be the location of B 
inside A's radio range? The answer to both of these questions is that it depends on the speed 
and transmission rate of node B. Nodes with lower transmission rates can penetrate more into 
the radio ranges before their presence being acknowledged. In other words, the greater the 
transmission rate of the nodes the sooner (and close to the boundary of radio range) their 
presence will be acknowledged and vice versa. The greater the speed of B, the further it will 
penetrate into the radio range of A before A acknowledges the presence of B. In order to 
refine our detection threshold, we conducted further experiments for speed. We do not 
conduct experiment for transmission rate because our aim here is to demonstrate, at what 
distance node B first acknowledged. This will potentially be affected by speed and 
transmission rate. We can get our aim by using speed and keeping transmission rate constant 
(or vice versa). 
7.2 Detection of Whitewashing Identities 
(a) (b) 
Figure 7-2: (a) Without and (b) with categorization of radio range 
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Experiment 2 
We conducted this experiment in order to establish how far node B penetrates into node A's 
radio range before A acknowledges B's presence. For this purpose we simulate the same 
scenario as shown in Figure 7-2(a) using NS-2.30. First A establishes a connection with B, 
where both the nodes are static. Then B starts moving in the opposite direction at a speed of 2 
m/s speed until it goes out of range. After taking a pause, node B starts moving towards its 
original location with four different speeds one by one i. e. 2,4,10 and 15 m/s. The resulting 
RSS values received at node A can be seen in Figure 7-4. It is evident from the graphs that the 
greater the incoming speed of B, the greater the first RSS value of B that will be received by 
A. In other words, as the incoming speed of B increases, it penetrates further into A's radio 
range before A acknowledges its presence. Hence, the first presence or RSS signal varies with 
speed. 
We will set our detection threshold based on the maximum speed of the network; assuming 
that no node can move faster than this maximum speed. Now the question becomes, which 
speed should we adopt as the upper bound or our detection threshold, from Figure 7-4? To 
answer this question and for clarity purposes, we logically partition the radio range of node A 
into two zones: a grey zone and a white zone, as shown by Figure 7-2(b). Please note that this 
partitioning is based on the speed-based detection threshold. If we incorporate various speed- 
based thresholds from Figure 7-4 into Figure 7-2(b), it would become clear that higher speed 
thresholds produce wider grey zones. However, wider grey zones produce low true positive 
rates because wider grey zones increase the chance of nodes being able to commit 
whitewashing in this area. Whitewashing in this area cannot be detected, since the first 
appearance (or acknowledgment) of a node in the grey zone would usually represent a normal 
entry into the radio range of the node. In other words, if the threshold is based on I Om/s (i. e. 
where this is the maximum speed of the network), any node entering into A's radio range, 
with a speed of l Om/s or below cannot produce its first appearance to node A inside the white 
zone of it (assuming no variance in RSS). So any new identity creation in the white zone will 
be detected as a whitewashing or Sybil identity, because normal nodes can't produce their 
first appearance in this area. From the above discussion, we can deduce that smaller speed- 
based thresholds will work better than larger ones because they will produce high true 
positives. Please note that we adopt a lOm/s threshold in our simulation based evaluation in 
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Section 7.6, and for this speed the simulation produced sound results. We believe that 
detection will be improved by using a lower speed threshold than l Om/s. 
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There are two problems with this approach. The first problem is that if node C changes 
identity in the grey zone, node C will not be detected as a whitewasher. This effect can he 
reduced by collaboration with nearby nodes. For example. if (, whitewashes in the grey zone 
of A, it may nonetheless be detected by B if C is in the white zone of B. This implies that a 
greater node density is likely to produce a higher true positive rate, our results also support 
this. The second problem is related to the low number of connections in the network. For 
example, suppose C is the destination-only node in the white zone of node A (node A is not 
aware of node C), and currently C is not receiving any traffic from its source node due to the 
connection being broken (due to mobility or other reasons) and that it has not re-established a 
connection yet. Node A will detect C (being a good node) as a whitewasher when node ("s 
previously broken connection is re-established, resulting in a false positive. 'l'he solution to 
this problem is that each node should transmit periodic beacon messages in order to indicate 
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their presence; however this is costly in terms of communication overhead. A promising 
solution to mitigate this issue is to increase the number of connections in the network which 
will decrease these types of false positive. In other words, connections play an inverse 
relation to that of false positives, a fact we will demonstrate in our simulation results. 
We have shown the natural behaviour of new entrants. Now node A can easily differentiate 
between a new node B that is coming into its neighbourhood and a whitewasher's new 
identity, pretending to be a new node joining the neighbourhood. This is done as follows. 
Node A will make a decision based on the RSS values of the nodes. If the first RSS value 
captured is greater than the threshold, i. e. a node is in the white zone, A will deem that 
identity as a new identity from a whitewasher, since no node can penetrate into white zone 
within the specified speed. If the first RSS value received is less than the threshold i. e. a node 
is in the grey zone, it will be considered as a normal new entrant and will be added to the 
neighbour list. The following are pseudo code for our scheme. 
Algorithms 
In order to detect new identities spawned by a whitewasher or Sybil attacker, Algorithm 7-1 
checks every received RSS by passing it to the addNewRss function, along with its time of 
reception and the address of the transmitter. If the address is not in the RSS table, meaning 
that this node has not been interacted with before, i. e. it's a new node and the RSS received is 
its first acknowledged presence. This first received RSS is compared against an 
UB_THRESHOLD (this threshold is used to check from the RSS whether the transmitter is in 
white zone, i. e. whitewasher). If it is greater than or equal to the threshold, indicating that the 
new node lies near in the neighbourhood and did not enter normally into the neighbourhood; 
the address is added to the malicious node list. Otherwise, the address is added to the RSS 
table and a link list is created for that address in order to store the recently received RSS 
along with its time of reception in it. Finally, the size of the link list is checked, if it is greater 
than the LIST SIZE, the oldest RSS is removed from the list. 
7.2 Detection of Whitewashing Identities 
Algorithm 7-1: Detection of New Malicious IDs 
addNewRss (Address, rss, time recv) 
BEGIN SUB: 
IF: Address is not in the Table 
THEN: 
IF: rss >= UB THRESHOLD 
THEN: Add Address to Malicious list 
ELSE: Add Address to the Table 
END_IF 
Create a link list element for the Address 
Push_back the rss value and its time recv to the link list 
IF: Size of the list > LIST SIZE 
THEN: Pop front 
END SUB: 
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It is important to control the size of Table 7-1 otherwise it would grow invariably. In order to 
control its size, the unused records are needed to be deleted. These unused records are due to 
certain reasons. First, when a malicious node changes its identity, its previous identity record 
stays in the RSS table. Second, nodes join and leave the network at any time; hence the nodes 
that depart from the network leave behind a record of their RSS histories. In order to control 
the size, a global timer, called RSS_TIMEOUT shown in Algorithm 7-2, is maintained to 
flush the unnecessary records. When this timer expires, the rssTableCheck function is called, 
which checks the time of the last received RSS against the TIME THRESHOLD for every 
address of the RSS table. If the time obtained is greater than this threshold, indicates that it is 
enough time past since it is not heard from this node. Now to check the reason of 
disappearance of nodes, the strength of the last RSS is checked against the 
UB THRESHOLD, if it is greater, indicates that it is the previous identity of a whitewasher; 
otherwise it is concluded as a normal out of range scenario. 
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Algorithm 7-2: Table Refreshing: Detection of Previously Whitewash IDs 
IF: RSS TIMEOUT 
THEN: Call rssTableCheck( 
rssTableCheck( 
BEGIN SUB: 
FOR: for each Address in the Table 
DO: 
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Pop the recent link list element 
IF: (Current Time - getTime()) > TIME THRESHOLD 
//Indicating that we did not hear from this Address since the 
TIME THRESHOLD 
THEN: 
IF: getRss() > UB THRESHOLD 
Log ID to Malicious list: Previous ID of a Whitewasher 
ELSE: Normal out of Range 
END FOR: 
END SUB: 
7.3 Sun Spot Testbed 
We conducted several real-world experiments using Java Sun Spot sensors [98], in order to 
confirm our results; since various authors, such as [ 101], pointed out that the received signal 
strength is unreliable. The aim of this testbed is to check the entrance and exit behaviour of a 
node from its RSS values. In addition, it is also important to check and see the dynamics of a 
node from its RSS values. For this purpose we conduct a testbed of Sun Microsystems newly 
developed Sun Spot sensors. There are two types of Sun Spots used in our experiments. One 
is the base station that is directly connected to a computer or a laptop via a wired link, in 
order to collect data from the transmitting sensors. The second is a free range Sun Spot, 
shown in Figure 7-5 that is used to transmit data to the base station wirelessly while being 
static or mobile. We configure these free range sensors to transmit packets to the base station 
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after each 100 millisecond via a radiogram connection. The base station is configured to 
capture the RSS value of the received packets and log them into a file along with their time of 
reception. 
In the next sub sections, we will show the experiments conducted in an indoor environment 
based on different mobility patterns, i. e. walking patterns and random waypoint like pattern. 
In the latter we used a Lego Robot for mobility as shown in Figure 7-6. Finally, we will 
summarise the observations made from the experiments. 
Figure 7-5: Free range Sun Spot sensors 
F, 
Figure 7-6: Sun Spot and Lego Robot in experiment 
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7.3.1 Walking Patterns 
The purpose of this experiment is to check the behaviour of a sensor's motion as if it were a 
PDA or smart phone held by humans. We constructed the following scenarios. First, a sensor 
normally enters into the radio range of a base station, moves randomly with random pauses 
and finally goes out of range, shown in Figure 7-7. It is observed from the figure that RSS 
increases when the distance between the sensor and the base station decreases and vice versa. 
Second, the sensor node moves out of range from a location near the base station and then 
moves towards that location with the same speed, as shown in Figure 7-8, and with greater 
speed than the previous one, as shown in Figure 7-9. It is observed that while entering the 
radio range with higher speed, the base station acknowledges the first presence of the sensor 
node a little bit latter; hence a little bit higher RSS is received. The same fact has been shown 
in Figure 7-4. Third, a sensor node enters into the radio range and after some random 
movements and pauses changes its identity and with this new identity, it goes out of range. 
This is depicted in Figure 7-10. 
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7.3.2 Random Waypoint like Pattern 
We used a Lego Robot, as shown in Figure 7-6, in order to repeat the above four scenarios for 
random waypoint like patterns. The results of the experimentation are as follows. Figure 7-I I 
shows the RSS plot of normal entrance and exit behaviour of a node; Figure 7-12 and Figure 
7-13 depicts the scenarios when a node uses two different speeds to enter the radio range of 
the base station. Finally, an identity changer node is depicted by Figure 7-14. 
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7.3.3 Observations 
The following are the main observations that we recorded about the above experiments. 
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" The radio range of the Sun Spot sensors in the indoor environment is 33 feet or 10 
meters approximately. 
" We are concerned about the entrance and exit behaviour of a node, so mostly the 
entrance and exit occurs in the range of -47 to -45 dbm. 
" As we discussed above that the acknowledgment of the first presence depends on 
speed. When the sensor node moves into the radio range with higher speeds in our 
experiments, the first presence is acknowledged in the higher RSS range, i. e. from -45 
to -40 dbm. 
" If the identity change occurs near the boundary, such as the recorded RSS in the range 
of -45 to -40, it is not sure whether the received RSS is from a new legitimate identity 
(with higher speed) or an identity of a whitewasher; more specifically at -40 dbm. 
" There is considerable amount of fluctuation in the RSS data. 
In order to setup a detection threshold, the last three points are very important. In the next 
section we analyse these points to obtain a refined detection threshold. 
7.4 Tuning the Threshold 
The main difference we found between the results obtained from our simulations and from 
our testbed experiments is the variation in received signal strength values. As RSS varies, for 
a node B at a fixed distance d from a node A, the receiving node A can receive multiple 
different RSS values in the fluctuation range [-v, +v] (assuming +v is greater than -v) and 
hence these values do not represent an exact indication of distance. If the detection threshold 
is based on a single RSS value, node A can receive, at any particular time RSS from B (while 
B is good node just outside the white zone) with +v variance, shown in Figure 7-15 (a). As a 
result, A incorrectly detects B as a whitewasher, hence false positive (i. e. while the node 
might stay in grey zone). Another case can occur when node B is a whitewasher in the white 
zone near the boundary on its way out performs a whitewash, however, due to the variations 
in signal strength node A might receive RSS with -v variation, as shown in Figure 7-15 (b), 
considering it a signal coming from the grey zone and hence will not detect it. In Appendix 
C, we determine the real fluctuation in the RSS data through real-world experiments. One 
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way of mitigating the effect of this variation is to base our detection on an average RSS 
across n values (moving average), instead of basing our detection on a single RSS value. 
Figure 7-15: RSS with fluctuation 
it is important to tune our detection threshold based on the speed and variation of the RSS 
values. This threshold logically partitions the radio range into white and grey zones: greater 
(or equal) signal strength than the threshold means white zone and grey zone otherwise. Let 
node B be approaching node A's radio range with velocity s (ms -1), assuming that db is the 
boundary of A's radio range (in meters), At is the time (in seconds) between two packet 
transmissions and d,, is the inaccuracy in distance caused by v (in meters), where v is the 
variation in the RSS in the range of [-v, +v]. We assume for the sake of simplicity that just 
before the boundary, B transmits a packet which is not captured by A, so the worst case 
reading A will capture as a first acknowledgement or the white zone will be as the following. 
Zw = (db + d) + (s x At) Eq. 7-1 
The value of d and s will be negative when node B is moving towards node A and positive 
otherwise. From Appendix C we can know the value of db is 10 meters and v is 2.24 dbm 
which is the two standard deviation at position 3 (on the boundary), shown in Appendix C, 
Table C-3. 
In summary, we can know from the calculation and discussion from Appendix C that for 95% 
confidence interval, the received signal strength can fall in the range [-45.16, -47.41, which is 
approximately two standard deviation or 2.24 dbm. So the distance produced from this 
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variation in signal strength will be approximately 1.8 meters. Putting the above values in Eq. 
7-1, we can calculate the threshold for the white and grey zones as the following. 
ZK, = (10m - 1.8m) + (1 ms-1 x 0.1s) 
Zw = (8.2m) + (- 0.1m) 
Zti, = 8.1m 
ZG = (10m) - (8.1m) 
ZG = 1.9m 
7.5 Response to the Reputation System 
When a whitewasher's or Sybil attacker's new identity is detected, that identity is passed to 
the reputation system in order to record it in the detecting node's malicious node list. The 
detected identity will then be isolated from the network, i. e. other nodes will drop data and 
route request packets originating from the malicious identity, as we discussed in relation to 
the node isolation process in Section 4.6. With the passage of time when all nodes update 
their malicious lists by exchanging malicious list information with each other, the malicious 
identity will become completely isolated from the network. This also reduces the opportunity 
for whitewashers as well as Sybil attackers to launch their attacks. 
7.6 Evaluation 
7.6.1 Simulation Setup 
In order to implement and evaluate our scheme, we use Network Simulator NS-2.30 using the 
parameters listed in Table 7-2. In this simulation study our aim is to establish the detection 
percentage of our proposed scheme in different scenarios. As we discussed above, two 
attributes of the network are mainly responsible for affecting the accuracy of detecting 
malicious nodes. These attributes are number of network connections, node density and 
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transmission rate. In each of our scenario we take speed as our main attribute. All of the 
results we present here have been calculated as an average of 25 different random scenarios 
(or simulation runs). 
In the next section, we will analyse our simulation results that are based on a variety of node 
speeds, connections and node densities. 
Table 7-2: Simulation Parameters 
Parameter Level 
Area 1000m x 1000m 
Speed 2 to 16 m/s 
Pause Time los 
Radio Propagation Model Two-ray Ground Reflection 
Radio Range 250m 
Carrier Sense Range 550m 
Number of Nodes 20 to 60 
MAC 802.11 
Application CBR, 10 to 40 
Packet Size 64 B 
Simulation Time 600s 
Movement Random Waypoint Model 
Placement Uniform 
Malicious Population 10% 
Whitewash Ids per Malicious Node 5 
RSS TIMEOUT 100 seconds 
TIME THRESHOLD 30 seconds 
UB RSS THRESHOLD 6.45x 10'10 Watts 
LIST SIZE 5 
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7.6.2 Metrics 
We use two main metrics in order to determine the detection accuracy of our scheme in 
different environments, i. e. True Positive Rate (TPR) and False Positive Rate (FPR). True 
positive means a malicious node is correctly detected and false positive means a good or 
legitimate node is incorrectly detected as a malicious one, as given below. 
True Positive Rate = 
Correctly detected whitewash ids 
Total whitewash ids 
False Positive Rate = 
Incorrectly detected good ids 
Total good ids 
7.6.3 Analysis 
As shown in Figure 7-16, data connections in the network are inversely proportional to the 
false positives of our scheme. For detection, movement sensing or the reception of frequent 
RSS values are important. In order to obtain RSS values from a node, that node should be 
involved in some form of communication, for example by acting as a source, forwarder, or 
destination. The more frequent a node sends or receives packets, the more efficiently a 
neighbouring node will detect it in the event that it tries to whitewash its identity. Fewer 
connections in a network imply fewer source and destination nodes, and greater difficulty for 
a node to distinguish other nodes' positions (i. e. their position as being either in a grey or 
white zone, or neither). Consequently a greater number of false positives will result. 
However, connections have no apparent effect on the true positives and for most of our 
experiments the true positives remained around the 90% level, as depicted in Figure 7-I 7. 
Whitewashing Detection in. tiIA, N'ETs:. 4 Reactive Approach 
u ý 
C. 
E 
LL 
100 
80 
70 
40 
30 
Cones vs Speed (Pause = 1O, Pkt Rate = 2pps) 
20 
10 
10-corns FP 
20-conns FP 
30-conns FP 
40-cones FP ý 
4-rr 
2468 10 12 14 16 
Max Speed (m/s) 
Figure 7-16: False positives with various speeds and connections 
Conns vs Speed (Pause = 10. Pkt Rate = 2pps) 
r 
100 
90 
80 
70 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
10-conns TP -ý 
20-conns TP -- ý---- 
30-conns TP AE 
40-conns TP 9 
2 
0 
ýý-ý 
--+--- 
4 68 10 12 
Max Speed (m/s) 
14 
_S 
16 
134 
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As shown in Figure 7-18 and Figure 7-19, density has comparatively little effect on the false 
positives as compared to the true positives. The increase in false positives in Figure 7-18 is 
due to the speed of the nodes. As we mentioned earlier we setup the threshold for the nodes 
assuming a maximum speed of IOm/s. For this reason we can see that the increase in false 
positives beyond IOm/s is significantly greater than the level below the IOm/s mark. In 
Figure 7-19, we can observe how a high density produces high true positives. The reason for 
this is that it is possible for a node to change identity in a grey zone, and hence not be 
detected. Increasing the node density would increase detection because if a node whitewashes 
in the grey zone of one node, it's unlikely to be not in the grey zone of all other neighbouring 
nodes in the network (meaning other nodes will detect it); hence the high true positive rate. 
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Figure 7-18: False positives with various speeds and densities 
Whitewashing Detection in 
. 
%IAi\'ETs: A Reactive Approach 
m ý° 
Density vs Speed (Conn = 25, Pause = 10, Pkt Rate = 2pps) 
100 
90 F 
80 F 
-ý 
70 +--- -ý +--ý 
60 
50 
ý 
ý 
40 h 
30 F 
20 h 
_a 
20 Nodes WIDs TP 10 
L40 IJ 
Nodes WIDs TP 11 
0 
60 Nodes WIDs TP 
2468 10 12 14 16 
Max Speed (m/s) 
Figure 7-19: True positives with various speeds and densities 
136 
Low transmission rates produce false positives, especially when the speed is high, as shown 
by Figure 7-20. It is due to the fact that a legitimate node with low transmission rate and high 
speed can penetrate into the white zone of the receiver node. The receiver node will 
acknowledge its first appearance in the white zone and hence the legitimate node is detected 
as a whitewasher node. True positives are still about 90%, as shown in I igure 7-2 1, licrice 
transmission rates do not have a big impact on true positives. 
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7.7 Summary 
In order to safeguard the network against whitewashing and Sybil attacks, a second line-of- 
defence is very important, even if a first line-of-defence already exists. In this chapter, we 
presented our detection mechanism for these attackers in mobile environments. We 
demonstrated through various experiments that a detection threshold exists for the distinction 
of legitimate new nodes and new malicious identities. We confirmed this distinction rationale 
through simulations as well as through the use of a real-world testbed of Sun Spot sensors. 
We also showed the various factors affecting detection, such as network connections, packet 
transmission rate, node density and node speed. The simulation results show that our scheme 
works better even in mobile environments and can detect whitewashers and Sybil attackers 
with a high degree of accuracy. 
Chapter 8 Conclusions and Future 
Work 
This thesis has presented security flaws in cooperation enforcement schemes, specifically 
reputation-based schemes. These issues are direct interactions and identity-based attacks. A 
number of novel countermeasures have been proposed in order to deter and detect these 
attacks. In this chapter, we provide summary and our research contributions of this thesis; we 
will also discuss the issues that need to be worked on in the future research work. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 8.1 and 8.2 presents the overall thesis summary 
and the research contributions respectively. In Section 8.3 and 8.4, we outline the comparison 
with existing schemes and future work respectively. The chapter is concluded in Section 8.5. 
8.1 Thesis Summary 
Mobile ad hoc networks are constructed with the help of a large number of wireless nodes, 
such as laptops, tablets, PDAs and sensors, usually having limited transmission, battery and 
computation powers. The key advantage of these networks is their capability to work without 
relying on any centralized architecture or control. Each node provides packet forwarding 
services to other nodes in the network, since there are no dedicated routers present in the 
network for packet forwarding. However, due to a variety of reasons nodes may not always 
return such altruistic behaviour. One reason for this might be that nodes do not belong to a 
single authority. This is quite a common scenario within civilian applications. Nodes have 
different interests and objectives and they are therefore sharing their resources for the sake of 
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global connectivity. Another reason might be that nodes belong to a single authority such as 
the military and have common goals; however they nonetheless operate in a physically 
insecure environment, where they are vulnerable to being captured or compromised. In any 
case, nodes show reluctance to spend their precious resources on forwarding other nodes' 
packets and therefore they may exhibit selfish behaviour. This selfishness can ultimately lead 
to network partitioning and performance degradation. Reputation-based schemes have been 
proposed to counteract selfish nodes in mobile ad hoc networks. 
The main purpose of reputation-based schemes is to discourage selfish nodes by isolating 
them from the network once they have been detected. In other words, these schemes ensure 
that selfish nodes bear the consequences of their bad actions. However, selfish nodes can 
compromise this policy of the reputation-based systems by applying certain techniques. For 
example, they can still gain benefit from the network after being detected through direct 
interactions by exploiting mobility. Nodes can change identities to escape the consequences 
and whitewash their bad histories. They can also create and control more than one identity on 
a single physical device in order to self-promote themselves by publishing bogus positive 
recommendations. Malicious nodes can also use these Sybil attacks to defame good nodes. 
In order to help secure reputation-based schemes and deal with the above mentioned issues, 
we have proposed solutions in order to counteract them in this thesis. As shown in Figure 8-1, 
we have proposed a layered defence in order to tackle whitewashers and Sybil attackers. 
Since a single layer or defence is usually easy for attackers to compromise, a double defence 
based on deterrence and detection would make the system more robust and efficient against 
the attacks. In the figure below, the detection mechanism detects whitewashers' and Sybil 
attackers' new identities and pass them on to the reputation-based system. The reputation- 
based system then isolates those identities from the network (as we discussed in Section 7.5). 
The direct interactions are used by the selfish nodes to gain benefit after being detected by the 
reputation-based system or without paying the fee in the fee-based scheme. We have 
proposed a scheme in order to thwart those attackers using a contribution to consumption 
ratio (C2CR) that works along with the fee-based mechanism. 
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Figure 8-1: Layered Security for Reputation-based System 
A chapter wise summary of the thesis is given below. 
Chapter 1 outlined the potential issue of selfishness in MANETs and the schemes proposed in 
the literature, such as reputation and trust based schemes, to counteract it. We highlighted 
issues in the reputation-based schemes, such as direct interactions, whitewashing and Sybil 
attacks. Finally, we outlined research aims and novel contributions of the thesis. 
Chapter 2 presented a background and preliminary information about general network 
security and discussion about why the traditional network security techniques are not suitable 
for MANETs. In addition to packet relay problem or selfishness, we discussed routing modes 
of operation, the DSR protocol and the threats posed against the ad hoc routing protocols. 
Finally, we discussed the widely used network simulators for MANETs and discussed the 
reasons and requirements based on which we chose NS-2. 
Chapter 3 presented a survey of cooperation enforcement schemes, such as reputation, trust 
and credit based schemes. We discussed the suitability of reputation-based schemes for 
MANETs. Finally, the limitations of these schemes in general were presented and the 
countermeasures proposed in the literature for the whitewashing and Sybil attacks were also 
surveyed. 
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In Chapter 4, we presented our proposed reputation-based scheme and discussed each of its 
components, i. e. the monitor, the reputation system and the path manager. The main purpose 
of this scheme was to use this for our layered security architecture presented in Chapter 6 and 
7. We evaluated the scheme in order to confirm its working and validity which was shown 
through the simulation results. 
Chapter 5 highlighted the problem of direct interactions from two different facets. They 
might be a selfish node's strategy to increase its benefits after the detection or they might be 
produced by inappropriate simulation parameters. In the former case, they are a threat to the 
security of reputation system and in the latter case they cause misjudgements and confusion 
in the results during the evaluation. We proposed methods to mitigate their affects for both of 
the above cases. We adopted a widely used reputation-based scheme as a case study for our 
simulation based evaluation. 
Chapter 6 presented the first part of our proposed layered security architecture, i. e. pro-active 
deterrence. In this chapter we demonstrated where and why in the reputation range a 
whitewasher can obtain the benefits. We then proposed a novel non-monetary fee per identity 
based scheme in order to discourage these attackers by reducing their benefits. We evaluated 
and compared our scheme with a widely used reputation-based scheme. The simulation 
results have shown that our scheme works well in reducing the evil nodes' throughputs and 
utility in the network. 
Chapter 7 outlined the second part of our proposed layered security architecture, i. e. the 
detection. We proposed our scheme that used received signal strength to detect the new 
identities of whitewashers or Sybil attackers. Through extensive simulations and real-world 
measurements using sensors testbed, we have shown that our proposed solution improves the 
overall system performance thereby detecting such malicious nodes with good accuracy even 
in the presence of mobility. 
8.2 Research Contributions 
In this section we present the research contributions of this thesis. The first one is related to 
the direct interactions which we covered in Chapter 5. While the last two is related to 
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identity-based attacks, i. e. whitewashing and Sybil attacks which we covered in Chapter 6 
and 7. 
" We have proposed methods to cope with direct interactions in the network, whether 
they are natural or deliberate. We have established that commonly used simulation 
parameters produce a considerable amount of direct interaction as a by-product, which 
could affect the interpretation and evaluation of any results obtained. We 
demonstrated through simulations that this confusion can be mitigated by categorizing 
the network throughput and utility. We also proposed proactive measures for use in 
simulations to help reduces direct interactions. In case a selfish node decides to 
capitalise on direct interactions as part of a strategy, this can be tackled by promoting 
fairness in the network by employing service consumption to contribution ratio in the 
network. 
" In order to tackle Sybil attacks and whitewashing, we proposed a layered security 
approach in which the attackers are thwarted in layers or line-of-defences, i. e. 
proactive measures (before the attack occurs) are used as first line-of-defence and 
reactive measures (after the attack occurs) are employed as a second line-of-defence. 
The former deters the attackers and the latter detects the attackers. As a proactive 
measure, we deter and discourage these attacks by proposing a non-monetary fee (in 
the form of node cooperation) incorporating a reputation-based scheme that acts as a 
first line-of-defence. This type of fee enforcement has several advantages. Unlike 
other fee-based approaches that have been previously proposed in the literature, our 
proposed fee structure is easily manageable in a MANET environment. It does not 
need any tamper-proof hardware and uses packet forwarding as a fee payment; hence 
no extra hardware needs to be incorporated into the system. We have shown through 
simulations and mathematical formulations that the scheme discourages these 
attackers by reducing their benefits and makes identity creation costly for these 
attackers. 
" We proposed a scheme that detects the new identities of whitewasher or Sybil 
attackers on the MAC layer using the 802.11 protocol without the use of any extra 
overhead or extra hardware. This scheme acts as a second line-of-defence of our 
layered approach. After setting up the threshold, the scheme distinguishes between 
new legitimate nodes and new identities spawned by whitewashers or Sybil attackers. 
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We have shown through extensive simulations and real-world experimentations 
(using sensors testbed) that our proposed solutions detect these attackers with good 
accuracy even in mobile environments. 
Our layered security approach use lightweight and distributed methods to deter (in the first 
place) and detect whitewashers and Sybil attackers without incurring any extra overhead or 
any hardware. As a result, these proposed methods help reducing and thwarting these 
attackers in various schemes developed for MANETs, especially reputation and trust based 
schemes. 
8.3 Comparison with Existing Schemes 
In this thesis, we have proposed novel schemes to counteract the problems of Dis, 
whitewashing and Sybil attacks. We compared our schemes with the existing benchmark 
schemes through simulation or by providing theoretical arguments. 
In Chapter 6, we have proposed a non-monetary fee based scheme in order to discourage 
whitewashers and Sybil attackers. We compared our scheme with a widely used reputation- 
based scheme, CONFIDANT [25,55], and the simulation results have shown that our scheme 
worked better than the above scheme in reducing the evil nodes' benefits, such as throughput 
and utility; while at the same time maintaining high throughput and utility for the good nodes 
as well. Our proposed scheme makes identity creation costly for these attackers and hence 
they can perform fewer whitewashes or generate fewer identities within the limits of their 
battery capacity, as compared to the above scheme. 
In Chapter 7, we proposed a scheme to detect whitewashers and Sybil attackers' new 
identities. Unlike [24,96], our scheme does not need any extra hardware, such as directional 
antennae and unlike [84,97], our scheme does not use GPS (Geographical Positioning 
System) equipment or other costly localization techniques. 
8.4 Future Work 
A number of potential areas of further research will be discussed in this section. 
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8.4.1 Securing Fee Information Dissemination 
Our work related to non-monetary fee enforcement, discussed in Chapter 6, raises a number 
of additional challenges. Nodes disseminate fee related information with their neighbours; 
however, a malicious node may generate its own fake fee information in collusion with other 
malicious nodes in the network, i. e. a malicious node can lie about another malicious node as 
being mature without paying the fee. In order to mitigate the effect of nodes' lies about fee 
payments, we propose a voting based scheme. We assume that the number of good nodes is 
greater than the malicious liar nodes in the network and only mature nodes' information will 
be considered. That is, when N neighbours of a node share fee information about it, m 
malicious nodes out of N lied about the fee, where N >2 m. Each receiving node of these fee 
based information will decide about its credibility based on voting, i. e. a greater number of 
votes implies the truthfulness of the information. However, more work needs to be done in 
order to improve the above mentioned idea and to implement and evaluate it. 
8.4.2 Whitewashing Detection in Non-homogenous Transmit Power Systems 
More experimentation needs to be conducted with our whitewashing and Sybil attack 
detection scheme, presented in Chapter 7. In future work we aim to deploy more 
sophisticated attackers who can tamper with their radio device in order to transmit on non- 
homogenous transmit powers in the network. An adaptable threshold should be devised to 
detect such types of attacker in the network. 
8.4.3 Identity Spoofing 
A particularly important issue related to identity in MANETs is the detection of spoofing 
attacks. In an identity spoofing attack, a node can adopt another node's identity for malicious 
purposes, a process that is also often referred to as masquerading. Depending upon the 
motivation of the attacker, an attacker can spoof good as well as evil nodes' identities. 
However, the basic motivation usually is to escape detection and accountability. Work 
therefore needs to be done in order to develop a distributed detection mechanism for identity 
spoof detection in MANET environments. Since there is no centralized identity management 
Conclusions and Future Work 146 
or other controlling body for the management of the network, distributed identity spoof 
detection mechanisms represent an interesting and challenging task. 
8.4.4 Tuning the Thresholds 
In order to establish accurate threshold for the proposed schemes, such as fee count in 
Chapter 6, upper bound threshold for received signal strength, etc., further analysis should be 
carried out in future. Moreover, the proposed methods are needed to be deployed on real- 
world and large-scale networks in order to establish a relationship between the thresholds in 
simulated as well as in real-world scenarios. 
8.4.5 Effect of Direct Interactions on Mobility Models 
We have only shown in this thesis the effect of direct interactions on reputation-based 
schemes using random way point mobility model. Other mobility models should also be used 
in order to check its effect. Another work related to direct interactions is the contribution and 
consumption ratio metric, that should also need to be implemented in order to confirm its 
validity. 
8.4.6 Combining Layers in a Single System 
In our future work we will combine both of the schemes, i. e. fee-based deterrence and 
received signal strength based detection of whitewashers and Sybil attackers in a single 
system, in order to demonstrate the overall benefits of our proposed work. 
8.5 Concluding Remarks 
The problem of node misbehaviour or selfishness is serious in the self-organized MANETs. 
Since, there are no dedicated routers in the network; intermediate nodes forward other nodes 
packets in order to send data to nodes that do not fall in their direct communication ranges. In 
such an environment selfish behaviour of nodes can severely degrade network performance. 
Cooperation enforcement schemes have been proposed to tackle this issue; however, they by 
themselves are not secured. In this thesis, we presented the attacks that jeopardize the security 
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of these schemes. These issues are direct interactions, whitewashing and Sybil attacks. We 
proposed methods to counteract these attacks. In addition to direct interaction, we also 
proposed a layered security architecture that tackles the whitewashing and Sybil attacks 
efficiently in a layered fashion. In the first line-of-defence, we proposed a scheme that pro- 
actively deters these attacks. While in the second line-of-defence, we proposed a method that 
efficiently detects the new identities of these attackers, when the attack is launched. The 
simulation results demonstrated that our proposed schemes worked better in discouraging and 
detecting these attackers while maintaining good network performance. 
Appendix A Implementation of the 
Attacker Nodes 
Commands 
We modify the mobility and traffic generation scripts of NS-2 (which will be shown later) in order to 
implement our attack models9. We also modify their parameter list to pass the number of the attacker 
nodes along with the identity used per attacker. The modified commands are shown below. 
For Mobility: 
. /setdest -v 
1 -n 41 -p 10.0 -M 10.0 -t 600 -x 1000 -y 1000 -w 3 -i 5> output 
Note: -w is used for the number of Whitewashers and -i is used for the number of 
identities used by a whitewasher node. 
For Traffic: 
ns modifiedcbr. tcl -type cbr -nn 42 -seed 1 -mc 20 -rate 2.0 -wn 3 -wids 5> 
output 
Note: wn is used for number of Whitewashers, wids specifies the number of IDs used 
for Whitewash. 
Source Code of TCL Script 
The TCL script is used as a front-end script for the NS-2 simulations. Its purpose is to specify the 
values the simulation scenarios, for example specifying network area, routing protocol, number of 
9 Due to the limitation of space, we do not include the source code for the reputation incorporated DSR, fee per identity and 
signal strength based detection which is presented in Chapter 4,6 and 7 respectively. 
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nodes, simulation time, etc. The following is the TCL script we used for our Chapter 6 and 7 
simulations. 
# Define options 
set val(chan) Channel/WirelessChannel 
set val(prop) Propagation/TwoRayGround 
set val(netif) Phy/WirelessPhy 
set val(mac) Mac/80211 
set val(ifq) CMUPriQueue 
set val(l1) LL 
set val(ant) Antenna/OmniAntenna 
set val(x) 1000 ;#X dimension of the topography 
set val(y) 1000 ;#Y dimension of the topography 
set val(ifqlen) 1000 ;# max packet in ifq 
set val(seed) 1.0 
set val(adhocRouting) DSR 
set val(nn) xxx ;# how many nodes are simulated 
set val(cp) "trgen l" 
set val(sc) "scen l" 
set val(stop) 600.0 ;# simulation time 
Agent/Null set sport_ 0 
Agent/Null set dport_ 0 
Agent/CBR set sport_ 0 
Agent/CBR set dport_ 0 
# unity gain, omni-directional antennas 
# set up the antennas to be centered in the node and 1.5 meters above it 
Antenna/OmniAntenna set X0 
Antenna/OmniAntenna set Y0 
Antenna/OmniAntenna set Z 1.5 
Antenna/OmniAntenna set Gt_ 1.0 
Antenna/OmniAntenna set Gr 1.0 
# the above parameters result in a nominal range of 250m 
#Phy/WirelessPhy set RXThresh_ 8.91754e-10 
#set nominal_range 250.0 
#set configured_range -1.0 
#set configured_raw_bitrate -1.0 
Mac/802_11 set basicRate 1Mb 
Mac/802 11 set dataRate 11Mb 
# Number of Whitewashers (WNODES) and Number of IDs per Whitewasher (WIDS) 
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set WIDS 5 
set WNODES 3 
# Main Program 
Initialize Global Variables 
# create simulator instance 
set ns [new Simulator] 
# setup topography object 
set topo [new Topography] 
# create trace object for ns and nam 
set tracefd [open wtr_l. tr w] 
set namtrace [open wtr l. nam w] 
$ns trace-all $tracefd 
$ns namtrace-all-wireless $namtrace $val(x) $val(y) 
$ns use-newtrace 
# define topology 
$topo load_flatgrid $val(x) $val(y) 
# Create God 
set god_ [create-god $val(nn)] 
# define how node should be created 
#global node setting 
$ns_ node-config -adhocRouting $val(adhocRouting) \ 
-llType $val(11) \ 
-macType $val(mac) \ 
-ifqType $val(ifq) \ 
-ifqLen $val(ifqlen) \ 
-antType $val(ant) \ 
-propType $val(prop) \ 
-phyType $val(netif) \ 
-channelType $val(chan) \ 
-topoInstance $topo \ 
-agentTrace ON \ 
-routerTrace OFF \ 
-macTrace OFF \ 
-movementTrace OFF \ 
-energyModel EnergyModel \ 
-initialEnergy 100 \ 
-rxPower 0.3 \ 
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-txPower 0.4 
# Create the specified number of nodes [$val(nn)] and "attach" them 
# to the channel. 
for {set i 0} {$i < $val(nn) } {incr i} { 
set node ($i) [$ns node] 
$node_($i) random-motion 0 ;# disable random motion 
} 
# Define node movement model 
puts "Loading connection pattern... " 
source $val(cp) 
# Define traffic model 
puts "Loading scenario file... " 
source $val(sc) 
# Whitewashing nodes: IDs on off mechanisms. 
for {set i 0} {$i < [expr { ($WNODES * $WIDS) }] }{ incr i $WIDS }{ 
for {set j 1} {$j < $WIDS} {incr j} { 
# puts "\$ns at 1.00000 \"\$node ([expr {\$i + \$j}]) off\"" $ns_ at 1.00000 "$node_([expr {$i + $j}]) off" 
} 
} 
set z1 
for {set k 0} {$k < $WIDS} { incr k}{ 
for {set i 0} {$i < [expr { ($WNODES * $WIDS) }] }{ incr i $WIDS }{ 
for {set j 0} {$j < $WIDS} {incr j} { 
if {$j == $z && $k < $WIDS} { 
#puts "\$ns_ at [expr {(\$z * 100) + 0.500}] \"\$node ([expr {\$i + \$j }]) onV"' _ 
$ns_ at [expr {($z * 100) + 0.500}] "$node ([expr {$i + $j}]) on" }- 
if {$j =_ [expr { $z -1 }] && $k < [expr { $WIDS -1 }] }{ 
off\"it 
fFputs °\, ins_ at {expr ((\$z * 100) )j \"\$node_((expr {\$i + \$j}]) 
$ns_ at [expr {(\$z * 100) }] "$node_([expr {$i + $j}]) off" 
} 
} 
} 
incr z 
# Define node initial position in nam 
for {set i 01 {$i < $val(nn)} {incr i} { 
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# 20 defines the node size in nam, must adjust it according to your scenario 
# The function must be called after mobility model is defined 
} 
$ns initial_node_pos $node_($i) 40 
# Tell nodes when the simulation ends 
for {set i 0} {$i < $val(nn) } {incr i} { 
$ns at $val(stop). 0 "$node ($i) reset"; 
} 
$ns at $val(stop). 0002 "puts \"NS EXITING... \" ; $ns halt" 
puts $tracefd "M 0.0 nn $val(nn) x $val(x) y $val(y) rp $val(adhocRouting)" 
puts $tracefd "M 0.0 sc $val(sc) cp $val(cp) seed $val(seed)" 
puts $tracefd "M 0.0 prop $val(prop) ant $val(ant)" 
puts "Starting Simulation... " 
$ns run 
Source Code of Mobility Script 
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The purpose of the mobility script is to generate random mobility patterns for the nodes taking part in 
the simulation. This is file is used then within the TCL script. We modified this script (shown below) 
to implement our attack model of whitewashing and Sybil attacks. 
/* 
(1) Input parameters 
<Original version> 
=> -M maximum speed (minimum speed is zero as a default) 
=> -p pause time (constant) 
=> -n number of nodes 
=> -x x dimension of space 
=> -y y dimension of space 
<Modified version> 
=> -s speed type (uniform, normal) 
=> -m minimum speed >0 
=> -M maximum speed 
=> -P pause type (constant, uniform) 
=> -p pause time (a median if uniform is chosen) 
=> -n number of nodes 
_> -x x dimension of space 
=> -y y dimension of space 
(2) In case of modified version, the steady-state speed distribution is applied 
to the first trip to eliminate any speed decay. If pause is not zero, the first 
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trip could be either a move or a pause depending on the probabilty that the first 
trip is a pause. After the first trip regardless of whether it is 
a move or a pause, all subsequent speeds are determined from the given speed 
distribution (e. g., uniform or normal). 
(3) Refer to and use scenario-generating scripts (make-scen. csh for original 
version, make-scen-steadystate. csh for modified version). 
*1 
extern "C" { 
#include <assert. h> 
#include <fcntl. h> 
#include <math. h> 
#include <stdio. h> 
#include <stdlib. h> 
#include <string. h> 
#include <sys/time. h> 
#include <sys/types. h> 
#include <sys/uio. h> 
#include <unistd. h> 
#if ! defined(sun) 
#include <err. h> 
#endif 
}; 
#include ".. /.. /.. /tools/rng. h" 
#include "setdest. h" 
#include <iostream> 
// #define DEBUG 
#define SANITY CHECKS 
//#define SHOW SYMMETRIC PAIRS 
#define GOD FORMAT 
#define GODFORMAT2 
#define NODE FORMAT 
#define NODE FORMAT2 
#define NODE FORMAT3 
#define 
#ifndef min 
#define 
#define 
#endif 
#define 
#ifndef PI 
#define 
#endif 
"$ns_ at %. 12f \"$god set-dist %d %d %d\"\n" 
"$god_ set-dist %d %d $d\n" 
"$ns at %. 12f \"$node($d) setdest %. 12f %. 12f 4,. 12f\"\n" 
"$node ($d) setdest %. 12f %. 12f %. 12f\n" 
"$node (%d) set %c %. 12f\n" 
RTG_INFINITY Ox00ffffff 
min (x, y) ((x) < (y) ? (x) : (y) ) 
max(x, y) ((x) > (y) ? (x) : (y) ) 
ROUND ERROR le-9 
PI 
//#define WIDS 5 
static int count = 0; 
3.1415926 
//ýýý+****ý Sohail 
Function Prototypes 
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void usage(char**); 
void init(void); 
double uniform(void); 
Global Variables 
---------- 
const double RANGE = 250.0; // transmitter range in meters 
double 
double 
double 
double 
double 
double 
double 
double 
double 
double 
double 
double 
double 
double 
uint32_t 
uint32_t 
uint32_t 
uint32_t 
uint32_t 
uint32_t 
u int32 t 
TIME = 0.0; my clock; 
MAXTIME = 0.0; duration of simulation 
MAXX = 0.0; width of space 
MAXY = 0.0; height of space 
PAUSE = 0.0; pause time 
MAXSPEED = 0.0; max speed 
MINSPEED = 0.0; min speed 
SS_AVGSPEED = 0.0; // steady-state avg speed 
KAPPA = 0.0; 
MEAN = 0.0; 
SIGMA = 0.0; 
EXP1V = 0.0; 
EXPR = 0.0; 
PDFMAX = 0.0; 
SPEEDTYPE = 1; 
PAUSETYPE = 1; 
VERSION = 1; 
NODES = 0; 
RouteChangeCount = 0; 
LinkChangeCount = 0; 
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normalizing constant 
mean for normal speed 
std for normal speed 
// expactation of 1/V 
expectation of travel distance R 
// max of pdf for rejection technique 
speed type (default = uniform) 
pause type (default = constant) 
setdest version (default = original by CMU) 
// number of nodes 
DestUnreachableCount = 0; 
//************** Sohail ************ 
int wids = 0; Number of Identities per Whitewasher node 
int fw = 0; ID of first Whitewasher, in our case it will always be 0 int wnodes = 0; // Number of Whitewasher nodes 
Node *NodeList = 0; 
uint32_t *D1 = 0; 
u int32 t *D2 = 0; 
Random Number Generation 
_ _= === == === ===== ==== == = == == == === == ==== === = == ====s====s===a* 
#define M 2147483647L 
#define INVERSE_M ((double)4.656612875e-10) 
char random state[321; 
RNG *rng; 
double 
uniform() 
count++; 
return rng->uniform_double() 
/ 
1 
Appendix A Implementation of the Attacker Nodes 
Misc Functions... 
/* compute the expectation of travel distance E[R] in a rectangle */ 
void 
compute_EXP_R() 
{ 
#define csc(x) (1.0/sin(x)) csc function 
#define sec(x) (1.0/cos(x)) sec function 
#define sin2(x) (sin(x)*sin(x)) sin^2 
#define sin3(x) (sin2(x)*sin(x)) sin^3 
#define cos2(x) (cos(x)*cos(x)) // cos^2 
#define cos3(x) (cos2(x)*cos(x)) // cos^3 
double x= MAXX, y= MAXY; // max x and max y 
double x2 = x*x, x3 = x*x*x; x^2 and x^3 
double y2 = y*y, y3 = y*y*y; // y^2 and y^3 
y2; 
double terml 
double term2 
double term3 
double term5 
double term6 
double term? 
double term4 = (terml + term2) * x2 / 12.0 /y+ term3; 
* x3 / 
x2; 
} 
sin(atan2(y, x)) / 2.0 / cos2(atan2(y, x)); 
0.5 * log( sec(atan2(y, x)) + y/x ); 
-1.0 * x3 / y2 / 60.0 / cos3(atan2(y, x)) + 1.0/60.0 
-1.0 * cos(atan2(y, x)) / 2.0 / sin2(atan2(y, x)); 
0.5 * log( csc(atan2(y, x)) - x/y ); 
-1.0 * y3 / x2 / 60.0 / sin3(atan2(y, x)) + 1.0/60.0 
double term8 = -1.0 * (term5 + term6) * y2 / 12.0 /x+ term7; 
EXP_R = (4 * (term4 + term8)); // E[R] 
void 
usage(char **argv) 
{ 
* y3 / 
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fprintf(stderr, "\nusage: \n"); 
fprintf(stderr, 
"\n<original 1999 CMU version (version 1)>\n %s\t-v <1> -n <nodes> -p 
<pause time> -M <max speed>\n", argv[0]); 
fprintf(stderr, "\t\t-t <simulation time> -x <max X> -y Max Y> -w <wnodes> - 
i <wids>\n"); 
fprintf(stderr, "\nOR\n<modified 2003 U. Michigan version (version 2)>\n *s\t- 
v <2> -n <nodes> -s <speed type> -m <min speed> -M <max speed>\n", argv[01); 
fprintf(stderr, "\t\t-t <simulation time> -P <pause type> -p <pause time> -x 
<max X> -y <max Y>\n"); 
fprintf(stderr, "\t\t(Refer to the script files make-scen. csh and make-scen- 
steadystate. csh for detail. ) \n\n"); 
} 
Void init() 
{ 
/* 
* Allocate memory for globals 
*1 
NodeList = new Node[NODES]; 
if(NodeList == 0) { 
perror("new"); 
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} 
exit (1); 
D1 = new u_int32_t[NODES * NODES]; 
if (D1 == 0) { 
perror("new"); 
exit(1); 
} 
memset(D1, '\xff', sizeof(u int32 t) * NODES * NODES); 
D2 = new u_int32_t[NODES * NODES]; 
if (D2 == 0) 
perror("new"); 
exit(1); 
} 
memset(D2, '\xff', sizeof(u int32 t) * NODES * NODES); 
} 
extern "C" char *optarg; 
int 
main(int argc, char **argv) 
{ 
char ch; 
while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "v: n: s: m: M: t: P: p: x: y: w: i: o: ")) != EOF) { 
switch (ch) { 
case 'v': 
VERSION = atoi(optarg); 
break; 
case 'n': 
NODES = atoi(optarg); 
break; 
case 's': 
SPEEDTYPE = atoi(optarg); 
break; 
case 'm': 
MINSPEED = atof(optarg); 
break; 
case 'M': 
MAXSPEED = atof(optarg); 
break; 
case 't': 
MAXTIME = atof(optarg); 
break; 
case 'P': 
PAUSETYPE = atoi(optarg); 
break; 
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case 'p': 
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} 
PAUSE = atof(optarg); 
break; 
case 'x': 
MAXX = atof(optarg); 
break; 
case 'y': 
MAXY = atof(optarg); 
break; 
case 
I wl: 
wnodes = atof(optarg); 
break; 
case 'i': 
wids = atof(optarg); 
break; 
default: 
usage(argv); 
exit(l); 
} 
if(MAXX == 0.0 II MAXY == 0.0 II NODES == 0 II MAXTIME == 0.0) { 
usage(argv); 
exit (1 ); 
} 
157 
/* specify the version */ 
if (VERSION !=1 && VERSION != 2) 
printf("Please specify the setdest version you want to use. For original 
1999 CMU version use 1; For modified 2003 U. Michigan version use 2\n"); 
exit (1); 
} 
if (VERSION == 2 && MINSPEED <= 0) { 
usage(argv); 
exit (1); 
} else if (VERSION == 1 && MINSPEED > 0) { 
usage(argv); 
exit(l); 
} 
// The more portable solution for random number generation 
rng = new RNG; 
rng->set seed(RNG:: HEURISTIC SEED SOURCE); 
/********************************************************************* 
Steady-state avg speed and distribution depending on the initial distributions 
given. 
/* original setdest 
if (VERSION == 1) ( 
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fprintf(stdout, "#\n# nodes: %d, pause: %. 2f, max speed: %. 2f, max x: 
%. 2f, max y: %. 2f, wnodes: %d, wids: %d \n#\n", NODES, PAUSE, MAXSPEED, MAXX, 
MARY, wnodes, wids); 
} 
/* modified version */ 
else if (VERSION == 2) { 
/* compute the expectation of travel distance in a rectangle */ 
compute_EXP_R(); 
E[1/V] 
/* uniform speed from min to max 
if (SPEEDTYPE == 1) 1 
EXP 1V= log(MAXSPEED/MINSPEED) / (MAXSPEED - MINSPEED); // 
SS_AVGSPEED = EXP_R / (EXP 1 V*EXP R+ PAUSE); 
steady-state average speed 
PDFMAX = 1/MINSPEED*EXP R/ (EXP 1 V*EXP R+ PAUSE) / (MAXSPEED- 
MINSPEED); // max of pdf for rejection technique 
} 
bin 
/* normal speed clipped from min to max 
else if (SPEEDTYPE == 2) { 
int bin no = 10000; 
// the number of bins for summation 
double delta = (MAXSPEED - MINSPEED)/bin no; // width of each 
int i; 
double acc_k, acc_e, square, temp-v; 
MEAN = (MAXSPEED + MINSPEED)/2.0; means for normal dist. 
SIGMA = (MAXSPEED - MINSPEED)/4.0; std for normal dist. 
/* computing a normalizing constant KAPPA, E[1/V], and pdf max 
*1 
KAPPA = 0.0; 
EXP_1_V = 0.0; 
PDFMAX = 0.0; 
/* numerical integrals */ 
for (i=O; i<bin_no; ++i) { 
temp_v = MINSPEED + i*delta; ith v from min speed 
square = (temp_v - MEAN)*(temp_v - MEAN)/SIGMA/SIGMA; 
acc_k = 1.0/sgrt(2.0*PI*SIGMA*SIGMA)*exp(-0.5*square); 
KAPPA += (acc_k*delta); // summing up the area of 
rectangle 
0.5*square); 
pdf 
acc_e = 1.0/temp_v/sgrt(2.0*PI*SIGMA*SIGMA)*exp(- 
EXP_1_V += (acc_e*delta); //summing up for denominator of 
/* find a max of pdf */ 
if (PDFMAX < acc e) PDFMAX = acc_e; 
} 
EXP_1_V /= KAPPA; normalizing 
SS_AVGSPEED = EXP_R / (EXP_1_V*EXP R+ PAUSE); 
// steady-state average speed 
PDFMAX = EXP_R*PDFMAX/KAPPA / (EXP 1 V*EXP R+ PAUSE); 
// max of pdf for rejection technique 
} 
/* other types of speed for future use 
Appendix A Implementation of the Attacker Nodes 159 
else 
fprintf(stdout, "#\n# nodes: %d, speed type: %d, min speed: ß. 2f, max 
speed: %. 2f\n# avg speed: %. 2f, pause type: %d, pause: %. 2f, max x: %. 2f, max y: 
%. 2f\n#\n", 
NODES , SPEEDTYPE, MINSPEED, MAXSPEED, SS_AVGSPEED, PAUSETYPE, 
PAUSE, MAXX, MAXY); 
} 
finit(); 
//++*++++++++*++++++++++ Sohail (start) ++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
o) 
} 
i=i+ wids; 
u int32 t i; 
for(i = 0; i< NODES; i++) { 
if ( NodeList[i]. node_type == NONE) 
NodeList[i]. PrintPosition(i); 
if ( NodeList[i]. node_type == PARENT){ 
for (int j=0; j< NodeList[i]. noch; j++)( 
NodeList[i]. PrintPosition(i+j); 
} 
? 
//i =i+ NodeList[i]. noch; 
if ( NodeList[i]. node_type == CHILD) 
//return; 
} 
{} 
//********************** Sohail (End) ***********+************ 
while(TIME <= MAXTIME) { 
double nexttime = 0.0; 
u int32 t i; 
for(i = 0; i< NODES; i++) { 
} 
NodeList[iJ. Update(); 
for(i = 0; i< NODES; i++) 
Node *n = &NodeList[i]; 
for( int i= fw; i< (wnodes * wids); ){ 
NodeList(i]. Setnoch( PARENT, Wids, i ); 
//Node type = PARENT, No. of IDS per Whitewasher, ID of First Whitewasher (_ 
if (n->time transition > 0.0) { 
if(nexttime == 0.0) 
nexttime = n->time transition; 
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} 
else 
nexttime = min(nexttime, n->time transition); 
if(n->time arrival > 0.0) { 
if(nexttime == 0.0) 
nexttime = n->time arrival; 
} 
} 
else 
nexttime = min(nexttime, n->time arrival); 
assert(nexttime > TIME + ROUND_ERROR); 
TIME = nexttime; 
} 
//show counters(); 
int of; 
if ((of = open(". rand_state", O_WRONLY I O_TRUNC IO CREAT, 0777)) < 0) { 
fprintf(stderr, "open rand state\n"); 
exit(-1); 
} 
for (unsigned int i=0; i< sizeof (random state); i++) 
random_state[i) = Oxff & (int) (uniform() * 256); 
if (write(of, random state, sizeof(randomstate)) < 0) { 
fprintf(stderr, "writing rand state\n"); 
exit(-l); 
) 
close(of); 
} 
Node Class Functions 
u_int32_t Node:: Nodelndex = 0; 
Node:: Node() 
t 
//u int32 t i; 
index = Nodelndex++; 
//if(index == 0) 
return; 
route changes = 0; 
link_changes = 0; 
// **** **+* *************+ Sohai1 **+*********ý ****+ 
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node_type = NONE; 
//children = false; 
//child = NULL; 
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/*********************************************************************** 
Determine if the first trip is a pause or a move with the steady-state pdf 
/* original version 
if (VERSION == 1) { 
time arrival = TIME + PAUSE; 
} 
/* the first trip is a pause 
if (prob_pause > uniform()) { 
/* constant pause */ 
if (PAUSETYPE == 1) { 
time_arrival = TIME + PAUSE; // constant pause 
) 
/* uniform pause 
else if (PAUSETYPE 2) { 
time_arrival = TIME + 2*PAUSE*uniform(); // uniform pause 
// constant pause 
/* modified version */ 
else if (VERSION == 2) { 
/* probability that the first trip would be a pause 
double prob pause = PAUSE / (EXP 1 V*EXP R+ PAUSE); 
[0,2*PAUSE] 
} 
first trip = 0; // indicating the first trip is a pause 
} 
} 
/* the first trip is a move based on the steady-state pdf 
else { 
time arrival = TIME; 
first-trip = 1; // indicating the first trip is a move 
} 
time_update = TIME; 
time transition = 0.0; 
position. X = position. Y = position. Z = 0.0; 
destination. X = destination. Y = destination. Z = 0.0; 
direction. X = direction. Y = direction. Z = 0.0; 
speed = 0.0; 
RandomPosition(; 
//fprintf(stdout, NODE 
_FORMAT3, 
index, 'X', position. X); 
//fprintf(stdout, NODE_FORMAT3, index, 'Y', position. Y); 
//fprintf(stdout, NODE_FORMAT3, index, 'Z', position. Z); 
} 
//***************** Sohail ****+***+******* 
void 
Node:: Setnoch(NODE_T nodetype, int nofch, int cur 
{ 
NodeList[cur]. node_type = nodetype; 
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NodeList[cur]. noch = nofch; 
for(int i= cur+1; i <= (cur + noch)-1; i++ 
NodeList[i]. node type = CHILD; 
} 
void 
Node:: PrintPosition(u_int32_t nod) 
{ 
fprintf(stdout, NODEFORMAT3, nod, 'X', position. X); 
fprintf(stdout, NODEFORMAT3, nod, 'Y', position. Y); 
fprintf(stdout, NODE_FORMAT3, nod, 'Z', position. Z); 
} 
void 
Node:: RandomPosition() 
{ 
position. X = uniform() * MAXX; 
position. Y = uniform() * MAXY; 
position. Z = 0.0; 
} 
void 
Node:: RandomDestination() 
{ 
destination. X = uniform() * MAXX; 
destination. Y = uniform() * MARY; 
destination. Z = 0.0; 
assert(destination != position); 
} 
* Speeds are chosen based on the given type and distribution 
void 
Node:: RandomSpeed() 
( 
/* original version 
if (VERSION == 1) 
speed = uniform() * MAXSPEED; 
assert(speed !=0.0); 
} 
/* modified version */ 
else if (VERSION == 2) { 
/* uniform speed */ 
if (SPEEDTYPE == 1) { 
/* using steady-state distribution for the first trip 
if (first_trip == 1) { 
/* pick a speed by rejection technique */ 
double temp_v, temp fv; 
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PAUSE) / 
temp_v = uniform() * (MAXSPEED - MINSPEED) + MINSPEED; 
tempfv = uniform() * PDFMAX; 
} while (temp fv > 1/temp_v*EXP_R / (EXP 1 V*EXP R+ 
(MAXSPEED-MINSPEED)); 
speed = temp_v; 
first_trip = 0; // reset first_trip flag 
} 
/* using the original distribution from the second trip on 
else { 
speed = uniform() * (MAXSPEED - MINSPEED) + MINSPEED; 
assert(speed !=0.0); 
} 
} 
/* normal speed */ 
else if (SPEEDTYPE == 2) { 
/* using steady-state distribution for the first trip 
if (first_trip == 1) { 
double temp-v, temp_fv, square, fv; 
f1 
/* rejection technique */ 
do { 
temp_v = uniform() * (MAXSPEED - MINSPEED) + MINSPEED; 
temp_fv = uniform() * PDFMAX; 
square = (temp_v - MEAN)*(temp_v - 
MEAN)/SIGMA/SIGMA; 
0.5*square); 
PAUSE)); 
fv = 1/KAPPA/sgrt(2.0*PI*SIGMA*SIGMA) * exp(- 
} while (temp_fv > 1.0/temp v*fv*EXP R/ (EXP 1 V*EXP R 
speed = temp_v; 
first_trip = 0; 
MEAN)/SIGMA/SIGMA; 
/* rejection technique */ 
do ( 
temp_v = uniform() * (MAXSPEED - MINSPEED) + MINSPEED; 
temp_fv = uniform() * max 
- 
normal; 
square = (temp_v - MEAN)*(temp_v - 
) while (temp_fv > max_normal * exp(-0.5*square)); 
speed = temp_v; 
assert(speed !=0.0); 
} 
} 
/* using the original distribution from the second trip on 
else { 
double temp_v, temp_fv, square; 
double max_normal = 1.0/KAPPA/sgrt(2.0*PI*SIGMA*SIGMA); 
// max of normal distribution 
} 
} 
/* other types of speed for future use 
else 
} 
+ 
void 
Node:: Update() 
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{ 
position += (speed * (TIME - time_update)) * direction; 
if(TIME == time arrival) 
vector v; 
if(speed == 0.0 11 PAUSE == 0.0) { 
RandomDestination(; 
RandomSpeed(; 
v= destination - position; 
direction =v/v. length(; 
time_arrival = TIME + v. length() / speed; 
} 
else { 
destination = position; 
speed = 0.0; 
/* original version 
if (VERSION == 1) { 
time arrival = TIME + PAUSE; 
} 
/* modified version 
else if (VERSION == 2) { 
/* constant pause 
if (PAUSETYPE == 1) { 
time arrival = TIME + PAUSE; 
) 
/* uniform pause 
else if (PAUSETYPE 2) { 
time_arrival = TIME + 2*PAUSE*uniform(); 
} 
} 
} 
//******ý********** Sohail **ýý**+*ýý*ý**** 
if ( NodeList[index]. node_type == NONE) { 
fprintf(stdout, NODE 
- 
FORMAT, 
TIME, index, destination. X, destination. Y, speed); 
} 
else 
if ( NodeList[index]. node_type == PARENT)( 
for (int i=0; i< NodeList[index]. noch; i++) 
fprintf(stdout, NODE 
- 
FORMAT, 
TIME, (index + i), destination. X, destination. Y, speed); 
} 
else 
} 
return; 
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time update = TIME; 
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time transition = 0.0; 
} 
Source Code of Traffic Generator Script 
The purpose of this script is to generate random traffic patterns (connections) for nodes in the 
simulation. We modify this script (shown below) for our attack model implementation. 
# Default Script Options 
set opt(nn) 0 ;# Number of Nodes 
set opt(seed) 0.0 
set opt(mc) 0 
set opt(pktsize) 64 
set opt(rate) 0 
set opt(interval) 0.0 ;# inverse of rate 
set opt(type) "" 
set opt(wn) 0 ;# Whitewasher nodes 3 
set opt(wids) 0 ;# Ids per w-node 5 
proc usage {} { 
global argvO 
puts "\nusage: $argvO \[-type cbrltcp\] \[-nn nodes\] \[-seed seed\] \[-mc 
connections\] \[-rate rate\] \[-wn wnodes\] \[-wids wids\]\n" 
] 
proc getopt {argc arge} { 
global opt 
lappend optlist nn seed me rate type wn wids 
for {set i 0} {$i < $argc} {incr i} { 
set arg [lindex $argv $i] 
if {[string range $arg 0 0] !_ "-"} continue 
set name [string range $arg 1 end] 
set opt($name) [lindex $argv [expr $i+l]] 
} 
} 
proc pre-print { src dst stime }{ 
global opt 
# wn is the number of Whitewashers, wids is the number of IDs used per 
Whitewasher, UP is the uper bound. 
set UP [expr {$opt(wids) * $opt(wn) - 1}] 
if {($src > $UP) && ($dst > $UP)} { 
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set stop 0 
print $src $dst $stime $stop 
} 
if {($src <= $UP) && ($dst > $UP)} { 
for {set i $src} {$i < [expr { ($src + $opt(wids)) - ($src % $opt(wids)) 
}] } {incr i} { 
set stop [expr { (($i % $opt(wids)) + 1) * 100 }} 
if {$stop > 400} { 
set stop 0 
} 
print $i $dst $stime Sstop 
set stime [expr {$stop + 1}] 
} 
} 
if {($src > $UP) && ($dst <= $UP)} 
for {set i $dst} {$i < [expr { ($dst + $opt(wids)) - ($dst % $opt(wids)) 
}] } {incr i} { 
set stop [expr { (($i % $opt(wids)) + 1) * 100 }] 
if {$stop > 400} { 
set stop 0 
} 
print $src $i $stime $stop 
set stime [expr {$stop + 1}] 
} 
} 
if {($src <= $UP) && ($dst <= $UP)} { 
for {set i $dst} {$i < [expr { ($dst + $opt(wids)) - ($dst % $opt(wids)) }] } {incr i} { 
set stop [expr { (($i % $opt(wids)) + 1) * 100 }] 
if {$stop > 400} { 
set stop 0 
} 
print $src $i $stime $stop 
incr src 
set stime [expr {$stop + 1}] 
} 
} 
} 
proc adjust_id { stime wid }{ 
global opt 
if { $stime <= 100 }{ 
set ID (expr {$wid * $opt(wids)}] 
} elseif { [expr {($stime > 100) && ($stime <= 400)}] }{ 
set temp [expr { ($stime - ($stime % 100)) / 100 }] 
set ID [expr {($wid * $opt(wids)) + $temp}) 
} elseif { [expr {($stime > 400)}] }{ 
} 
set ID [expr (($wid * $opt(wids)) + ($Opt(wids) - 1)}] 
return $ID 
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} 
proc create-cbr-connection { src dst stime }{ 
global opt 
set UP [expr {($opt(wids) * $opt(wn)) - 1}] 
if {($src >= $opt(wn)) && ($dst >= $opt(wn))} { 
set src [expr {$src + $UP}] 
set dst [expr {$dst + $UP}] 
pre-print $src $dst $stime 
} 
if {($src < $opt(wn)) && ($dst >= $opt(wn))} { 
set src [adjust id $stime $src] 
set dst [expr {$dst + $UP}] 
pre-print $src $dst $stime 
} 
if {($src >= $opt(wn)) && ($dst < $opt(wn))} { 
set src [expr {$src + $UP}] 
set dst [adjust id $stime $dst] 
pre-print $src $dst $stime 
} 
if {($src < $opt(wn)) && ($dst < $opt(wn))} { 
set src [adjust_id $stime $src] 
set dst [adjust id $stime $dst] 
pre-print $src $dst $stime 
} 
} 
proc print { src dst stime stoptime }{ 
global rng cbr_cnt opt 
puts "#\n# $src connecting to $dst at time $stime\n#" 
##puts "set cbr_($cbr_cnt) \[\$ns create-connection \ 
##CBR \$node ($src) CBR \$node ($dst) 0\]"; 
puts "set udp_($cbr_cnt) \[new Agent/UDP\)" 
puts "\$ns_ attach-agent \$node ($src) \$udp_($cbr_cnt)" 
puts "set null 
_($cbr_cnt) 
\[new Agent/Null\]" 
puts "\$ns_ attach-agent \$node_($dst) \$null_($cbr_cnt)" 
puts "set cbr($cbr_cnt) \[new Application/Traffic/CBR\]" 
puts "\$cbr_($cbr_cnt) set packetSize $opt(pktsize)" 
puts "\$cbr_($cbr_cnt) set interval_ $opt(interval)" 
puts "\$cbr_($cbr_cnt) set random 1" 
puts "\$cbr_($cbr_cnt) set maxpkts_ 10000" 
puts "\$cbr_($cbr_cnt) attach-agent \$udp_($cbr_cnt)" 
puts "\$ns_ connect \$udp_($cbr_cnt) \$null_($cbr cnt)" 
puts "\$ns_ at $stime \"\$cbr_($cbr_cnt) start\"" 
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} 
puts "\$ns_ at [expr {$stoptime - 11 ] \"\$cbr_($cbr_cnt) stop\"" 
] 
incr cbr cnt 
proc create-tcp-connection { src dst }{ 
global rng cbr_cnt opt 
set stime [$rng uniform 0.0 180.0] 
puts "#\n# $src connecting to $dst at time $stime\n#" 
puts "set tcp_($cbr_cnt) \[\$ns create-connection \ 
TCP \$node_($src) TCPSink \$node ($dst) 0\1"; 
puts "\$tcp ($cbr cnt) set window_ 32" 
puts "\$tcp_($cbr_cnt) set packetSize_ $opt(pktsize)" 
puts "set ftp_($cbr_cnt) \[\$tcp_($cbr_cnt) attach-source FTP\]" 
puts "\$ns_ at $stime \"\$ftp_($cbr_cnt) start\"" 
incr cbr_cnt 
} 
getopt $argc $argv 
if { $opt(type) 
usage 
exit 
} elseif { $opt(type) "cbr" }{ 
{ 
if { $opt(nn) == 0 II $opt(seed) == 0.0 11 $opt(mc) == 0 II $opt(rate) == 0) 
usage 
exit 
} 
set opt(interval) [expr 1/ $opt(rate)] 
if { $opt(interval { 
puts "\ninvalid sending rate $opt(rate)\n" 
exit 
} 
} 
puts "#\n# nodes: $opt(nn), max conn: $opt(mc), send rate: $opt(interval), seed: $opt(seed)\n#" 
set rng [new RNG] 
$rng seed $opt(seed) 
set stime [$rng uniform 10.0 280.0] 
set stime [expr { int($stime) }] 
set cbrcnt 0 
set src_cnt 0 
set u2 [new RandomVariable/Uniform] 
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$u2 set min 0 
$u2 set max (expr {$opt(nn) - 14}) 
$u2 use-rng $rng 
set u3 [new RandomVariable/Uniform] 
$u3 set min 0 
$u3 set max [expr {$opt(nn) - 15}] 
$u3 use-rng $rng 
for {set i 0} {$i < [expr {$opt(mc) }} } {incr i} { 
set s [$u2 value] 
set src [expr { int($s) }] 
set d [$u3 value] 
set dst [expr { int($d) }] 
if {$dst >= $src} {set dst [expr ($dst + 1)]} 
incr src cnt 
create-cbr-connection $src $dst $stime 
} 
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puts "#\n#Total sources/connections: $src_cnt/$cbr_cnt\n#" 
Appendix B DSR Structure in NS2 
The Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) protocol is one of the main routing protocols developed 
for mobile ad hoc networks; we discussed it in Section 2.6. Since most of our work was 
related to this protocol (for example, we incorporate our reputation-based scheme into DSR), 
it is important to discuss its main structure and functions. In this Appendix, we will discuss 
with the help of flowchart diagrams the DSR structure used in the NS-2 simulator [43-44]. 
The main functions will be explained, such as how a sender, a destination and a forwarder 
can perform their routing duties, using the diagrams B. 1, B. 2 and B. 3 with the help of pseudo 
code. For clarity, each process or condition is marked with a number. The plus sign attached 
to a process indicates that this process is further extended in the next diagram. 
Sender 
When a sender node S has data to send to an unknown destination D, the following steps will 
be followed. 
" Packets sent by the application agent or MAC layer agent will be received at the 
recv() function in the DSR agent, denoted by l in Figure B. I. We will refer these 
labels as boxes or processes interchangeably followed by there numbers, for example 
box 1. 
" The packet will contain two parts: a data payload and a header (contains routing 
information). The packet header is checked to establish whether it contains a valid 
source route (SR). In the case where the packet has no established route, the decision 
path from box 2 in Figure B. 1 will be No. 
" In box 3, a check is made to establish whether it is a broadcast packet, in this case, it 
is not a broadcast packet, so the decision will be No. 
" Packet is passed to a handler function of packets having no SR, denoted by box 4 and 
which is further extended in Figure B. 2. 
" In box 5, if the packet is not destined for the node that receives it (here node S will 
check it as well because it acts like a receiver from the upper layers or from other 
functions), then go to box 6. 
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" As the packet has no SR, Swill check its route cache to find out if it has a route to the 
destination D; this is denoted by box 6. If there is no route found in the cache then go 
to box 7. 
" Process 7 will buffer the data packet and try to find a route for it. In order to find the 
route to the destination, process 7 will make a route request packet in box 7a and then 
box 7b will pass it to the process 21 which is extended in Figure B. 3. Process 21 will 
further broadcast the route request on the MAC layer following the order specified 
using processes 21-22-23-24-26. 
We will show in the next section that when S receives a route reply as a destination node the 
node will store the SR and send the buffered data packet on that SR using processes I9-25. 
Receiver 
A node acting as a destination can receive data, route requests, route replies and route error 
packets, as explained below. 
" The packet follows the path 1-2-8-9. 
" At process 9, the route request follows the path 10-11; route error follows the path 10- 
12-13; route reply follows the path 10-12-14-15; and data packets follow the path 10- 
12-14-16. At process 16, any packet destined for the receiver (i. e. D) will be given to 
the upper layers (to the application layer via a demultiplexer or demux). 
Forwarder 
Nodes forward unicast (such as data and route reply) as well as broadcast (such as route 
request) packets. 
" The unicast packets will follow the path 1-2-8-17-19-20-21-23-24-25, where process 
19 is the main function for forwarding the packets. 
" The broadcast packets will follow the path 1-2-8-17-18-21-22-23-24-26, where 
process 18 will investigate the drop reasons, for example the forwarder node drop 
the packet because the threshold for the number of re-transmissions is exceeded, etc. 
The condition for checking whether the receiver is the destination at process 22 seems 
meaningless because it has already checked for it at process 8. The reason for this is that 
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other functions also use the process 21, where it is necessary to check for the destination and 
if it turns out to be true, the packet is passed again to process 1, i. e. from process 28 to 
process 1. 
I 
Valid SR? 
BcastPkt? 
handlePktWithoutSR() 
sendoutBcastPktp 
Origin = me? 
Port demux->recv() 
Dst is me? 
handleForwarding() 
handlePadcelReceipt() 
handleRouteRequestQ 
sendoutPktWithRoutep 
Figure B. 1: Flowchart of DSR's recvO function in NS-2 
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7a 
Make Route Req. Pkt 
7b 
sendOutRtRegQ 
21 
sendOutPacketWrthRoute() 
+ 
9 
14 
handPktToDmuxQ 
173 
11 
15 
acceptRouleRepiyp 
Figure B. 2: Flowchart of DSR's handlePktWithoutSR() function in NS-2 
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19 
hand leForwardingQ 
Snoop SR? 
sendoutPktWith Route() 
Dst is me? 
Set Direction = DOWN 
Forward according to 
SR 
RReq? 
DoMAC_BCAST 
Return 
Figure B. 3: Flowchart of DSR's handleForwarding function in NS-2 
Appendix C Analysing RSS 
Fluctuation in Sun Spots 
In order to analyse the fluctuation occur in the RSS readings of Sun Spot sensors, we 
conducted an experiment in which 1000 samples of RSS were collected at three different 
positions. The sensor was placed at 1,15 and 33 feet distance from the base station. We 
found out that 33 feet (approximately equal to 10 meters) is the boundary of the radio range 
of the base station. The descriptive statistics and data distribution (using SPSS) of each 
position is given below. 
Position 1: 
Table C-1: Descriptive statistics for 1 foot distance 
Descriptive Statist) 
N Mean Std. Deviation Variance 
Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Statistic 
RSS_P_1 
Valid N listwise 
1000 
1000 
-18.9180 . 02408 . 76148 . 580 
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600 
SM-1 
400-1 
3001 
200-" 
1007 
0 
-19.00 
I 
-18.00 -17.00 -16.00 
RSS_P 1 
ý 
-15.00 -14.00 
Figure C-1: Data distribution for 1 foot distance 
Position 2: 
Table C-2: Descriptive statistics for 15 feet distance 
D 
N Mean Std. Deviation Variance 
Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Statistic 
RSS_P_2 
Valid N listwise 
1000 
1000 
-32.5970 . 02571 . 
81317 
. 661 
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-35.00 -34.00 -33.00 -32.00 -31.00 
RSSP2 
-30.00 
Figure C-2: Data distribution for 15 feet distance 
Position 3: 
-29.00 
Table C-3: Descriptive statistics for 33 feet distance 
Descriptive Statistics 
N Mean Std. Deviation Variance 
Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Statistic 
RSS_P_3 
Valid N listwise 
1000 
1000 
-44.3110 . 
03560 1.12585 1.268 
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-47.00 -41.00 -46.00 -45.00 -44.00 -43.00 
RSSP3 
-42.00 
Figure C-3: Data distribution for 33 feet distance 
Distance Produced from Fluctuations: 
The power received at any distance d is inversely proportional to the mth power of the 
distance [102], i. e. 
1 
Pd OC 
dm Eq. C-1 
Where Pd is the received power at distance d and in free space and in Line-Of-Sight (LOS) 
conditions, the path loss exponent m is 2. The received power at any distance can be 
calculated by using Eq. C-I as below. 
Pd dm 
Pdo d'n Eq. C-2 
Taking the logarithm of Eq. C-2, we can get the expression below for the received power at 
any distance d from the transmitter, i. e. Pd where d> do. 
Pd (dbm) = Pdo (dbm) - 10 loglo 
(; )m E9. C-3 
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Where do is called the reference distance, we know from our Sun Spot experiment, Section 
7.3, do is 1 foot (0.30 meter) and Pd0 is approximately -17 (dbm) from Table C-l. We will 
use Eq. C-3 in order to find out the received signal strength at the boundary, i. e. where d= 10 
meters, as shown below. 
0 llll Plo = (-17) - 
[20 log10 (1.30/J 
Plo = (-17) - [20 loglo(33.33)] 
Pio = (-17) - [20 x 1.52] 
Plo = -47.4 dbm 
In our testbed experiment, the received power for 10 meters distance is -44.3 dbm, as shown 
in Table C-3. The reason for lower received signal strength in our indoor testbed experiment 
is that in real-world scenarios, there are other factors affecting the radio propagation, such as 
obstacles, etc. Now our aim is to find out the distance d,, resulted from 2.24 dbm variation in 
the signal strength, which is a two standard deviation in received signal strength at the 
boundary, shown in Table C-3. The received signal strength, when the 2.24 dbm variation or 
2 Standard Deviation (SD) in the data exists, can be computed as 
Pd, - P10 = 2.24 dbm 
Pd = 2.24 - 47.4 
Pdti = -45.16 dbm. 
Whereas distance d can be computed using Eq. C-3 as the following. 
( 
d- 10-(Pdv-Pdo)+20loBio(do) 
j 20 
v- 
-(-45.16 -17)+2010910(0.30)\ 
20 dv -- 10(k 
d = 10(0.91) 
d=8.13m 
Appendix D Ratio of RSSIs 
The author [78] show that no sensor node can hide its location when it is monitored by four 
or more nodes as follows. 
Suppose a node to be monitored transmits at the power P,, then sensor a will receive this 
signal at power 
Pr(a) = Pr K/ daa. Eq. D-1 
Where P, (a) is the received power at the sensor node a, K is constant, da is the distance 
between sensor node a and the monitored node, and a is the distance power gradient. 
The ratio of the received signal at two different sensors, from a to b (a # b) is 
Pr(a)/Pr(b) _ (PtK/daa)/(PtK/dba) Eq. D-2 
_ (db/da)a. 
dblda 
1 
_ (Pr(a)/Pr(b) )a. Eq. D-3 
The beauty of Eq. D-3 is that it is independent of the transmit power P, Now assume that the 
location of the monitored node in two-dimensional Cartesian coordinates is (x, y), with sensor 
a, b, c, and d locations as (xa, ya), (Xb, yb), (xc, yc), and (xd, yd) respectively. The location (x, y) 
can be determined by solving the following equation. 
«x - xa) + (Y - Ya))2 
12 
(pr(a)/Pr(b»a «X - Xb) + (Y - Yb)ý 
1 
- (Pr(a)/Pr(c))a «x - xc) + (y - Yc))2 
1 
r,, 
- 
(Pr(a)/Pr(d))a ((x - Xd) + (y - Yd ))2. Eq. D-4 
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